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Abstract 
 
This historical and political economic investigation aims to illustrate the ways in which 
the Motion Picture Association of America radically revised their methods of patrolling and 
fighting film piracy from 1996-2008.  Overall, entertainment companies discovered the World 
Wide Web to be a powerful distribution outlet for cultural works, but were suspicious that the 
Internet was a Wild West frontier requiring regulation. The entertainment industry’s guiding 
belief in regulation and strong protection were prompted by convictions that once the copyright 
industries lose control, companies quickly submerge like floundering ships.  Guided by fears 
regarding film piracy, the MPAA instituted a sophisticated and seemingly impenetrable “trusted 
system” to secure its cultural products online by crafting relationships and interlinking the 
technological, legal, institutional, and rhetorical in order to carefully direct consumer activity 
according to particular agendas. The system created a scenario in which legislators and courts of 
law consented to play a supportive role with privately organized arrangements professing to 
serve the public interest, but the arrangements were not designed for those ends.  Additionally, 
as cultural products became digitized consumers experienced a paradigm shift that challenged 
the concept of property altogether. In the digital world the Internet gives a consumer access to, 
rather than ownership of, cultural products in cyberspace. The technology granting consumers, 
on impulse, access to enormous amounts of music and films has been called, among many 
things, the “celestial jukebox.”  Regardless of what the technology is called, behind the eloquent 
veneer is the case in point of a systematic corrosion of consumer rights that, in the end, results 
in an unfair exchange between the content producers and consumers. What is the relationship of 
the MPAA to current piracy practices in America? How will Hollywood’s enormous economic 
investment in content control affect future film distribution, exhibition, and consumer 
reception?  Through historical analysis regarding the MPAA’s campaign against film piracy 
along with interviews from key media industry personnel and the pirate underground, this 
contemporary illustration depicts how the MPAA secures its content for Internet distribution, 
and defines and criticizes the legal and technological controls that collide with consumer 
freedoms. 
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Content Control: The Motion Picture Association of America’s Patrolling of Internet 
Piracy in America, 1996-2008 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The number of film piracy cases grew at a breakneck pace in the early 1970s because of 
an important breakthrough permitting movies to become tangible consumer goods.   The 
appearance of the videocassette recorder (VCR) was significant to consumers in countless ways. 
While the typical video fan used the technology to collect, archive, share, and learn from an 
enormous archive of film and video, VCRs also permitted consumers to shift distribution control 
away from the transnational multimedia conglomerates.  Additional technological advances 
permitted consumers time-shifting recording and content sharing, eventually allowing the rapid 
and inexpensive reproduction of film products and thereby placing the consumer within the 
framework of production and distribution.1 Video Cassette Recorders created huge profits for the 
Hollywood major studios, although initially the studios contested the arrival of the technology in 
the courts and were slow to respond in creating an ancillary market through the sale of 
videocassettes.2 On January 17, 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the taping of a 
television program, including movies broadcast on television, was legal for home viewing, 
rejecting the assertion by the entertainment industry that viewers who recorded programs were 
stealing copyrighted product. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  
1 Shujen Wang, Framing Piracy: Globalization and Film Distribution in Greater China (Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
 
2 Kerry Segrave, Piracy in the Motion Picture Industry (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2003), 222.   
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VCRs also allowed video enthusiasts to share content and duplicate and distribute media 
on a mass scale.3  By 1985, the Film Security Office (FSO), an office established by MPAA 
president Jack Valenti to combat piracy on behalf of its member companies, Columbia, Warner 
Bros., United Artists, Paramount, Fox, Universal, Allied Artists, and Avco Embassy, estimated 
the worldwide loss of revenue to the majors due to film piracy was $1 billion.4   By 1988, the 
total number of piracy investigations equaled 10,500.  Countries with the largest number of 
 
illegal tapes included Japan, Italy, the United States, West Germany, Brazil, Taiwan, and the 
Philippines.  In the United States that same year, Valenti, FSO president Richard Bloeser, and 
MPAA North American anti-piracy director Mark Kalmonsohn discussed anti-piracy 
enforcement measures with FBI head William Sessions.  A decade later (1998), during the initial 
phases of consumer broadband penetration, public service announcements crafted by the MPAA 
appeared in 33 New York City movie houses asking the audience to collaborate and report 
offenders to the appropriate theater authorities by looking for individuals operating illegal 
camcorders that were recording films. 
 
Purpose 
 
 
This dissertation aims to illustrate the ways in which the Motion Picture Association of 
America radically revised their methods of patrolling and fighting film piracy because of the 
digitization of media, digitization that was marshaled in by two prevailing developments.  The 
invention of the digital videodisc and subsequent introduction to the consumer market created 
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Wang, Framing Piracy. 
4 Segrave, Piracy in the Motion Picture Industry. 
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marginal revenues for Hollywood; although because of its superior resolution (720 lines versus 
videotape at 420) and high capacity (a dual layer DVD can hold 8.5 gb of data), it quickly 
became an extremely profitable media for the studios.  Similarly, in 1996 neo-liberalism policies 
based on deregulation helped the Internet expand to thousands of customers because telecoms 
began offering bundled services that were previously prohibited by Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) rules.  
 
In this investigation, I argue that the DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act), a severe 
and reckless piece of legislation that the MPAA (Motion Picture Association of America) and 
the RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America) lobbied Congress to pass in 1998, 
permitted a whole host of new legal and technological controls that produced a collision with 
freedom of expression.  By freedom of expression, I mean to say that prior to the passage of the 
DMCA, individuals generally experienced fewer conflicts over the copyright industries’ 
protection of works and the artistic creation of new works influenced by, and based on, previous 
works.  The DMCA made it a civil and criminal act to circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a protected work under this act.  Additionally, the DMCA made the 
manufacture, import, offer to the public, the provision or otherwise participation in any 
technology, product, service, device, etc an unlawful offense.  Ironically, just three short years 
after the passage of the DMCA, Apple Computer released a new advertisement campaign to sell 
its new and improved iMac home computers: Apple’s Rip, Mix, Burn promotion celebrated new 
consumer freedoms with the pairing of a cd-rw drive and an Apple personal computer. Shortly 
thereafter, the public began ripping mp3’s to rewritable compact discs and this eventually 
became a problem for the RIAA.  Then, in what can only be deemed paradoxical, in 2003, 
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Apple’s iTunes store debuted and in a dramatic shift in direction, the computer electronics 
company eventually compromised its vision in order to placate the recording industry and its 
concerns regarding piracy. Among many criticisms, the iTunes store has been called proprietary 
with regard to devices not manufactured by Apple. Specifically, Apple’s use of drm schemes on 
its audio, video, and e-book products frequently prevents Apple media from being authorized to 
play on other non-Apple hardware.  Generally, Apple achieved incredible success with iTunes 
by offering its products at a cheaper rate than the competition and creating an e-vendor that was 
convenient and systematized.  However, Apple’s security encryption schemes do nothing for 
consumer freedoms as it proclaimed in the 2001 iMac campaign.   
Following the passage of the DMCA, the movie industry started to incorporate digital 
protections on saleable media that were far more sophisticated than Macrovision protection on 
VCR tapes.  Macrovision, considered the first global copy protection technology for video, made 
a veritable fortune from the motion picture industry with its sales of copy protection technology 
on videotapes in the early 1980s.  At this particular moment, the home video industry was all but 
certain that VCRs would destroy the movie business, failing to recognize that video was a future, 
critical source for Hollywood ancillary revenues. The first home video cassette containing a 
major film release encoded with Macrovision protection was The Cotton Club (dir. Coppola, 
1985).5  
 
 
You Can’t Protect What You Don’t Own 
 
With the gradual shift of cultural products from the physical to digital universe, 
consumers experienced a paradigm shift that challenged the concept of property ownership 
altogether. Certainly, one of the features of the Internet is the ability to enable the spread of 
content efficiently, but this is a liability to a media producer, and therefore places the burden of 
                                                            
5 Andy Wickstrom, “Macrovision Hasn't Stopped Tape Copying,” The Ledger, February 15, 1986. 
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providing some kind of oversight on consumer Internet usage.  Described officially as a 
mechanism for enforcing copyright, digital rights management goes beyond simply preventing 
the duplication and distributing of media content and actually exceeds the boundaries of 
copyright law.  Copyright law was originally intended to give property owners the right to 
control only the public performances and displays of certain works, but DRM actually acts as a 
kind of private governance system in which computer program code regulates which acts 
consumers are authorized to perform.6  Pamela Samuelson, Professor of Law and Information 
Management at the University of California, Berkeley, suggests that Digital Rights Management 
is actually a misnomer, with the copyright protection technology more aptly titled “digital 
restrictions management” since it allows the copyright industries to determine user rights.  The 
DRM technology manages the permissions of the digital information instead of any particular 
digital rights, and does not understand the nuances of fair use, for instance, when the consumer’s 
	  
use of a cultural product is for commercial or educational purposes.  A computer code is a poor 
arbiter, and begs one to ask ultimately, what fair use is actually good for. 
 
In the digital world, consumers cannot protect what they do not own, and the Internet 
gives a consumer access to, rather than ownership of, cultural products in cyberspace.  If you 
can’t protect what you own, then you don’t own anything.7 7   The technology that grants 
consumers, on impulse, access to enormous amounts of music and films has been called, among 
many things, the “celestial jukebox.”   Regardless of what the technology is called, behind the 
eloquent veneer is the case in point of a systematic corrosion of consumer rights that, in the end,  
                                                            
6 Pamela Samuelson, “DRM {and, or, vs} the Law,” Communications of The ACM 46, no.4 (2003): 41-45. 
7 Jack Valenti wrote a memo to the United States Senate on April 21, 2001, warning that movie studios in 
the future would have difficulty raising money for new film products if the state could not guarantee copyright 
protection for filmmakers and their producers. “If copyright is allowed to decay, then this nation will begin the slow 
undoing of an immense economic asset… who will invest huge amounts of private risk capital in the production of 
films if this creative property cannot be protected from theft?  If you can’t protect what you don’t own, than you 
don’t own anything.” Valenti’s plea for regulation is characteristically populist, and from a particularly sardonic 
point of view, his oratory with respect to ownership is highly interchangeable with the opposition. 
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results in an unfair exchange between the content producers and consumers. 
 
DRM is one concern of this dissertation, yet another is recognizing the content industry’s  
power determined by the political economic framework of what Tarleton Gillespie calls the 
“trusted system,” the relationships between the technological, legal, economic and cultural 
arrangements that make all the elements of a regulatory regime work together.8 8   These 
exclusive arrangements are important because the MPAA relies on the strength of this “regime of 
alignment” to distribute video products. The trusted system is the interlinking of the 
technological, the legal, the institutional and the rhetorical in order to carefully direct 
consumer	  activity according to particular agendas.9   The system creates a scenario in which 
legislators and courts of law also consent to play a supportive role with privately organized 
arrangements that profess to be serving the public interest, but the arrangements are not designed 
for those ends.  
  The trusted system scenario, as articulated by Gillespie, illustrates a top down, command 
and control framework that prevented consumers from performing activities with digital 
properties that were considered routine with physical media.  My investigation is primarily 
concerned with the MPAA’s partnerships with specific individuals in the trusted system and the 
ways in which their professional activities support the copyright industries’ agendas.  The 
MPAA plays a prominent role creating the backdrop for copyright enforcement, but its 
relationships with its affiliates are diffuse.  For this investigation, my primary research question 
was: Who are the people that uphold the MPAA’s trusted system framework on a daily basis? 
Additionally, the move to digitize and secure Hollywood’s media properties affected film post-
production and distribution methods.  In what ways did the enforcement of copyright in the  
                                                            
8 Tarleton Gillespie, Wired Shut: Copyright and the Shape of Digital Culture (Cambridge, MA: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007). 
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digital age affect production, distribution, and exhibition?  Lastly, the MPAA’s new legal and 
rhetorical responsibilities of upholding the DMCA presented new challenges for the 
organization, as consumers were experiencing fatigue from being branded as criminals.  What 
were some of the public relations tactics that the film organization utilized to connect more 
effectively with consumers? 
After the failure of the Recording Industry Association of America to successfully 
implement a trusted system that would protect copyrighted music in digital formats, the Motion 
Picture Association of America (MPAA) threatened to withhold all film content for Internet 
distribution until a sufficient regulatory framework was put into place.  The incorporation of DRM 
for Internet film distribution provided the first obstacle to individuals seeking to make 
unauthorized film copies. The recording and film industries’ use of DRM only played a minor 
factor in a comprehensive four-pronged strategy that sought to limit the control of their products. 
Also playing a crucial role in the regime of control is the passage of DMCA legislation that 
prohibited any content user from circumventing copyright encryption schemes.  The DMCA, 
combined with legal efforts to prosecute users sharing and downloading content, along with 
prohibiting the production of tools and networks that facilitate sharing and copying, are similarly 
prohibited.  The incorporation of technological barriers that interfere with content production and 
exhibition, as well as devices used for exhibition manufactured in turn prevents casual copying. 
The contractual arrangements between the content industries ensure that the guidelines imposed 
through law and technology is followed, and the special interests representing the content 
industries convince legislators that such systems are compulsory.10 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  
	   9  Ibid.	  
10 Ibid.
 
 
8 
	   	  
Research  Methods 	  
 
While Digital Rights Management has been at the forefront of the criticism regarding 
consumer rights on the Internet, it is in fact critical that the DMCA, the legal threat of 
prosecution, the prohibition of tools and networks that share and facilitate copying (covered 
under the DMCA), and the incorporation of DRM- all of these arrangements must be in place for 
the media industries to regulate unauthorized copying.  Gillespie’s research exposes the 
arrangements between policymakers, the law, the content industries and the hardware 
manufacturers.  If, for example, the majority of hardware manufacturers refuse to act in 
accordance with these arrangements and decline implementing copy protection within a bounded 
set of devices and networks the trusted system collapses.  Similarly, if content providers cannot 
agree on a suitable digital encryption standard, all bets are off and so on. 
 
 
Gillespie’s work provides a political economy of the content industries, and showcases 
the way in which contractual arrangements between the legal, software, and hardware industries 
protect content.  Gillespie’s work is lacking, however, in representing some of the main players 
in this “regime of control.”  Of course, the industry players’ discourse regarding copyright 
protection and piracy dominate the media, and receive far more attention because of the absence 
of a fair and balanced discussion regarding intellectual property and consumer rights. 
Organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and other consortia supporting privacy and 
free speech are generally left out of the debates centered on the future role of technology and its 
role in media distribution and consumption. It is, however, important for this project to include 
	  	   	  
some of the central players involved in streaming and content distribution and respond to some 
of these concerns. 
I suggest that Gillespie’s work would be improved if it featured some of the 
 
 
9 
individuals who played integral roles within the trusted system who could in turn answer 
some of Gillespie’s charges.  For instance, Gillespie chronicles the MPAA throughout 
his investigation by providing remarks from former MPAA President Jack Valenti about 
his organization’s efforts to stop piracy, rhetoric derived from various press conferences. 
The long-time Washington politico was a veritable quote sensation and certainly the 
most colorful, discernible representative of the studios’ anti-piracy campaign.  However, 
Valenti did not involve himself with the daily machinations of planning the piracy 
operation, nor did he prepare the litigation against film industry adversaries.  For all 
intents and purposes, Valenti was the important public face promoting the MPAA’s ant-
piracy propaganda operation and in Gillespie’s trusted system framework, functioned as 
the discursive, rhetorical apparatus supporting the MPAA’s goals to control 
Hollywood’s content.   
Likewise, Gillespie spends an extensive amount of time discussing the SDMI 
(Secure Digital Music Initiative) and CPTWG (Copy Protection Technical Working 
Group) coalitions, and conveys that the existing literature is short on industry consortia, 
and therefore utilizes popular press articles to chronicle both the SDMI and CPTWG’s 
activities. No person is interviewed in the work that can actually speak about the 
activities that transpired during the SDMI’s attempts to build copy protection for the 
.mp3 format, or the CPTWG’s creation of CSS (content scrambling system), which was 
the DVD copy protection scheme.  From a political-economic perspective, the 
relationships among the policy makers, intellectual property attorneys, and engineers are 
compulsory for the trusted system to function properly, and Gillespie’s investigation 
lacks the primary data to support his claims of collusion among institutions, in spite of 
the argument’s apparent likelihood on paper.  Moreover, while Gillespie’s book  
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investigates the ways in which digital content is “wired shut” within devices whose 
specifications are devised through the hawkish gaze of the MPAA, he does not speak 
with anybody from Hollywood about how this affects security or piracy matters related 
to the film industry.  Gillespie argues that the MPAA has contractual relationships with 
outside interests that not only regulate content but also essentially shut out outside 
competition through a type of cronyism in which consortia and standards-bearing groups 
become the standard operating procedure.  Although seemingly factual and correct, 
Gillespie does not include anyone to interview in his investigation that can answer his 
assessment.  
Without hearing from some of the individuals who enforce this “trusted 
system,” readers of Wired Shut may come away thinking that the MPAA is monolithic 
or immutable, and that is simply not the case.  Although the organization’s enforcement 
of copyright control seems to be carefully calculated, the MPAA does not have the 
unity and cohesion that people assume. At the same time, I want to make it clear that by 
speaking to actual people in my own investigation, I am not seeking to masquerade the 
MPAA and its affiliates as something they are not.  I am not offering, for instance, 
superficial human-interest pieces or trying to deflect attention away from the 
organization’s overall policies to dominate the film market and take down potential 
competition.  My interest in interviews arises from the notion that individuals are living 
their daily lives trying to uphold the content industries’ agendas, and these important 
perspectives have not historically been featured in the research.  The MPAA, as I argue, 
is not monolithic.  Organizations like the MPAA and RIAA often administer their 
agendas by means of conflicting and/or competing interests that, while in the midst of  
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enforcing the various directives, the organizations perform erratically or make colossal 
mistakes.  Sadly, the size and scope of the errors dims in comparison to the 
aforementioned agendas that are often rapidly set in motion before the press or a 
consumer advocacy group sounds the alarm that the conjectured organization 
sponsoring the legislation lied or got “creative” with statistics.  To illustrate, in 2008, 
the MPAA convinced Congress to pass legislation to make colleges and universities 
responsible for reducing copyright infringement activities on campuses by threatening 
that universities who failed to comply would be passed over for federal funding.11  The 
law was a test to see if Internet service providers would shoulder some of the 
responsibility to patrol users, but in order to get the bill passed, the MPAA actually lied 
about the number of infringement cases that occurred on college campuses. The film 
industry organization originally claimed that 44% of its economic losses came from the 
file sharing activities at universities and was forced to apologize and admit error when 
it reduced its assertion to 15%.   
During this series of developments, an MPAA lawyer actually went as far to 
argue that the primary purpose of Internet access on campus was for students to 
illegally trade files.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) then asked the 
MPAA to support its revised assertion of 15%, and, in fine form, the MPAA refused to 
provide any data. Most unfortunate about this story is that although the organization 
was caught in a lie and publicly chastened by the press, the law placing ISP’s in charge 
of users’ activities continues to remain in effect and has not been repealed by 
Congress.  The MPAA gambled all along that producing false evidence about file 
                                                            
11 Mike Masnick, “No Surprise: MPAA Wouldn’t Reveal Data on How It Came Up with Bogus ‘Piracy’ 
Numbers,” April 21, 2010, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100420/1046519111.shtml 
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sharing would not impede its ability to successfully advance legislation, and nobody 
stepped forward to challenge the legislation after it passed.  
In a far less serious case that emphasizes the overall decentralized nature of the 
MPAA and RIAA lobbying organizations, the RIAA frequently engages in scenarios 
that illustrates disunity among its copyright enforcement partners.  The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for the domain seizures of Internet 
sites deemed guilty of posting copyrighted materials, acts on behalf of the MPAA and 
RIAA and has frequently seized and disabled internet sites that are in fact following the 
law.  The DHS was discovered to be seizing sites that were hip-hop blogs and forums 
continually supported by some of the leading artists in hip-hop, and the DHS used 
affidavits filled with technical and legal errors.12  The Internet sites that were seized and 
disabled contained songs that were actually sent by the artist or record label 
representatives themselves.  Record label representatives, for the specific reason of 
promotion, actually gifted the songs to the sites.  An employee working for the DHS, 
Agent Reynolds, became embroiled in an embarrassing situation that placed him 
against a segment of the recording industry since the RIAA’s left hand (lawyers) was 
unaware of what the right hand was doing (promotions and marketing).   If there was 
any previous doubt that the content industries make mistakes, these two depictions 
should counter notions that the MPAA and RIAA lobbying organizations are absolute 
and integrated.           
 Using Tarleton Gillespie’s trusted system as my template, I interviewed subjects 
who work directly with the MPAA or who function as the various contractual affiliates 
                                                            
12 Mike Masnick, “More & Bigger Mistakes Discovered in Homeland Security’s Domain Seizures,” 
December 22, 2010, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101222/02112912376/more-bigger-mistakes-discovered-
homeland-securitys-domain-seizures.shtml. 
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that enforce digital copyright control in the consumer electronics market.  By 
contractual affiliates, I mean that the trusted system scenario is based on the MPAA’s 
partnerships with legal institutions, with software and hardware manufacturers, all who 
descend on Los Angeles, California every 3-4 months to attend the Digital Video Disc-
Copyright Control Association (DVD-CCA) meeting and the Copy Protection Technical 
Working Group (CPTWG). These two groups are part of the industry consortia that 
Gillespie describes as constituting one interest though they would seem to represent 
many.  The meetings are held at the Westin Hotel in downtown Los Angeles.  It is here 
where trusted system partners confer with one another about the various technical 
specifications for video products and their attendant playback devices. The CPTWG 
meetings are considered a public forum; therefore no proprietary information may be 
disclosed at the gatherings.14 I attended a CPTWG meeting in January 2011.  The 
CPTWG group attendees include consumer electronics makers, the information 
technology sector, and the movie and music industries including the Consumer 
Electronic Manufacturers of America, the Motion Picture Association of America, and 
the Recording Industry Association of America.   
From an outsider’s perspective, the MPAA’s connections to the aforementioned 
consortia are difficult to decipher, although the film association is responsible for the 
inception and formation of the groups.  All of the participating attendees have a 
contractual relationship with the film lobbying organization as it has publically called 
for digital technology that is enhanced by the legal and technological protection of the 
industry’s product.  The MPAA has a bevy of lawyers, engineers, hardware and 
software experts at its disposal that deal with the daily minutiae of creating a digital 
environment that offers the necessary security to attract “high value” content and 
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provides the necessary legal climate that ensures strong worldwide protections for 
creative efforts to be preserved.13  The presence of the film organization as it relates to 
the consortiums and their working meetings is elusive, however.  I spent some time 
clicking on the various links contained on the CPTWG website that persistently directed 
me to the MPAA’s main website.  Although the MPAA sends a designated 
representative who functions as the official CPTWG contact, this person’s duties are 
limited to greeting members and taking attendance.  The representative does not raise 
concerns or present research at the meetings. The contact’s duties, insofar as my own 
recollections and observations at the meeting, included arranging hotel space and 
sending out correspondence about the consortium’s future gatherings.   
I also interviewed founding CPTWG member, James Burger, who is a tech 
lobbyist.  In the trusted system, Mr. Burger fills at least two roles; as an expert in 
intellectual property law for the technology industry, Mr. Burger must understand 
Capitol Hill and its policy-making activities so he may better serve his clients who have 
jobs in the consumer electronics industry.  As a lobbyist for the technology industry, he 
assists the MPAA and its legislative efforts in support of the publishing industries.    
In the MPAA’s trusted system, leading the rhetorical charge against piracy is the 
film organization’s president and CEO, who seeks to ensure an environment that is ideal 
for political and economic activities, and a stable legal climate allowing the film studios 
to be profitable.14   Although I was unsuccessful trying to interview former MPAA 
President Glickman (2004-2010), I spoke with Dean Garfield, former executive Vice 
President and Chief Strategic Officer of the Motion Picture Association of America 
(2003-2008).  Mr. Garfield operated with a team that functioned as both the legal and 
                                                            
13 Gillespie, Wired Shut. 
14 Ibid. 
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rhetorical arm of the trusted system.  Mr. Garfield, an intellectual property lawyer, 
worked as an expert in both traditional and emerging digital media during his tenure 
with the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), where he helped manage 
the court cases against the file sharing services Grokster, Kazaa and MusicCity.  During 
his tenure at the MPAA, he was the public face enforcing copyright on behalf of the 
eight film studios: Disney, Warner Bros., Universal, Sony, Fox, Paramount, United 
Artists and MGM.  
In Wired Shut, Gillespie does not illustrate how the trusted system’s influence on 
film production, distribution, and exhibition figures into the exhibition market; 
therefore, I ventured beyond Gillespie’s focal point and also interviewed John Hurst, 
whose Burbank, California-based company, Cinecert, was selected by the six 
Hollywood film studios to convert Hollywood to a digital standard.  The argument for 
digital, Hollywood argues, is that the medium a higher quality, safer, and more 
economical alternative to film stock.  Cinecert, Mr. Hurst’s employer, was selected to 
participate in the Digital Cinema Initiative project, or DCI, which is the global name for 
this massive venture.15  Mr. Hurst spoke to me in detail about the ways that Hollywood 
secures its films for the exhibition circuit, with the major film studios delivering movies 
to theater chains on encrypted hard drives via United Parcel Service (UPS) or Federal 
Express, which is cheaper than placing content on film platters and subsequently using 
bonded couriers for delivery.  In the trusted system framework, Mr. Hurst helps devise 
the “trusted” portion of the system in which computer code is the law, acting as the 
necessary speed bump that prevents a majority of copyright infringing activities.  The 
encryption schemes are only part of the climate that makes up the trusted system and in 
                                                            
15Laura Holson, “Film Studios Reportedly Agree on Digital Standards,” New York Times, July 26, 2005. 
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Chapter Four, I look specifically at six legal cases that involve the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and its advocacy efforts to defend individuals and companies from penalties 
arising from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.    
For Chapter Four, I used the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) archive, a web 
site containing numerous white papers that chronicled some of the precedent setting 
court cases involving digital copyright and fair use. The EFF is a not-for-profit 
consumer advocacy group that defends free speech and fights for consumer privacy on 
the World Wide Web.  My primary purposes for using the EFF archives were to discuss 
the organization’s legal challenges the organization brought against Digital Rights 
Management technology and to showcase its formal arguments criticizing the 
technology in the Supreme Court.  The organization’s participation in thousands of court 
cases, and its routine of taking on large corporations and even the U.S. government 
regarding digital copyright enforcement is well known. As legal scholar Lawrence 
Lessig states, code is law in terms of how rules are built into technological systems. The 
heavy lifting of deliberation, in this particular context, is an oversight.  The law, at least 
in principle, is supposed to be the product of public deliberation by elected officials.16 
 
Coexisting Trusted Systems 
When I started writing this dissertation, I aspired to go beyond the confines of 
Hollywood, the MPAA and its relationships with institutions that form what Gillespie 
terms a “regime of control.”  I wanted to include several perspectives from individuals 
that actively resist Hollywood’s production, distribution, and exhibition efforts.  
Although I initially sought to frame these subjects as demonstrating economic or 
                                                            
16 Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0, (NewYork, Basic Books, 2006). 
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political resistance through their counterfeiting and hacking activities, I eventually 
realized that my “criminalized” subjects endorsed the very same procedures as the 
Hollywood studios, trying to enforce their own monopolies on distribution channels. In 
fact, I maintain that my representatives from the underground are actively engaged in 
coexisting or parallel trusted systems.  
Like pirates of the ocean, digital pirates are outsiders against whom a form of 
propriety, in this case capitalism, is defined, defended, and upheld as fundamental to 
order.17  Ideologically, capitalism values the products produced by entrepreneurial 
activity, all the while encouraging monopoly as a means of controlling the market. 
Simon Petersen and Dan Mickell are both interested in making enough of a profit to pay 
for their overhead and ideally pocket a surplus.  They enjoy making money and do not 
purport to be political ideologues.  Although both of my featured individuals operate in 
their own individual piracy networks and employ DIY (do it yourself) modes of 
engagement to counter conventional media making practices, they manage their own 
trusted systems that co-exist with Hollywood.  It is farfetched to say that my subjects 
who exist in the piracy underground have equal footing with Hollywood, however.  
They do not.  Be that as it may, using Gillespie’s concept, I am arguing that my 
criminalized subjects provide a regulatory framework of their own that erects strong 
barriers to entry and protects their products from other pirates. My subjects seek to 
reproduce, not to originate, although they may try to improve upon the original.  In 
terms of political economy, they substitute Hollywood manufacturing and distributing 
techniques with their own and dispense with directives in favor of expediency. 
Technologically savvy pirates like my subjects use more efficient and flexible networks 
                                                            
17 Adrian Johns, Piracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
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that seriously undermine Hollywood’s control.  Wang discusses the importance of speed 
in a globalized economy where pirates will compete with Hollywood’s windowing 
strategies in what becomes a battle over technology.18  The shortening of release 
windows illustrates just how serious is piracy’s effect on Hollywood and demonstrates 
how the film studios are scrambling to be the champion in the contest over speed. 
 
Interview Sample 
  The MPAA’s relationships, albeit diffuse, are designed to assert control over its 
film properties in the digital domain.  I spoke of my three interviewees who play specific 
roles in the trusted system’s attempts to enforce copyright control on the consumer 
electronics or cinema exhibition market: Garfield, Burger, and Hurst all come to my 
investigation with long professional histories working in the film and media industries. 
With respect to my interview selection process, I should reveal that a small number of 
subjects I initially intended to interview were unable to commit.  I initially spoke with a 
former vice-president of technology for a major film studio, and the legal conditions 
around his present contract prohibited him from giving me specific information. 
Correspondingly, a former executive director with Dolby Laboratories was also bound 
by the same contractual terms. One subject ultimately declined to participate in the 
project completely while the other indicated that he would prefer remaining anonymous 
and not have his particular comments made public.  I mentioned that I tried to interview 
former MPAA President and CEO Dan Glickman and was unsuccessful.  I made 
attempts via e-mail and phone to contact him when he was transitioning away from 
Refugees International, a not for profit agency in Washington, D.C. to his current 
                                                            
18 Shujen Wang, Framing Piracy: Globalization and Film Distribution in Greater China (Oxford, UK: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003). 
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position as a senior fellow with the Bipartisan Policy Center, also in Washington.   I also 
spoke informally at the CPTWG meeting with Mr. Brad Hunt, former technology 
director with the MPAA (1999-2007) and his contributions are slight. He did not wish to 
be pursued for further information.  
 
Piracy 
 
Throughout the dissertation, I frequently refer to the word “piracy,” a word that comes 
fully functional and pre-loaded with a variety of political, social, and economic overtones.   The 
word is negatively charged, and particularly open to question when creativity somehow becomes 
plagiarism.  Mimesis, or the act of imitation, is one of the most important concepts in Western 
literary and art criticism, and its roots can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle.19 Mimesis is a 
contested point of disputation where Plato sees it as purely a passive act while Aristotle sees the 
artist asserting a creative agency.  Aristotle’s belief would certainly be challenged in today’s 
consumer market where it is typically technology rather than the human hands doing the 
copying.20    Asian scholar Laikwan Pang, for example, discusses how pirated Hollywood cinema 
illustrates the complex global politics of world cinema.21  From a producer’s vantage point, Pang 
shows that Hollywood has been the biggest pirate incorporating or copying creative ideas from 
one national cinema to another.  Alternatively, at the point of consumption, Chinese audiences 
inject their own discourses through the use of subtitles. Because acts of piracy and their 
production and distribution system exist outside the control of the transnational conglomerates, 
the interpreter of the pirated product relies on prior cultural assumptions that are frequently 
incorrect.  In Kill Bill: Volume 1 (dir. Tarantino, 2004), the set of subtitles does not generally 
correspond to the onscreen dialogue.  The Bride, a female character in the Tarantino film, is 
                                                            
19 Lessig, Code Version 2.0. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Laikwan Pang, Cultural Control and Globalization in Asia: Copyright, Piracy, and Cinema (New York: 
Routledge, 2006). 
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more apologetic for her angry and dangerous behavior in order to conform to the Chinese 
stereotype that American women are not rude or violent.  This particular example demonstrates 
tremendous authorial inscription at the point of reception, and contains the agency that Aristotle 
speaks of.  Segrave illustrates historically that some American artists were not necessarily open 
to any particular ideas of an “exchange.”  Although borrowing was alive and well during the 
days of vaudeville, at the height of her popularity in 1909 vaudeville superstar Eva Tanguay 
ranted onstage that she was tired of at least 20 people copying her act: “I make this whole 
statement to the public because only the public can protect an originator, and that would be by 
hissing the imitator.”22 
	  
The trade magazine Variety often published reports of  “lifters” that were exposed by an 
inspector.  The inspector’s job was to continually visit New York theaters to uncover copyists.  A 
suggested plan to protect the artist was set up in 1914 that permitted an association to be formed 
for annual dues of $100, payable in advance. From that money, an office was set up and 
maintained by the “inspector.”23 
 
When people I meet from the United States, especially, come to find that my research is 
about film piracy, the majority of the questions asked of me are influenced by the rhetoric 
surrounding the piracy debate, rhetoric couched in the narrow confines of “property” and “theft,” 
which forces me to subsequently define the phenomenon from an ethical or moral posture.  First, 
I use the word piracy to describe it as the appropriation and reproduction of an invention or work 
of another for one’s own profit, without authority; it is the infringement of the rights conferred 
by patent or copyright.  Piracy is also the knowing or unknowing of copying a protected work, 
and the performing or distributing copies of the work. My investigation will especially focus on  
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23 Segrave, Piracy in the Motion Picture Industry. 
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the use of peer -to -peer technologies (hereafter known as P2P networks) used to share cultural 
works such as music, film, books, and other media.  In contrast, the Recording Industry 
Association of America, in a section on their website, argues that it is Internet driven peer-to- 
peer file sharing and transfers that constitutes piracy: 
Online piracy is the unauthorized uploading of a copyrighted sound recording and 
making it available to the public, or downloading a sound recording from an Internet 
site, even if the recording isn’t resold.  Online piracy may now also include certain 
uses of “streaming” technologies from the Internet.24 
 
The MPAA is similarly narrow in its definition of piracy and relies on deft rhetorical campaigns 
to define the debate in its own terms.  In the 1980s, the MPAA went as far as suggesting that 
typical video pirates were taking their VCRs to hotels to record closed circuit movies in order to 
help themselves to an evening’s worth of illicit film fare.  This characterization became one of 
the MPAA’s typical tropes to describe the most egregious of offenders. 
 
One of this investigation’s chief concerns is recognizing the political economic 
framework of the “trusted system.”   To understand the relationships between the film industry, 
hardware manufacturers, content distributors, the law, and political policy, an individual needs 
only to look at a DVD player’s façade to see that it lacks a record button.  Prior to the success of 
the DVD player, there was only the Video Cassette Recorder and Betamax player to reference, 
technologies that represented a stark contrast to the regulatory regime accompanying the 
movement to selling digital cultural products on the Internet.  Gillespie illustrates that the DVD 
player lacks a record button because DVD manufacturers signed a license with the major movie 
studios; the license mandates a series of technical requirements for the device, the purpose which 
                                                            
24 “Piracy: On the Street,” September 27, 2009, 
http://www.ria.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy_details_street.  
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is to protect DVD content from being duplicated.25 The mandates include the prohibition of a 
 
record button.  All major hardware manufacturers signed the same license because every 
Hollywood DVD that is distributed is encrypted, requiring that any DVD player must include 
one set of decryption keys, which can only be acquired by signing the license.  The DVD is  
encrypted for several reasons, to prevent users from making copies but to also ensure that DVD 
manufacturers agree to the terms of the licenses, which gives Hollywood studios the power to	   
dictate what DVD players will or will not allow.23  To summarize, the DVD player specifically 
prevents copying, and the DRM encryption technology prevents the disc from being readable.  It 
is all of these elements that work together that render some activities possible and others not. 
The technological innovation here is not copy protection specifically, according to Gillespie, but 
the more powerful assurance that this complex partnership will be necessary and enforceable, in 
other words a “trusted system.”26   The system must be constructed to withstand attack, 
technologically and legally.  If a user is able to break the encryption, or somehow dupe the 
system by batch dumping unprotected digital copies onto a hard drive, or break open and rewire 
the device, or reprogram it so it does not charge per use, the system is obviously leaky.  If a 
hacker develops a tool to accomplish some or all of these things, whether it involves distributing 
unauthorized content or tools to break content encryption on the Internet, the trusted system 
disintegrates. The shift from Content Scrambling Systems (CSS) encryption code to the bold 
trifecta of DRM and the legal and commercial arrangements eventually constructed a massive 
infrastructure enforcing copyright protection. 
 
Digital Rights Management is an umbrella term for a family of technical applications, 
and for the legal and commercial agreements they require.  Starting with the kind of protective 
measures typically utilized in the delivery of television through cable and satellite and in the sale 	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of software, DRM systems depend on the use of encryption to mathematically alter digital 
information according to sophisticated algorithms.  The data the DRM shields can be retrieved 
by using a key that removes the mathematical distortions in a very precise way.27  
 
The concept of intellectual property and the litigious conditions the word brings forward 
gradually became less of a third-tier, technical issue in the lexicon of U.S. trade policy to become 
“priority number one” in the 1990s when Congress added more than a hundred pages to the 
copyright statute, almost all of them billed as loophole-closers.28 Long before the discovery of 
the Internet, intellectual property and the copyright wars routinely materialized and affected 
 
other, smaller mass communications outlets.  In the 1730s, for example, the United Kingdom 
witnessed the “Battle of the Booksellers”, a conflict occurring between London booksellers who 
believed they possessed perpetual rights over the reproduction of authors’ works based on 
natural rights, or rights independent of any legislative procedure.29 After an extended battle 
concluding with conflicting judicial decisions, the author received copyright protection for a 
limited period of time. 
 
Three hundred years later, entertainment companies discovered the World Wide Web to 
be a powerful distribution outlet for cultural works, but were suspicious that the Internet was a 
Wild West frontier requiring regulation.  The entertainment industry’s guiding belief in 
regulation and strong controls were prompted by convictions that once the copyright industries 
lose control, companies quickly submerge like floundering ships. 
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Legislation 
 
 
There are three rather important pieces of legislation that play a large role in navigating 
the practice of digitizing cultural works towards the consumer standard we witness today. 
 
The Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA), enacted by Congress in 1992, sought to 
address the possible problem posed by the digital reproduction of sound recordings.  More 
commonly known as Digital Audio Tape (DAT), the technology certainly had the capacity for 
widespread piracy but never caught on as a mass media format, and the legislation prevailed 
longer than the technology itself. The only portion of the law that remains important for 
consumers is that they still are permitted to make non-commercial digital or analog copies of 
musical recordings without fear of copyright infringement liability. 
 
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (1998) essentially extended works 
created on or after 1923 for 20 more years.  Until then, copyright lasted the duration of an 
author’s life plus 50 years.  As a consequence of the act, current copyrighted works will not enter 
the public domain until they expire in January 1, 2019.  Because the act was so powerful in scope 
in terms of its newly enhanced restrictions- several Disney characters including Mickey Mouse, 
for example, were set to enter the public domain between 2000-2004. Copyright seemed more 
like a vehicle for publishers to squeeze out all of the possible commercial value from works of 
authorship, even though some works that previously were deemed permissible to use were 
brought within the copyright owner’s control.  The Bono act pleased the Disney Corporation and 
other important beneficiaries like the estate of George Gershwin.  The DMCA (Digital 
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Millennium Copyright Act) became law on October 28, 1998 and represented the most dramatic 
change in the history of American copyright law. 
 
Nuances  of  the  Debate 
 
Some conditions and distinctions need to be articulated when discussing media piracy, 
and the use of various technologies to acquire, duplicate and redistribute products via digital 
distribution channels, or through alternative means.  For example, defining all-and-out piracy 
versus sharing (or bootlegging) requires an understanding of the history of discourse where the 
two words are used freely and interchangeably.  Before the digitization of media that eventually 
brought into view compact discs, laser discs, and digital video discs, VCR enthusiasts bootlegged 
and shared media as part of a sometimes-egalitarian redistribution of culture and information. 
Not all instances of bootlegging were necessarily resistant or progressive, just as contemporary 
examples of peer-to-peer sharing are not.   However, although the law often overlooks the 
difference, I argue there is an critical distinction between piracy, which is the outright stealing or 
performance of a work without compensation to the creators or rights holders of the works, 
versus productive, non-infringing media reproduction and sharing.  For example, it was only 
within the last decade that the MPAA finally acknowledged that film professors with access to 
audio-visual works in a university or college library were exempted from the DMCA and 
consequently permitted to circumvent copyright protection measures without fear of prosecution. 
The choice of words for any legal statute is fundamental, and I must point out that the DMCA 
exemption stating that a  “college or university library” must exist provides no specific 
illustrations or distinctions of professors working in departments without access to an on site 
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library. On certain campuses such as Florida State University in Tallahassee, Florida, the 
College of Communications offers film and screenwriting classes to undergraduate students and 
relies on the professors to provide the materials.  How does the law, therefore, interpret the acts 
of these teachers?  This is just one example in which productive, non-infringing reproduction and 
sharing requires a skilled defense in a court of law. 
 
The Statement of Best Practices, a document crafted by Pam Samuelson who is a noted 
attorney and legal scholar, received assistance from members of the Society for Cinema and 
Media Studies (SCMS), a professional organization of college and university educators, 
filmmakers, critics and scholars, and the resulting document created from this collaboration 
attempts to provide clarification requiring the permissible use of copyrighted works for teaching; 
however, the fair use claim remains a difficult defense to maintain given the extraordinary cost 
of legal fees.  The claim of fair use has emerged as one of the most contested and celebrated 
ideas in U.S. Copyright law, as both an exception and a contradiction, yet it is the core of 
copyright.  For example, in 1976 the fair use provision was written into American law in order to 
balance the interests in favor of the public good while the majority of the 1976 modifications 
actually created more advantage for copyright holders.  The fair use exemption allowing 
circumvention of the encryption code on copyrighted works is up for renewal in October, 2009, 
and it will be important to see how or even if the exemption is modified. 
 
With regards to intellectual property concerns, the film and music industries have 
repeatedly blamed financial losses on piracy.  This investigation considers how the film industry 
particularly confronts piracy in an era where media is ubiquitous and consumer acquisition and 
consumption is “simple and straightforward.”  Henry Jenkins describes this era as a time of  
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“media convergence,” when the shift towards a hyper- mediated society is not simply predicated 
on technology, but when the relationships between existing technologies, industries, markets, 
genres and audiences also change.30  Jenkins emphasizes the blatant contradiction between the 
increased ways to watch media versus the number of media outlets, bringing up critical 
questions surrounding media consolidation and ownership.  To some, media convergence is a 
godsend, a world without gatekeepers, while others are cautious and see the gatekeepers as 
possessing unparalleled control.  For the purposes of this study, discussions will be centered on 
the policies and technologies that limit freedoms in favor of the copyright industries. 
The movie studios are the main forces that direct the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA) policy, and it is the studio executives themselves who are especially 
vociferous regarding film copyright infringement and piracy issues.31 According to recent 
numbers offered by the MPAA, the Hollywood film industry loses nearly six billion dollars 
annually because of Internet theft, or piracy, which is the unauthorized downloading, copying, 
and distribution of cultural products such as films, television shows, computer games, and 
software.32  Peer- to- peer (P2P) networks, private servers, websites and computers that have 
been hacked all serve as instruments for the illegal downloading and duplication of content. The 
Internet plays a central role in consumers’ first acquiring the media, then burning it to Digital 
Video Disc (DVD) and, finally distributing it as a pirated good on auction sites like Ebay.  The 
designated price of the pirated version is the “featured attraction” here, which is much lower than 
 
price at retail. 
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Literature  Review 
 
 
Digital copyright, intellectual property on the Internet, and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act are subjects that have earned generous attention in the last decade by legal 
scholars, and this branch of study is now a burgeoning area not only for law researchers, but also 
for those individuals who are stakeholders in the battle over creativity, cultural freedoms, and 
consumer rights on the Internet.  The academic literature regarding the history of the MPAA’s 
battle to fight piracy, however, is scarce.  Kerry Segrave’s Piracy in The Motion Picture Industry 
(2003) is an extensive historical account of film piracy that is exhaustive in its chronological 
detail of various cases involving piracy, although it neglects any particular scholarly analysis. 
Additionally, Segrave’s lack of any strong, authorial voice gives the impression that her work is 
simply multiple factoids in search of a thesis.  From a strictly historiographical perspective, the 
author implements seemingly arbitrary practices of constructing the narrative, all the while 
neglecting any overarching research questions or arguments. The author’s previous works adopt 
a similar vein, avoiding the esoterica and chronicling the banal and/or excessive: Shoplifting: A 
Social History (2001), Tipping: An American Social History of Gratuities (1998), and Women 
Serial and Mass Murderers: A Worldwide Reference, 1580 through 1990 (1992) are just a few 
examples of Segrave’s random fascinations with popular culture. Though certainly questionable 
in its approach, Piracy in the Motion Picture Business is one of the first published books solely 
devoted to film piracy and examines how the culture of borrowing became a culture of pirates. 
From the early days of vaudeville and the salad days of film exhibition, when projectionists 
somehow “misplaced” reels, allowing their colleagues to show celluloid images in their own 
theaters, to the technological breakthrough of video cassette players in the 1970s, which created 
a whole new fandom of videophiles bootlegging and sharing their favorite television shows, 
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Segrave illustrates a multi-faceted viewpoint of the piracy phenomenon.  While consumers have 
 
a fascination with entertainers and the cultural products showcasing their favorite stars, corporate 
and legal interests have always intervened in order to control access to, or restrict their 
intellectual properties from being used in ways contrary to the profiteering goals of transnational 
media conglomerations. 
Segrave illustrates the MPAA initially as a fledgling association, operating in the 1920s as 
the MPPDA (Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association), an organization whose 
main goal was to clear up the public’s negative perception that Hollywood was a bastion of 
moral decadence.  The MPAA also was to begin confronting film piracy on an international 
level, specifically trying to stop a piracy hub operating in the United Kingdom from making 
unauthorized film copies and furtively shipping the merchandise to Canada.  In parts of Canada, 
films were exhibited illegally and then shipped to the United States for identical purposes. 
Readers of Piracy in the Motion Picture Business also learn that former FBI and Scotland Yard 
operatives are employed to shut down particular rings like this. Segrave chronicles how the 
MPAA evolved into a multi-faceted organization using every means necessary to combat the 
piracy phenomenon, from forming strong relationships with the Office of the U. S. Trade 
Representative to participating in anti-piracy campaigns in 19 nations in 1978.  Additionally, the 
MPAA sent a comprehensive Prosecutor’s Manual and Investigator’s Manual to every U.S. 
Attorney and FBI office in America in order to support the ongoing efforts to combat piracy in 
the United States. 
Segrave presents research that is revelatory, such as how the MPAA created the Copyright 
Protection Bureau in the 1930s because it was afraid of the piracy threat.  Segrave  
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constructs her own narrative from articles pulled from Variety, the New York Times, Billboard,	  	  
and American Film.  Segrave’s lack of any analysis prompts a number of questions: How did 
the Internet challenge the MPAA’s conventional methods of fighting piracy?  And how did the 
identity of the typical film thief operating in the pre-internet age change, when multitudes of 
teenagers and college students without any previous criminal histories began using peer-to-peer 
file sharing to trade music and films online? Before the digital age, the illegal copying and 
distribution of cultural products relied on sophisticated methods to transport products 
internationally or between states.  Now, individuals engage in peer- to -peer file sharing on their 
computers because, as Edmund Hillary answered when he climbed Mt. Everest because “it’s 
there.” 
Another book that prominently considers the MPAA’s battle against contemporary 
digital piracy is Darknet: Hollywood’s Role Against the Digital Generation (2005) by J.D. 
Lasica.  Lasica. a journalist by profession, uses some valuable contacts to penetrate the 
“darknet,” a clandestine space in real or virtual settings where people can share copyrighted 
material to avoid the restrictions on digital media imposed by entertainment companies. Of 
course, this kind of space has powerful currency because users have little or no fear of being 
detected.  Lasica argues that while the content industry claims that no one is anonymous on the 
Internet, the proponents of this kind of fear mongering are lying.  Millions of people find ways to 
engage in a shared media experience by finding and joining one of these secret places.  For this 
particular book, Lasica concerns himself with investigating the “underground” Internet, a cluster 
of private networks that people join by invitation only, receiving a password for access.  Lasica 
tells readers that these secretive networks function like a pyramid, where the most daring thrill 
seekers, the technologically savvy, stand at the top by ripping or decoding media, or distributing  
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the titles to other Usenet news groups or Web-based file-sharing services.  The ones positioned at 
the top of the pyramid possess a complete disregard for authority and have strong convictions that 
Web content should be free.  These subjects are predominantly male.  At the bottom of the 
pyramid, on the other hand, are the people focused more on consumption, or downloading, rather 
than contributing to uploading or sharing material on networks. 
Lasica’s assertions are familiar arguments: associations like the MPAA are relying on old 
business models (the windowing of product, treating the paying public like felons, using 
outdated technology unlike smaller startup companies who are also competing in the digital 
distribution business) by allowing their fears regarding piracy to put them in a rigidly defensive 
posture.  By placing digital restrictions on media and attempting to control content access, the 
movie studios are partially responsible for scaring consumers away to illegal, underground 
networks. It is interesting to note that Lasica makes the point that Darknet members are primarily 
involved not because of any motive to make a political statement, but instead members have a 
desire to affiliate and belong to an “edgy, secretive brotherhood.”  Furthermore, the race to 
upload and make available the best content becomes a sporting competition for Darknet 
members, and the winner wins bragging rights against his opposition.  “It all comes down to 
status,” states a piracy consultant hired by the movie studios to monitor illegal activities on the 
Web. 
Among some of the high profile contacts Lasica interviews is former MPAA President 
Jack Valenti, whose long tenure (1969-2007) at the association became legendary.  Valenti, 
before he passed away, asserted that plugging the analog hole was the number one priority for 
his association because media consumers could run an analog line through hardware to copy 
content to a hard drive, therefore bypassing the restrictions the content providers placed on  
media.  The MPAA’s efforts ultimately failed, although Valenti’s efforts created some 
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interesting headlines: the press referred to the overreaching attempt by the MPAA to change 
consumer hardware as the “analog sunset.” 
Lasica’s ability to identify the specific players in the piracy debate is laudable, but there 
are some minor problems with the book and the way it frames the controversy.  The author 
often relies on journalistic hyperbole to make points, asserting that the media companies are 
going to “war” with the digital generation.  To Lasica, the digital generation is all that that is 
youthful and creative, all that is good.  These people are the salt of the earth, the creators, the 
fans, the independent filmmakers.  Hollywood, on the other hand, is bad.  The typical 
Hollywood executive is far from proactive, instead resting on his laurels by profiting from his 
studios’ film libraries culled from previous decades, or gaining property rights over additional 
cultural products from mergers or acquisitions.  Today’s film executive, according to various 
studies, is not even visionary or creative.  Many CEO’s have been promoted to the top after 
working previously for the same company in an accounting capacity. While Lasica’s binary 
may be partially accurate, it conveniently passes over people in Hollywood who are 
consciously trying to appeal and stay ahead of the curve with their fans.  As a matter of fact, 
an exception to the binary occurs when Lasica describes a music executive recalling that she 
was in a staff meeting with some of her colleagues in order to discuss the role technology 
played in the illegal sharing of music.  While another of the executive’s associates begins 
reading the Billboard Top Ten list, she opens up Kazaa and easily locates the content online, 
the free content which was ready for consumption.  “This was so cool as far as a future 
business model was concerned.”33    Lasica’s binary does not identify who represents the face 
of Hollywood in its contemporary piracy campaign. Is it Jack Valenti? With his fiery and 
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controversial oratory, Valenti is referenced in this book multiple times, but it is far too easy to 
give him the sole focus while making some serious omissions.   Identifying the proponents in the 
piracy debate is much more difficult now that Valenti is dead.  Additionally, other than 
mentioning the DMCA, the author does not engage in discussions about policy, which is a 
cornerstone of my investigation. 
 
My dissertation’s principal concern is the continuously evolving vertical and horizontal 
relationships built between the state, the content industries, or in this case, the film industry, the 
law, and hardware manufacturers.  These partnerships are strongly bound through contractual 
arrangements that affect everything from protecting proprietary information such as the use of 
code to regulate media products to the codification of internal hardware inside media consoles 
such as Sony’s Playstation and Microsoft’s Xbox.  Essentially, it is the hardware manufacturers 
who are coerced and strong armed into partnerships where they have to either participate or be 
placed on a blacklist, and forced out of business because the MPAA will withhold all future 
content.  Tarleton Gillespie’s Wired Shut: Copyright and the Shape of Digital Culture examines 
this “regime of control” by showing the importance of the exclusive arrangements between 
political, economic, and cultural entities that have managed to severely change the relationship 
between law and technology.34  Gillespie argues that previous research has tended to focused on 
 
Digital Rights Management software as the main culprit in the protection of intellectual property 
rights while skirting the more important political economic characteristics which privilege anti- 
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copying software as both a physical barrier to copying and an artifact that, if tampered with, 
constitutes a serious anti-circumvention crime.  What is most important in this scenario is not the 
intention of the user, for example consumer use or specifically why the DRM is bypassed, but 
rather that the technology is tampered with at all.  As an aside, the mattress industry has often 
been the subject for comedians who pretend to cower in pantomime hysteria from imagined 
threats transmitted in bold typeface on small, generic mattress tags.  The tags, of course, are to be 
taken seriously and warn individuals that removal of the seemingly harmless artifact constitutes a 
serious crime.  However, the tag fails to clarify that people owning the mattress can do whatever 
they wish with the tag.  The mattress tag warning is primarily a protection for the mattress 
industry, which lays claim to the tag as a signifier for upholding certain product safety standards. 
In the digital universe, technological artifacts have far more leverage than my mattress tag 
parallel, and the artifacts bear extraordinary legal power by infusing legal authority, authority 
that infringes on conventional property ownership rights. The technology has become the law, 
based on the prior political and legal efforts of the “regime of control.” 
 
Lawrence Lessig’s Code (1999) is often acknowledged as the first study to frame the 
discussion around the distribution of cultural works on the Internet, intellectual property, and the 
monitoring and restriction of access to such works.  To Lessig, the directives of government- 
influenced cyberspace and commerce will build an architecture that will perfect control and 
make highly efficient regulation possible.35  While some of this regulatory increase of the World 
Wide Web will produce positive results, Lessig is concerned with the technology, or “code” that 
will govern how laws in cyberspace function.  Code, as defined by Lessig, is the software and 
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hardware that represents as well as regulates cyberspace.  For the World Wide Web, code has 
become, and is law. 
 
While it is correct that there is a distinction between the regulatory effects produced by 
code versus the regulatory effects produced by law, the differences are especially compelling 
when one considers that legal regulation should reflect the values of the society imposing the 
regulation. In another public arena, for instance, laws regarding pollutants and pollution amount 
reflect a societal principle, and these principles therefore restrict industry behavior. Cyberspace 
code has characteristics at play which make it much harder to determine how and if societal 
values are first reflected and then actualized in situations between people and objects.  Therefore, 
Lessig argues that when constructing the code of cyberspace it is important to ask fundamental 
questions regarding the values being protected, and the values concomitant to future generations. 
Lessig’s research is always asking the fundamental questions regarding copyright and 
intellectual property laws, such as what values are being reflected as society becomes more 
technologically dependent? What role does deliberation play in a democratic society that relies 
on technology to enforce the law?  How did the basic role of copyright, as far as being a 
cultivator of innovation, actually come to stifle technological progress?  These are important 
questions this investigation will consider as it looks at the role of media content control in the 
digital age. While Lessig consistently speaks about the wonders of technology, he never loses 
sight of seeking to promote human welfare, which is a critical component to this investigation. 
Dan Schiller’s Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System (1999) is a 
seminal work that illustrates the political economy of networks that encompass cyberspace.37  It 
is important to this particular investigation because it is one of the first studies looking at the  
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production, distribution, and consumption components of the World Wide Web.  Schiller 
illustrates in infinite detail the ways in which cyberspace is transformed from primarily a 
messaging platform used by the military, to a digital marketplace where transnational companies 
begin selling digital goods in cyberspace.  Schiller’s view of the Internet is written in broad 
strokes from a macro-level, and his work is helpful to this study in the way it approaches the 
initial steps of how policy, economics, the legal and the corporate engaged in a partnership to 
accelerate internet growth, and expand capitalism to the digital universe.  As an illustration, the 
author specifically mentions former well-known media executive Steve Case and his company, 
the formerly robust AOL which began selling CD-quality MP3’s in September 1997 directly 
over the Internet.  Before AOL’s entrance into the marketplace selling digital music legitimately, 
however, the Recording Industry Association of America had plans to shut down hundreds of 
web sites selling unauthorized music, and it is quite clear that other associations like Broadcast 
Music Inc. (BMI, representing music publishers and recording companies) were using 
technologies that mined the web to regulate the use of its products before any encryption 
measures were put into place on musical properties.  Additionally, another organization, the 
Association of American Publishers, acted with the RIAA to obtain court orders and take its 
consumers to court. This period of time in the late 1990s is fascinating because the music 
industry was sorely unprepared for how to deal with secure, consumer-friendly digital 
distribution, and the book is useful to this investigation because it considers how the Internet was 
initially considered an unproven, contentious space to sell cultural works.  How does this 
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particular view held by the culture industries contradict the rhetoric regarding the Internet as an 
information super highway?  This investigation, informed by Schiller’s work, will highlight 
some of the cleavages between “cyberpole” and the media industry’s need for extreme control of 
its properties.38 
 
The telecommunications industry, specifically AT&T, eventually used the Internet for 
“accelerated commodification,” a term originating from Schiller which means a process where 
corporate and political powers mobilize their efforts to create new profit opportunities, in this 
case helping the United States economy shift from a manufacturing to an information industry; 
computers, telecommunications, and the services which grow out of or depend on those 
technologies. The 1990s was a time in which the Internet transformed from primarily a 
messaging platform to a vehicle for commerce, and, from a policy vantage point, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, a piece of legislation signed under Bill Clinton, represented 
the desire to create and foster competition among providers by dissolving the line between 
telephony and services such as cable and the Internet.  At this particular time, legislators did not 
see that the Internet represented a veritable watershed in terms of future communications such as 
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) and mobile wireless.  As a direct result of this disputed 
piece of legislation, AT&T began to offer bundled packages including providing the connection 
to the Internet for a subscription fee, as well as offering various other services. 
 
What became the advancing U.S. neoliberal policy model of the 1990s served the 
purpose of supporting the growth of companies whose offices and factories existed across 
transnational borders and, in order to implement a global telecommunications grid worldwide, 
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international companies needed direct political intervention.  Two important U.S. government 
initiatives ratified in 1997 allowed the Internet to grow exponentially.  First, the Supreme Court 
decided that the government found it “unlikely” that imposing restrictions on Internet content 
would be upheld as long as it had some intrinsic constitutional value.  As a result, the 
government decided that it viewed the Internet differently as other, more regulated electronic 
media like telephony and broadcast television.  Secondly, it was decided that the government 
should not stand in the way of “digital capitalism” because “unnecessary regulation could cripple 
the growth and diversity of the Internet.”  This was a far different time than a decade later when 
consumer cries for regulation rang out from the millions who were victimized from the market 
bubble burst in March 2001. The long-winding recession then began crippling the global 
markets. Looking back, the 1990s is frequently demarcated by laissez-faire markets and Alan 
Greenspan’s  “over exuberance” reference that built on a wholesale ethos of indulgence, 
indulgence that eventually spread like white water. 
 
Schiller’s How to Think About Information (2007) extends the investigation of the 
Internet and commodification of information and considers, among a host of variables, and 
considers how the romantic conception of authorship helped the culture industry to profit far 
beyond industrial capitalism’s rise in England in the 1830s.39   Drawings, books, theatrical 
performances, photographs and films all eventually came to bear the legal impress of copyright, 
and private ownership rights became fixed in particular cultural commodities.  With the growth 
of the Internet and the large scale profits for legally constituted private property in information, 
accelerated commodification permitted corporations who joined an intensive pan-corporate rush 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  
39   Dan Schiller, How to Think About Information (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois, 2007). 
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to patent, copyright and trademark anything in sight.  Digital media such as DVD burners, MP3 
players, personal computers, and mobile phones were, at least in economist’s terms, systems that 
were thought to enlarge the capacity to develop information as a public good.  However, the 
institutional response to these technologies has been instead to mobilize and guard against 
emergent forms of property.  For the purposes of this project, How to Think About Information is 
fundamentally important because it avoids rejecting the Internet based on the fallacies created by 
pre-2001 pipe dream rhetoric, and sees it continuing to operate “conditioned and structured by 
the institutions and relations in which it is embedded…social relations that are creating a 
capitalist organization agenda across an unprecedented range.”40   How does the global 
communications and information industry information continue to function as a “fountainhead of 
economic transformation” since the high tech bubble in 2001?  Schiller’s study illustrates how 
the Internet consists of a diversified set of cultural conglomerates, their advertiser patrons, and 
technology suppliers who have been empowered to make the Internet a more effective sales 
apparatus.  Schiller calls it a “self-service vending machine of cultural commodities” which is 
not a liberated zone existing beyond the market, but simply a new and effective channel to target 
and track desirable groups of shoppers.41 The research will be especially useful in how it 
theorizes information and the growing authority of copyright in cyberspace.  Schiller’s work 
prompts this study to consider how this emphasis on IP (intellectual property) influences 
corporate and state power, overall, as well as how the film industry uses copyright to advance its 
own agenda. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid. 
41 Schiller, How to Think About Information. 
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The copyright industries are a rich consortia of copyright owners, lobbyists, and lawyers 
who persuaded Congress in 1998 to develop and enhance legal and technological controls over 
cultural works to create what Jessica Litman wryly refers to as a digital multiplex.  Jessica 
Litman’s book Digital Copyright (2001) encapsulates this argument.   The book poses various 
questions vis à vis the invasiveness of copyright law and the exchange of information within a 
free society, first identifying the presumption that in the United States facts and ideas cannot be 
owned, inhibited, censored or regulated and are part of a larger cultural ideal where people are 
supposed to find, study, pass along and trade knowledge in the marketplace of ideas.  The 
presumption of freedom, however, fails to take into account the private vested interests wielding 
influence over policymaking, interests operating in a cloud of secrecy whose representatives hold 
conferences without any public hearings.42  The book will be useful as a historical reference that 
contains certain legal precedents that severely limited consumer freedoms in cyberspace. 
 
 
Litman argues that, in relation to fairness and copyright, there has been a long history of 
disregard for democracy.   Litman recounts how the Library of Congress convened a conference 
of experts and interested parties to consider codification of copyright laws in 1905, completely 
ignoring representatives who were not beneficiaries of the existing copyright statutes.  Groups 
excluded from the gathering included newer interests that had not received statutory recognition, 
such as the motion picture industry, the piano roll industry, and the “talking machine” 
(phonograph) industry, technologies that eventually induced piracy claims. The claims were 
inevitable, considering that the phonograph and the player piano, important technologies of the 
late 1800s, had the capacity to record. Critics of the technologies, at the time, argued eerily like 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  
42 Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Prometheus Books, 2001), 208. 
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intellectual property attorneys and rationalized that the music publishing industry was at the 
complete mercy of pirates because of these inventions.  Likewise, the innovators who created the 
player piano argued that the introduction of their invention deprived the composer of nothing he 
had before the technology was introduced, and rather that the machine actually was responsible 
for increasing the sales of sheet music. The law eventually adjudicated the matter in the early 
1900s by granting both parties legal reinforcement.  Composers were paid for the "mechanical 
reproductions" of their compositions, and the recording artists received the right to record the 
music at a price set by Congress after the composer granted permission for it to be recorded.  All 
in all, the legal decision was determined to be fair and evenhanded at the time. As a legal 
historian and expert on copyright, Litman’s work will inform this investigation regarding the 
changes and permutations of copyright since its origination in the physical world as a vehicle to 
promote innovation, to its growing authority in cyberspace as a means of controlling ownership. 
 
Additional research looking at consumer freedoms being limited as a result of 
transnational conglomerates’ control over information is Siva Vaidhyanathan’s Copyrights and 
Copywrongs.  Similar to Lessig, Litman, Gillespie and Schiller, the author argues that 
expansions in copyright law have restricted public access to the arts and stifled innovation, new 
technologies and ideas.  Vaidhyanathan contends that copyright law needs to be more flexible 
and humane, indicating that in 1996 Congress decided that copyright protection should not be 
fixed, and therefore extended it beyond the life of the author for an additional 50 years.43  Prior 
 
to 1996, copyrights were generally not renewed and eventually became part of the public 
domain, but the 1976 law changed copyright in several critical ways.  First, it extended the 
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  
43   Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It 
Threatens Creativity (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 
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protection beyond the life of the author, as previously mentioned.  Second, the 1996 law made 
copyright applicable to all expressions fixed in any tangible medium.44  What used to constitute a 
fair exchange between the media industries and the consumer (Vaidhyanathan is far less 
charitable explaining this, indicating the agreement before 1976 permitted a “temporary” 
monopoly) has shifted to the publisher possessing an endless monopoly over cultural works.  As 
long as the rhetoric of intellectual property is strictly focused on content, the people fighting for 
cultural freedoms and expression are forced to work within the very narrow definition of 
“intellectual property.”  Vaidyanathan, then, clearly defines how the foundation of copyright, 
which is built on property ownership, instead obfuscates the discourse regarding more important 
issues of freedom and expression.  Since this investigation considers the rhetoric of the media 
industry, specifically the MPAA, Vaidyanathan’s work will assist the investigation as it attempts 
to frame discourses around intellectual property versus fair use amidst the advances in 
 
technology and the speed of cultural reproduction. 
 
 
Kembrew McLeod’s Freedom of Expression: Resistance and Repression in the Age of 
Intellectual Property (2005) also argues that current copyright law stifles creativity and the free 
exchange of ideas.45   McLeod views creativity and expression as a democratic value, and uses 
his expertise as a music historian to illustrate that the rich tradition of borrowing is part of the 
cultural exchange between artists. McLeod is particularly interested in examining borrowing 
within the folk song tradition, citing musician Woody Guthrie as an artist who is emblematic of a 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	   	  
44   Carrie   McClaren,    "Copyrights  and  Copywrongs:    An  Interview  with  Siva  Vaidhyanathan,"Stay 
 Free!  May 15,    2009     <http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/electronic--‐publications/stay--‐
free/archives/20/siva_vaidhyanathan.html>.    
 
45 Kembrew McLeod, Freedom of Expression: Resistance and Repression in the Age of Intellectual 
Property (University of Minnesota Press, 2007).  
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culture that values the borrowing of lyrics and melodies.  McLeod is especially critical of elitism 
and “high art” ideals, and devotes time to criticizing the notion that the author is a necessarily a 
fixed supposition.  McLeod argues that copyright law is an abuse of power, that corporate and 
legal values fail to grasp the nuances of borrowing and free expression. The deterioration of the 
public space is at the forefront of McLeod’s critique, and he points to privatization schemes that 
shifted what was originally a society valuing collaboration to a society navigating through 
corporate and litigious values.  A study about the problems of the MPAA, copyright law, and the 
strong jurisdiction over digital works would not be complete without looking at the RIAA 
struggling with the same issues, although the music industry is shifting its public position 
regarding digital restrictions management, in this case offering more expensive, yet drm-free, 
watermarked content.  A watermark is an embedded digital symbol that allows content owners to 
locate and identify their property on computer networks. 
 
McLeod’s work extends the critique regarding how corporate greed trumps innovation 
and creativity.  His research about the RIAA and the organization’s concern over piracy will help 
this investigation as it looks to the MPAA in order to compare and contrast the two organizations 
as they struggle with how to securely distribute products over the World Wide Web. 
 
Framing Piracy (2003), by Shujen Wang, examines film distribution, both legal and 
illegal, in Greater China.46    While China’s “shadow economy” is protected by a bureaucracy that 
values China’s large and relatively cheap labor base, that its long coastal lines and shared borders 
which provide easy entry and connecting points for smugglers, the country operates within a 
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  
46 Wang, Framing Piracy. 
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fascinating context that provokes further questions about technology, politics, culture, and 
globalization.  For example, how does digital technology disrupt the balance of power and forms 
of control in the film industry?  How has China’s entry into the World Trade Organization 
affected its views regarding sovereignty, and accepting cultural products beyond its own 
borders? How do Chinese citizens who participate in piracy define themselves vis a vis the 
process of globalization?   The book is one of the few studies that places the author directly in 
the center of a piracy network, in this case in Shanghai, Beijing, and a small coastal town in the 
Zhejiang Province.  Wang asks the various case subjects in her interviews their reasons for 
pirating cultural goods, and how they define the media products they purchase and consume.  For 
this study, the book is extremely useful in how it depicts the Motion Picture Association of 
America shaping national and international trade policies, anti-piracy efforts, and the 
organization’s overall global film practices as they relate to copyright and intellectual property 
issues. 
 
 
Overview 
 
 
Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the MPAA prior to its development of the trusted 
system framework as both a strategic player in promoting Hollywood film internationally, as the 
author of the ratings system, and as the enforcer of copyright control related to videotapes, finally 
shifting its approach to ratcheting up the enforcement of piracy laws owing to rapid Internet 
growth.    
 
Chapter 3 includes interviews with individuals who are actively or formerly involved 
with the MPAA’s enforcement of the trusted system, performing the legal, political, technical, or 
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rhetorical functions necessary to protect Hollywood’s film products.  I interview Dean Garfield, 
who worked first as an intellectual property attorney for the Recording Industry Association of 
America and was recruited by the MPAA to become Executive Vice President and Chief 
Strategic Officer for the MPAA’s piracy campaign from 2003-2007.  Also interviewed for this 
chapter is James Burger, founding member of the Copy Protection Technical Working Group 
(CPTWG), one of two organizations responsible for holding discussions centered on content 
protection technologies for film. Additionally, I interview Chief Technical Officer (CTO) John 
Hurst, whose Burbank, California-based company, Cinecert, was selected by the six Hollywood 
film studios to convert Hollywood to a digital standard, which Hollywood argues is a higher 
quality, safer, and more economical alternative to film stock.  In this chapter, Mr. Hurst 
discusses the future of digital film distribution and exhibition and provides some intimate details 
about how the Hollywood Studios are providing advanced forensic watermarks on their films so 
the studios can identify where a film was illegally recorded through a camcorder device. 
In this chapter, I also include two individuals who demonstrate economic and political 
resistance to conventional media production and distribution practices. I speak to Simon Petersen 
(pseudonym) who calls himself a “piracy consultant” and professional media bootlegger as well 
as Dan Mickell (also pseudonym), creator of Movie Land, which is a software program that 
illegally downloads and streams film and television programs to Apple’s mobile iPhone devices.  
I include these people in the investigation to illustrate several perspectives from the piracy 
underground and the ways in which they support a broader argument that the trusted system’s 
opposition is more closely aligned to Hollywood’s grand designs than many people assume.     
 
Chapter 4 looks at the subject of piracy and the ways in which the Motion Picture 
Association of America aligned with political, legal, and technological authorities to lobby for 
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legislation that legally challenged and refashioned conventional views of property and ownership. 
Congressional legislation created the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998, which 
functioned as a rigid blueprint for the future consumption of digitized, cultural goods. This chapter 
presents some of the key lawsuits involving the DMCA brought forth by the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) with regard to film and media products.  The EFF archive contains an extensive 
amount of information about the thousands of lawsuits involving the non-profit agency acting as 
either litigant or defendant, and I selected several of the precedent-setting cases with regard to 
DVD copying and fair use.  Additionally, this chapter discusses several landmark cases involving 
general digital goods where companies were sued and unceremoniously brought to an end for 
producing products that were deemed to be violating the DMCA.  The DMCA is a severe, 
uncompromising piece of legislation introduced in 1998 that capsizes over two hundred years of 
copyright law, and is a major cornerstone for this investigation.  The DMCA legislation 
criminalized the circumvention of the digital encryptions placed on digital products, as well 
tampering with personal property such as removing the screws off the cover of, or tampering with 
a home entertainment console like an Xbox, Playstation 3, or Wi.  
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Chapter 2: Overview and Development of the 
Motion Picture Association of America 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 ventures away from the “trusted system” configuration and 
chronicles the rise and establishment of the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA), the world’s most powerful lobbying group that promotes American cultural 
exports.  The MPAA is persuasive and dominant; in fact, the industry alliance is 
currently ranked as the second largest export industry overall, following aerospace.47  
Responsible for contributing nearly $80 billion in annual growth to the U.S. 
economy, the MPAA is the only American industry to run a positive balance of trade 
in every country that it does business.48  The actual promoting and politicking of the 
Hollywood film market is handled by two distinct administrations: the MPAA, which 
specializes in the American, domestic film market and the MPAA’s international 
counterpart, the Motion Picture Association (MPA).  Although the MPA serves as the 
official voice and advocate for American film and its television and video market 
abroad, it is not a central feature to the research focus of this dissertation and will 
only be mentioned momentarily.       
This chapter provides a brief overview of the MPAA film organization itself 
and of its dual role as a business enterprise and major advocate of cultural goods in 
U.S. trade activities.  The chapter then brings forth a historical overview of the 
                                                            
47 “Motion Picture Association of America's Research and Statistics Page,” April 21, 2010 
<http://www.mpaa.org/researchStatistics.asp>. 
48 Kevin Lee, “The Little State Department: Hollywood and the MPAA's Influence on U.S. 
Trade Relations,” Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 28, no. 371 (2008): 371. 
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industry alliance and examines the MPAA’s piracy and media security campaign as it 
passes into a new era of championing digital cinema.    
 
 Characterization of the MPAA 
In 2010, the United States’ economy is continuing to recover from slipshod 
lending practices initiated by the world’s largest banks, the country’s unemployment 
index is said to be almost 10%, and there is staggering debt of over 11 trillion 
dollars.49  Indeed, the country’s poor economic health in 2010 places the MPAA’s 
success into an uncertain, idiosyncratic category.  Historically, the United States has 
not seen an economic downturn so synchronized, or a downturn in trade so sharp and 
widespread since post-World War II.  The current economic situation is rare in that so 
many other economies in the advanced world, which account for the lions’ share of 
world gross domestic product (GDP), are all simultaneously experiencing financial 
crises comparable to the 1930s.  How does the MPAA continue to succeed in an 
economic climate so dismal that in 2009 64% of Americans and 47% of consumers 
surveyed internationally indicated they would reduce future spending on 
entertainment? 50  There are several reasons that explain this prosperity.   
Previous scholarship featuring the MPAA and its various modes of operation 
often centered on the lack of any particular custodianship when it came to the 
MPAA’s dealings in international commerce.  In the United States, especially the 
MPAA’s position as premier power broker is facilitated by its multifarious, albeit 
                                                            
49  “National Debt Hits Record 11 Trillion Dollars,” CBS News, March 17, 2010, 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-4872310-503544.html>. 
50  “It's A Recession, Consumers Agree- But Until When?” Nielsen Wire, October 29, 2008,  
April 7, 2010. <http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/its-a-recession-consumers-agree-but-
until-when/>. 
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elusive status, which permits the organization to be both a big business syndicate and 
government enterprise simultaneously. We know historically that the U.S. 
Government has conceded authority to the MPAA and MPEA (Motion Picture Export 
Association) as well as their predecessors in negotiating international trade deals. 
And while there is certainly documentation that some international competitors tried 
to negotiate preferred terms with Hollywood, determining the fairness of the contracts 
would be immaterial in that Hollywood is known to be less than reciprocal in its 
negotiations with international film market representatives, as we shall see.  The 
MPEA, however, was not acting as the exception in terms of its drive to exploit 
foreign markets.  The Italian film industry, which long coveted access to distribution 
channels in the United States with its motion pictures reached an agreement, the 
“Italian Film Export “(IFE) in 1951 with the MPEA.51  For Italy, however, the 
agreement fell short of its original aspirations when independent film distributors 
affiliated with the Independent Motion Picture Distributors Association of America 
(IMPDAA) argued that the IFE allowed Italian distributors to book its films at prices 
that independents could not realistically meet.  In February 1954, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) ruled that the IFE was anti-competitive, and in 1954 the MPEA’s 
payments to the Italian film industry were suspended, officially symbolizing the 
termination of the IFE.52 The barriers for international film competitors to 
legitimately compete with Hollywood have always been extraordinarily high, as this 
chapter will continue to highlight. 
                                                            
51  Thomas Guback, The International Film Industry: Western Europe and America Since 1945 
(Ontario: Fitzhenry & Whiteside Limited, 1969). 
52  Ibid. 
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Thomas Guback frequently observes the strict barriers of entry for 
international film markets wanting to distribute their products in America in his book 
The International Film Industry: Western Europe and America Since 1945 (1969).  
Calling the MPEA a “legal cartel,” Guback’s analysis focuses on the ways in which 
American industry helped to determine the policies of international companies 
through bolstering its membership in overseas film industry trade groups.  While 
membership in these associations is one way that the MPEA demanded free 
competition, open access to markets, and free trade, foreign industries or 
governments tried to control the activities of American companies.53  On the subject 
of the MPEA’s seemingly hypocritical behaviors i.e. demanding unhindered trade 
while bold and brazen in its goals for monopoly, Guback argues that the maxims are 
not necessarily at odds with monopoly in that the behaviors work to create market 
conditions overseas that are "healthy" for American companies.  The MPEA, as 
Guback rationalizes, was legally emboldened to monopolize export business for is 
members. Hence, one then begins to understand why there is no discussion of equal 
footing or reciprocity for America’s trade competition. One of the themes of this 
dissertation is looking at how the market dominance of cultural products begins with 
powerful entities, who, guided by self-interest, are able to effectively co-opt legal 
authority while constructing a trusted system.  
 
MPAA and South Korea’s Screen Quota 
 
Historically, many countries with motion picture industries have sought to 
protect themselves from the onslaught of Hollywood’s cultural flows through the 
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incorporation of protectionist policies.  The justification for a government shielding a 
country’s domestic industries from foreign competition is usually dictated by 
economy of scale or imperfect competition, coupled with fears over the eventual loss 
of cultural sovereignty.54  Protectionism measures consist of directly subsidizing local 
film production, providing content regulation, tax concessions, entry barriers, 
licensing conditions, and screen quotas.  The South Korean government’s screen 
quota system constitutes the foundation of its protectionism policy.55 
The South Korean government has been engaged with the United States in a 
long disputation over trade.  For the purposes of this investigation, it is important to 
know that Korea has battled the Motion Picture Association (MPA) and Motion 
Picture Association of America (MPAA) for decades over preservation of its film 
industry. Korea first introduced legislation in 1966 requiring that Korean cinemas 
show only homegrown films for at least 146 days of the year, sheltering a domestic 
cinema industry that would begin to quickly gain an international reputation for 
excellence.56 Although the history of the quota goes back forty years, it was not 
actually imposed until 1993 when the Coalition for Cultural Diversity in Moving 
Images (CDMI) was formed to enforce it.57  
According to multiple accounts, Korea’s screen quota is severely outdated, 
considering that the market share of Korean domestic film product has grown at a 
record-breaking pace over the last 5-7 years.58  Information from the Korean Film 
Council (KOFIC) illustrates that domestic Korean film product accounted for 59.3% 
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and 58% of the box office take in 2004 and 2005, respectively.59  To illustrate, 
domestic films made in Korea gained more audience attendance than Peter Jackson’s 
The Lord of the Rings (2003) or the Wachowski Brothers’ The Matrix Revolutions 
(2003).60 Percentage wise, the domestic Korean film market grew by 32% in box 
office revenue in 2004 and almost 25% the previous year.61   Besides the United 
States, there are only a few countries where the market shares from domestic box 
office profits exceed 25%.62   The success of the Korean film market is therefore 
quite unusual. 
Jack Valenti, former MPAA president, devotes a considerable amount of print 
to excoriating Korea’s preliminary screen quotas in his memoir, This Time, This 
Place.63  Valenti, playing the role of the pot calling the kettle black argues that the 
Korean government is a “cartel,” profiting “mightily” from the “freeze-out of 
American movie distribution companies.”64  The Korean screen quota mandated that 
American studios be barred from opening offices in the country’s capital, Seoul, and 
American studios were prohibited from distributing American films throughout 
Korea. If by chance Hollywood films happened to come into the hands of strictly 
government-approved Korean distributors, the films were sold at a flat price for an 
average of less than $50,000 per film.  The rules and regulations governing 
Hollywood studios in Korea were “lunacy” according to Valenti, especially since 
Korean distributors profited enormously from the wide distribution channel of 
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American product, leaving the Americans “outside with their noses pressed against 
the cartel’s windowpane.”65  Valenti chronicles his long fight with the Korean 
government, a “battle” illustrated a la Valenti with substantial conflict, high stakes 
and the compulsory Hollywood denouement.  Although Valenti was initially 
unsuccessful removing some of the major restraints against the Hollywood film 
market, United International Pictures (UIP), a hybrid of studios consisting of 
Universal, Paramount, and MGM led by Michael Williams-Jones, was eventually 
able to open its Seoul headquarters for internal Korean distribution in 1998, after U.S. 
government political pressures provoked the Korean government to capitulate.  
Nevertheless, some Korean citizens who were angry over the proceedings began 
engaging in grass roots efforts to intimidate Hollywood and audiences who dared to 
attend films distributed by UIP.  According to various press reports, at one point live 
poisonous snakes were set loose in two theaters playing UIP’s films, an event that had 
a “depressing” effect on the audience, according to Valenti.66  Other Korean 
representatives affiliated with the UIP received threats towards their families, and 
their homes were vandalized.67 Despite this extraordinary pressure to cease operation, 
UIP continued to stay in Korea, and other Hollywood studios that originally abstained 
from doing business gradually opened their doors for film distribution in Korea. 
During his long tenure with the MPAA, Valenti lobbied consistently for Korea to 
decrease its screen quota from 146 days to 73.  Shortly after Valenti’s retirement, the 
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Korean government did indeed drop its screen quota to the desired 73 days with the 
help of newly hired MPAA president Dan Glickman.       
 
Hollywood’s Ascent Into International Markets 
Kristin Thompson’s “Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film 
Market, 1907-1934” (1985) notes that by the 1920s, people in every imaginable 
social and cultural situation worldwide were seeing American films along with every 
imaginable American consumer product like cars, furniture and fashions.68  After 
World War I, specifically, the beginning of American film domination over its 
international counterparts symbolized a much larger theme of American commerce 
influencing and propelling the United States into the prime position among world 
markets through technological advances in electricity, the internal combustion engine, 
and various chemical products and goods that all came to be manufactured on an 
assembly line.  The Industrial Age boom was, of course, very fortuitous for the 
United States.   
The more explicit move of the American film industry and its initiation 
towards oligopoly coincided with the formation of the MPPC (Motion Picture Patents 
Corporation), which first attempted to block imports.69  Following this, America 
continued pursuing fierce trade policies, fighting especially hard to expand its film 
market and distribution abroad after both World Wars when there was a colossal void 
in European production. 
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Up to this point, this chapter touches on various examples throughout film's 
brief history depicting the Motion Picture Patents Corporation and the Motion Picture 
Exports Group seeking to dominate the international film market. But there is scarce 
scholarly material available that illustrates the MPAA involved in the daily 
machinations of setting and administering policy abroad in its forty plus years as an 
organization.  Those who follow the MPAA are aware of many of the organization’s 
positions because, like any public politician, the president uses his clout with the 
studios (his electorate) and his relationship with the media to try to curry public 
patronage. Jack Valenti, who never hid from a public opportunity to champion 
America and its manifest destiny to dominate media flows, was quoted innumerably 
throughout his tenure as MPAA president regarding his organization's obsession with 
controlling international markets.   
Shortly after Mr. Valenti assumed his role as MPAA president in 1966, he met 
with Erik Pleskow, the manager of United Artists' worldwide distribution network, 
and he quickly realized that the expansion of American film into international 
markets should be his highest priority for the following two decades, through the year 
1986.70 At the time of Valenti's first briefing with Pleskow, total American industry's 
world revenues equaled some $1.5 billion dollars.71  Thirty-eight years later, when 
Valenti stepped down as chief executive of the MPAA, global revenue of world 
cinema, television programming and video appreciated to more than 41% of the total 
world revenue ($45 billion).72 During this considerable ramping up in terms of 
negotiating and securing foreign film markets, Valenti was criticized for acting as a 
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kind of "cultural emperor" when it came to projecting American values around the 
globe.73  Coupled with these criticisms was the tendency to mythologize Valenti's 
circle of powerful relationships that the seemingly indefatigable Valenti first 
developed in Washington, D.C as chief of staff to Lyndon Johnson, and finally in 
Hollywood as MPAA president.  In a concentrated effort as president, Valenti 
became the public face for Hollywood's campaign to 1) dominate international trade 
flows and 2) to enforce anti-piracy measures.  Former Kansas Congressman Dan 
Glickman went on to succeed Valenti in 2004 and, whether he orchestrated it or not, 
permitted Dean Garfield, MPAA vice-president amd head of legal strategy, to assume 
the public role of the anti-piracy “enforcer.”          
Explaining specifically what the MPAA is and how it conducts business 
requires the assistance of others who have published works on the organization’s 
various modes of operation, especially since the organization is secretive and lacks 
transparency. Kevin Lee’s article “The Little State Department: Hollywood and the 
MPAA’s Influence on U.S. Trade Relations” (2008) notes that the U.S. government is 
actively advocating domestic film industry interests in bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements because of the Hollywood film industry’s importance to the U.S. 
economy, to which the credit goes to the MPAA’s influential lobbying efforts.74  The 
arguments coming from the international community are familiar to those who follow 
film distribution: foreign competitors argue that Hollywood’s self-interest and power 
permit them to invade the trade flows which ultimately results in an inequitable 
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playing field.  To illustrate, although the number of film releases have diminished 
world wide, Hollywood still releases enough domestic film product to act as a non-
tariff barrier for those wanting to do business in the United States.  Moreover, 
international critics of Hollywood’s grand designs claim that the U.S. does not offer 
enough economic incentives to interest the international film community enough in 
doing business with the United States. 
 Any incoming president of the MPAA has at least two fundamental 
objectives as part of the job description, most importantly to make sure the film 
organization perpetually mollifies the top brass of each of the six film studios 
(Universal, Sony, Columbia, Disney, Fox, and Warner Bros). Secondly, the 
organization must be profitable internationally to sustain its influence over film 
markets. The MPAA carries special carte blanche status bestowed upon it by the U.S. 
government, allowing it to negotiate international trade deals.75  Historically, attempts 
to categorize the MPAA as either a government or business enterprise have been 
challenging because of the important historical symbiosis between the film 
association and big government.  In short, the two critically need each other as 
partners.  The chapter will highlight this connection following a general historical 
overview of the organization and its first encounters with film piracy. 
 
Historical Overview of the MPAA 
Concerns about piracy and copyright infringement within the film industry 
can be traced back to between 1900-1906 when many film production companies in 
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the United States, France and England enthusiastically pirated each other’s films, 
typically because the films were not secured through the Library of Congress.  
International film companies such as France’s Pathé did not fully understand the 
concept of intellectual property and, through their sheer ignorance regarding 
American laws, waived their claim to enormous profits during the early 1900s.76  
Pathe´s notable international film, George Meliés’ Trip to the Moon (1902), for 
instance, was widely distributed in American cinemas because of illegal copying. 
Consequently, Meliés was unable to collect a single penny from the film’s release in 
America during his lifetime. 
Historically, the ever-powerful American film cartels, which include the 
Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC), the Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors Association (MPPDA), and finally the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA), shifted extensively throughout the years in their institutional 
designs.  The MPPC in the early twentieth century carried out Thomas Edison’s 
unyielding opportunism by administering the controls and patents Edison himself first 
established in 1908. Edison is known historically for establishing uncompromising 
rules around copyright, especially creating stringent barriers for entry.  Indeed, the 
MPPC was the first film organization concerned with copyright issues, and it 
exercised its jurisdiction over unlicensed “outlaws,” otherwise known as independent 
filmmakers.77  Edison’s patent company responded to the independent film movement 
by forming a subsidiary called the General Film Company that blocked the entry of 
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independent filmmakers who did not have a license to use Edison’s equipment.  The 
General Film Company’s harsh treatment of unlicensed filmmakers through the 
confiscation of unlicensed equipment, its cancellation of product supply to theaters 
who dared to show unlicensed films, and its general monopoly over distribution with 
the acquisition of all US film exchanges, except for the one owned by William Fox, 
became legendary.  Independent filmmakers eventually fled the East Coast and went 
to California, which was far enough from Thomas Edison's influence for filmmakers 
to pirate Edison’s products without fear of arrest.78  Eventually, the enforcement of 
Edison's laws moved westward, but Edison's patents expired by the time federal 
marshals arrived in California.  Edison’s MPPC was shut down by the courts in 1918. 
  The Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association (MPPDA) was 
created in 1922 with the primary aim of enforcing strict censorship rules over film 
distribution.  Reaching a crisis in the United States in 1921 with the censorship issue, 
state and local censor boards decided to forcefully intervene in Hollywood with their 
own independent set of film standards because support for the National Board of 
Censorship had all but disappeared, and pressure for federal censorship mounted.79  
In his seminal work An Evening’s Entertainment, Richard Koszarski discusses a spate 
of racy films released between 1920-1921 that exploited infidelity themes, the 
portrayal of crime, brutality, nudity, narcotics, and suggestive sex. The films’ illicit 
themes were supposed to serve as the antidote to a postwar recession and subsequent 
weak box office ticket sales, but audience reception of the films posed an entirely 
new problem for Hollywood: the public disapproval of its leading performers. Quite 
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often, public reputation actually coincided with the fictional story and the film’s story 
line echoed the actors’ real life activities.  For instance, when actress Mary Pickford 
starred in Stella Maris (1918), portraying a physically disabled girl who competes for 
the affections of a married man, Pickford in her real life was going through a 
tremendously public divorce scandal brought about by her love affair with silent film 
star Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. Meanwhile, popular vaudeville and silent screen actor 
Roscoe “Fatty” Arbuckle was incarcerated in San Francisco on the rape and murder 
charges of a twenty-six year-old woman.80  Arbuckle’s trial is notable in that he was 
one of the highest paid film actors at the time of the scandal.  Because of Arbuckle’s 
elite position as a wealthy performer, when push came to shove it resulted in an 
ambitious, albeit public display of courtroom theatrics when the actor’s case went in 
front of a judge.  The highly combative San Francisco District attorney Matthew 
Brady, who was already known for his histrionic displays in the courtroom, forced 
Arbuckle's trial onto the docket and, in an anticlimactic series of events, the trial 
concluded with a hung jury. As pressure mounted to bring Arbuckle’s second case to 
trial, Hollywood’s industry leaders announced in late January 1920 that Will Hays, 
President William Harding’s then postmaster general, would leave his cabinet post in 
order to oversee the cleanup of the Hollywood film industry which the MPPDA 
would make its primary goal.81  After 1922, state reformers concerned with 
censorship allowed Hays and the MPPDA to construct a thirteen-point criterion that 
the MPPDA used to consider future story material and consequently accept or reject 
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screenplays for production.82  Note that the submitting of materials to the MPPDA for 
consideration was voluntary, and there was no penalty for ignoring the 
recommendations of the board, but the thirteen points served as the first in a series of 
codified standards that illustrated strong interventions to keep Hollywood as a self-
regulated industry.  Any film company choosing to overlook the recommendations of 
the film industry body was taking extensive risks, as they were almost certain to have 
problems later with distribution and exhibition.  
The MPPDA organization, because of Hays’ efforts to establish a moral 
standard on Hollywood film distribution, became more commonly known as the 
“Hays Office” as it eventually authored the Production (Hays) Code in 1930, and its 
influence over scripts and personnel grew even stronger.83  The organization went on 
to form the Production Code Administration (PCA) headed by Joseph I. Breen, a 
former Philadelphia journalist who subsequently asked Martin Quigley, a Catholic 
layman of enormous influence, to collaborate with Jesuit priest and teacher Daniel A. 
Lord to construct the Quigley-Lord code in 1930, but the studios ignored it.  Breen 
eventually became the Production Code Administrator after realizing that, although 
establishing a set of moral standards for Hollywood was indeed essential, a formula 
would have to be devised allowing sex and crime pictures continued entrée into 
American theaters, or the industry would fail miserably.84  For Breen and his 
Production Code office, it was unthinkable and unprincipled that the audience could 
sympathize with crime or sin.   Thus, the formula of compensating moral value 
became an important operative on the principle that if characters committed certain 
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objectionable acts onscreen, eventual countermeasures would guarantee some form of 
punishment and retribution, or reform and regeneration, of the “sinful” one.85   
In 1940, the MPPDA (Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association) 
helped to establish the Copyright Protection Bureau (CPB), the organization’s first 
non-profit anti-piracy unit.  At the time, Hollywood’s eight major film producers 
decided to contribute $200,000 annually.86  This was a negligible amount, even for 
the time period.  Jack Levin, chief of the bureau, had worked previously with the 
Mutual Studio in New York (studio home to Charlie Chaplin, D.W. Griffith, and 
other silent screen stars) in 1915 when the illegal practice of “bicycling”, one of the 
more popular scams of the early 1900s, was widespread.  The term bicycling referred 
to the hurried methods of biking film reels from one theater to the next directly after a 
particular screening’s conclusion.  Bicycling also consisted of a variety of ways to 
illegally exploit a film’s official run, namely that (a) an exhibitor who rented a film 
legitimately for a specified period could try and extend the run an extra day or two 
before or at the conclusion of the film’s official run, (b) the cinema owner could rent 
the film for one of his own theaters and then screen it illegally at another theater he 
owned (c) two exhibitors could rent half as many films as they needed and then swap 
and share the titles back and forth nightly, giving each a full program at half the cost.  
Bicycling was the indirect reason why the CPB was formed, according to Kerry 
Segrave, author of Piracy in the Motion Picture Business (2003). Aside from this bit 
of history, one of Levin’s duties before his ascension to Copyright Protection Bureau 
chief was working for the Mutual Studio, delivering movie prints to local exhibitors.  
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In 1945, Will Hays retired and was succeeded by former U.S. chamber of 
Commerce leader Eric Johnson.  The motion picture industry at the time faced the 
ongoing challenge of television, which was slowing box office sales by creating a 
diversion for people who typically attended the cinema.  This trend forced studio 
executives to implore their workers to develop new technologies like Cinemascope to 
excite audiences and bolster business.  It was also in 1945 that the MPPDA split into 
two distinct branches: the MPAA, which would focus on the continued enforcement 
of the Hays Code, and the Motion Picture Association (MPA), which would 
concentrate exclusively on the international trade markets.87  Both of these branches 
functioned as part of the larger Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA), which 
became the sole export sales agent setting prices and terms of trade for films and their 
distribution to international markets.  Foreign markets became especially important to 
Hollywood after World War II.  Production facilities and filmmaking equipment were 
destroyed in most of continental Europe, and by 1944 Hollywood relied on a 
European market that was significantly scaled down from wartime activities.  Only 
the British Empire, Latin America and a host of smaller, neutral countries functioned 
as Hollywood’s foreign revenue stream and, by 1944 the American film companies 
concentrated their efforts in the United Kingdom, the most important international 
market at the time.  
The importance of international markets cannot be overstated when it comes 
to Hollywood’s success.  In an interview given with a reporter in 1968, former 
MPAA President Jack Valenti discussed his views on film and, to a larger extent, the 
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role the MPAA plays as it functions within the framework of American trade policy.  
Valenti discloses that the motion picture business relies on the earnings brought back 
by international distribution, which are critically important to the U.S. balance of 
payments, part of the “sinew that builds the industry.”88   That the MPEA had the 
only U.S. operation that negotiated exclusively on its own with foreign governments 
was of special significance to Valenti, and in this interview he earnestly embraces the 
MPEA’s nickname as the “little state department.”  Valenti pointed to international 
markets, declaring that the MPAA was especially concerned with 1) expanding film 
markets and keeping them open and viable, 2) reducing restrictions on American film 
by directly negotiating with its foreign trade partners, and 3) negotiating film import 
agreements as well as their rental terms.   
Kevin Lee argues that the cultural flows as they relate to film are entirely 
lopsided: American films now dominate foreign markets, but foreign films have 
failed to establish a notable presence in the U.S. market, accounting for only 1% of 
movies shown.89  The U.S. government has actively advocated domestic film industry 
interests in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements because Hollywood is of 
paramount importance to the U.S. economy.  The MPAA’s lobbying efforts, by 
which officials often intervene in bilateral trade relations to protect the MPAA’s 
interests, are notorious, even when these interests are counter to more immediate U.S. 
economic interests.90  
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Historically, it is not uncommon for conflicts of interest to dominate the 
MPAA’s agenda.  In the 1950s, studios began investing in the medium of television 
to increase their distribution power, eventually capitalizing on product distribution 
windowing, where media content is distributed from one channel to another within a 
certain time frame, in this case products and the redistribution of their films to 
television networks in the 1970s.  The decision to invest in television was not without 
its own set of conflicts.   
Other disagreements between the MPAA and the six studios include choosing 
the appropriate methods to stop piracy.  In 2002, for instance, Walt Disney Co. and 
Fox appealed to the United States government to push for legislation that directed the 
U.S. Commerce Department to provide ongoing oversight over peer to peer 
technologies such as the Napster platform which was used for sharing unauthorized 
films.91  Warner Bros., meanwhile, opposed government intervention because the 
studio believed the private sector should assume responsibility.   
The globalization and subsequent growth of the transnational corporation has 
bedeviled the MPAA, supplying the organization with a myriad of conflicts 
throughout its history.  When the Motion Picture Association was founded over 80 
years ago, the organization was essentially functioning for a one-reel town, and 
Hollywood had only censorship to battle.  Eventually, globalization affected not only 
the studios but the conglomerates who owned them, creating a diverse and often 
competing set of interests including multinational interest and ownership in Internet, 
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broadcast, cable, satellite, consumer electronics, music, publishing, theme parks and 
so on.    
As stated previously, the MPAA remains initially responsible for serving as 
an advocate for the six film studios: 20th Century Fox, Warner Bros., Paramount, 
Universal, Columbia, Universal, and Disney.  Based in Washington D.C.; it also has 
several branches operating in Los Angeles, California, an anti-piracy department in 
operation in New York, and international operations in Brussels, Sao Paulo, 
Singapore, and Toronto. 
 
MPAA’s Relationship with U.S. Federal Government 
Many of the MPAA’s leaders and employees have previous experience 
working within high profile positions with the federal government.  Will Hays, the 
first MPPDA (Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association, the film 
industry’s earliest organization, formed in 1922) president, was the former U.S. 
Postmaster General and former chair of the Republican National Committee. Hay’s 
experience with parcel and mail delivery would be especially advantageous in today’s 
film market when speed is so very crucial in matters related to media distribution and 
the continuous challenge to fight piracy.  Before the internet movie rental company 
Netflix shifted its business strategy to leveraging its internet streaming business, the 
company hired former U.S. Postmaster General William Henderson for a single year 
to help improve the delivery times of its large, red envelopes to consumer 
mailboxes.92  Providing a segue back to the MPAA’s tendency to recruit high-level 
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government officials, Jack Valenti, the legendary MPAA president (1966-2004), was 
former President Lyndon B. Johnson’s adviser.  And Dan Glickman, the previous 
MPAA president (2005-2010), is a former Congressman from the state of Kansas, 
where he held the title of Secretary of Agriculture before his congressional 
appointment to the House.     
Historically, the MPAA has been chronicled frequently by its critics as an 
equal opportunity offender: As I already illustrated, the organization’s 
aforementioned authority to negotiate on its own has earned it the moniker “the little 
state department.” Domestic interest groups like the MPAA are always trying to 
advance their own agendas in foreign trade relations, and American industry groups 
have played prominent roles in treaty negotiations since 1878. Historically, the 
increased emphasis on global IP (intellectual property) has placed American private 
sector actors in the forefront with agreements such as the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).93   Overall, the MPAA exemplifies how private sector interests often cross 
over into the international sector, allowing an organization to flex its economic 
influence in international trade discussions. 
The film industry and U.S. government have ties going back to both World 
Wars.  In 1916, American dominance of the global film market caused an 
international move to establish trade barriers in order to protect domestic film 
industries.  In response, Hollywood sought assistance from Washington to advocate 
fewer restrictions in the international trade market.  During World War II, Hollywood 
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played an instrumental role in assisting the United States to support the war and 
America’s information campaign.  Propaganda films such as the Frank Capra Why We 
Fight series (1942-1945) created a patriotic mindset for American citizens because it 
argued that human sacrifices were inevitable in military combat if Americans wanted 
to be free citizens.          
 
MPAA’s Public Stances on Piracy 
The MPAA’s public fight against piracy is well known and has been a major 
concern for the motion picture industry for over a century.  But what do audiences 
think of the recent multi-million dollar campaigns put forth by the MPAA?  
Specifically, is the message that piracy is equivalent to stealing acting as a deterrent?  
As a whole, the American public seems to respond in contradictory ways.  On the one 
hand, while the majority of the public is highly aware that using peer-to-peer 
technologies is illegal, they are not buying into the larger argument that the law, as it 
stands currently, is a compelling enough reason to “cease and desist.”  Moreover, 
previous research trying to link piracy with lost revenues has not been conclusive.  A 
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) study attempting to quantify the 
size and scope of piracy, including the impact of Web piracy to the film and music 
industries, show that piracy is a drain on the U.S. economy, the country’s tax revenue, 
and in some ways it has the potential to threaten national security and public health.94  
Several influential entertainment industry trade groups, including the MPAA, RIAA, 
and Screen Actors Guild (SAG) argued to the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement 
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Coordinator how they thought the government should be preventing piracy.95  The 
trade groups believed that the Department of Homeland Security and the Department 
of Justice should arrange “preventative measures” to combat piracy before major 
motion pictures are released.  One might assume that piracy falls under the legal 
domain of domestic law enforcement, but the U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, a department within the Homeland Security Office, is constantly 
investigating and implementing piracy protocols.  The DHS is made up of 22 
components, with one of them being the traditional customs service, which is the 
largest investigative arm of the DHS.96 
The MPAA has tried to link film piracy with national security for many years.  
In a 2009 study funded by the MPAA, the RAND group found that organized crime 
and terrorism are funded by pirated DVD sales, showing that mobsters from Russia to 
Malaysia and in a variety of gangs including the Big Circle Boys in Canada, and the 
Camorra Mafia in Italy have relied on pirated goods to fund their illegal activities for 
years.97 
 The data used to quantify piracy, however, is not reliable, according to the 
GAO.  In effect, each attempt by the U.S. government establishing economic losses 
resulting from counterfeiting had methodological limitations.  In this particular case, 
the method of measuring the losses was at issue.  In its 32-page report, the GAO 
comments, “Each method (of measuring) has limitations, and most experts observed 
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that it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the economy-wide impacts.”98 After 
the report was issued publicly, the press pronounced the report a “setback” for 
Hollywood and the MPAA, especially because the research revealed information 
considered to be taboo in countries like the United States which stringently enforces 
intellectual property laws.  The accountability office noted in its report the existence 
of data that shows piracy may actually benefit consumers in some contexts because 
consumers knowingly purchase a counterfeit product over a legitimate item because it 
is less expensive, or because the genuine product is not available. 99  
Many Americans continue to engage in peer-to-peer trading and other forms 
of piracy, and apparently they feel indifferent about the debates, according to Gallup 
polls.  The MPAA’s campaigns to shape the public perception that piracy is wrong 
receives widespread attention, yet in many cases the campaigns still do not inhibit 
illegal behavior. In a survey by the Gallup Poll (2003), 83% young people said that 
downloading music for free was acceptable.100 Freestone and Mitchell (2004) found 
evidence that Internet piracy, in the form of downloading music, was seen as the 
“least wrong” of misconduct because respondents did not do harm to others.101  
Similarly, it was found that most college students believed that downloading digital 
copyrighted files was neither illegal nor an offense.102 Typically, the respondents in 
these studies knew that stealing the property of another was illegal and unethical, and 
significant majorities were highly aware of intellectual property laws and regulations 
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prohibiting such behavior.  In short, college-aged individuals felt indifferent about 
piracy.  Besides price, being connected to the cultural milieu, and geography (many 
major films are simply not scheduled in small markets for exhibition), there are other 
reasons to explain illegal peer-to-peer file trading behaviors. Certainly, the 
immediacy of Internet technology, the perceived anonymity of participating in peer- 
to-peer file sharing and the relative ease of access to various unauthorized distribution 
channels are compelling reasons for piracy to occur. 
 
Conclusion 
As Mr. Glickman prepared to finish his six-year tenure with the MPAA and 
transition to the non-profit Refugees International, his time with the association was 
marked by criticism from many Hollywood insiders.  In March 2009 Hollywood 
CEOs agreed to extend his contract for only 18 months because they were reportedly 
unhappy with his inability to preserve $246,000,000 in tax breaks for the Hollywood 
studios and filmmakers as part of the massive U.S. economic stimulus package.103  
Illustrating the dire condition of the economy in Southern California, the Los Angeles 
Times remarked recently that Hollywood is now operating within a climate where 
even hosting a movie screening and dinner is fraught with ethical complications.104 
The Obama administration’s current campaign to impose strict rules on lobbying 
makes the job formidable for any future MPAA leader. 
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Understanding the MPAA and its history of strong enforcement with 
intellectual property rules is crucial to knowing how the trusted system works.  
Chapter 2 chronicled the long history of the association and its efforts to clean up the 
public perception that Hollywood was morally decadent. It also discussed how the 
MPAA typically tried to obtain unanimity in its dealings with the six film studios, 
especially with the decisions centered on content control.  But the film association 
will often venture beyond the confines of Hollywood in order to build alliances that 
secure its products.  The film association also helps to persuade major players in other 
industries like consumer electronics and computers that they must align themselves 
politically and economically with the content industries.105  According to Gillespie, 
institutional agreement must exist for the future adaptation of technical standards to 
materialize. 
The next chapter discusses the development of the Internet with respect to the 
arrangements between the MPAA and its affiliates to manage copyright over cultural 
products.  I speak to three people who currently or used to work with the film 
lobbying organization in a legal and/or technical capacity.  For this chapter, I also 
interview two individuals who demonstrate economic resistance to conventional 
media production and distribution practices through the management of their own 
parallel or co-existing trusted systems.  
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Chapter Three 
        Putting Names to the Trusted System    
Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I spoke via telephone to Dean Garfield, former RIAA lawyer, 
Executive Vice President and Chief Strategic Officer for the MPAA’s piracy 
campaign from 2003-2007.  Mr. Garfield was specifically recruited by the MPAA to 
help the film industry combat film piracy, which was increasing due to peer-to-peer 
file sharing that transpired on the Internet. In Hollywood’s trusted system, Mr. 
Garfield operated with a team that functioned as both the legal and rhetorical arm of 
the campaign that countered film piracy activities.  Garfield was also chiefly 
responsible for the MPAA’s legal strategy against individuals and businesses engaged 
in alleged copyright infringing activities.       
I also interviewed John Hurst, Chief Technology Officer for Cinecert, whose 
company was chosen by the six film studios to assist Hollywood and its conversion to 
a digital standard, which Hollywood argues is a higher quality, safer, and more 
economical alternative to film stock.  To illustrate, according to one studio executive, 
in 2005 a movie print cost $1,000-$1200 to manufacture versus a digital version which 
totaled a fraction of the amount, as it could be either played back on a disc or 
transferred electronically.106  I travelled to Burbank, California and met with Mr. Hurst 
at Cinecert in March 2010.  Besides Mr. Hurst and Cinecert, the Research Institute for 
Digital Media and Content housed at Keio University in Tokyo, Japan tests the digital 
standards and its attendant copy protection for use in international markets.  The 
Digital Cinema Initiatives (DCI) program, which is the formal name for this massive 
                                                            
106 Laura Holson, “Film Studios Reportedly Agree on Digital Standards,” New York Times, 
July 26, 2005, sec. Theater. 
 
 
 
74 
venture, is a partnership between Disney, Fox, Paramount, Sony Pictures 
Entertainment, Universal and Warner Bros., and came together in 2002 after 
Hollywood’s major studios made the announcement.  For the following three years, 
Hollywood was in discussions about how to effectively create and distribute digital 
films, but the parties involved could not agree on a standard technology for projectors, 
or who would reimburse or replace the theater equipment.107  As a whole, theater 
owners were opposed to footing the equipment costs, fearing that the $100,000 
projectors would quickly become obsolete if a set of standards were not available.108  
Conversely, the film studios argued they were not responsible for the projectors 
because they did not own the theaters.  From a numerical standpoint, Hollywood’s 
desire to convert thousands of theaters to digital playback standards deemed 
appropriate by DCI was a colossal enterprise. There were only 250 digital cinema-
ready screens available out of approximately 105,000 worldwide, at the time of DCI’s 
announcement.109 Besides our meeting in March 2010, I spoke with Mr. Hurst once on 
the telephone prior to our visit, and another time in April to follow up with some of the 
information we discussed.   
Also interviewed for this chapter is founding member of the CPTWG (Copy 
Protection Technical Working Group), James Burger, who additionally acted as the 
chief intellectual property attorney representing the consumer electronics industry as 
part of the SDMI coalition.  Burger is a long-term participant in the music and film 
industry’s various consortia, helping to draft the technical specifications and standards 
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of digital media on behalf of the consumer electronics industry (CE) and its products. 
He fills at least two roles in the trusted system; as an expert in intellectual property law 
for the technology industry, Mr. Burger must understand Capitol Hill and its policy-
making activities so he may better serve his clients. He is a lobbyist for the technology 
industry, and has previously voiced concerns over privacy regarding the Hollywood 
studios control over consumer hardware in people’s homes.  In J.D. Lasica’s Darknet, 
Burger is quoted gratuitously throughout the book on a number of technology issues, 
but this is the first time he has given an interview about the CPTWG.  It is important 
to note that these “working groups” are careful not to present themselves as standards 
organizations, and can pursue the shared technical, economic, and political 
arrangements that accompany them.110  I had the pleasure of speaking with Mr. Burger 
in Los Angeles at the CPTWG meeting in early January 2011, and on the telephone in 
late January, March, and also July 2011.  Mr. Burger is an attorney in Washington DC 
with Dow Lohnes.      
To further the discussion of the audience and how it functions within the piracy 
nexus, in the conclusion of the paper I speak to Simon Petersen, piracy consultant and 
professional media bootlegger and Dan Mickell, creator of Movie Land, which is a 
software program that illegally downloads and streams film and television programs to 
Apple’s mobile iPhone devices.  Both of these individuals operate within their own 
individual piracy networks and counter conventional media making practices by 
employing DIY (do it yourself) modes of engagement.   
 The political economy of the media and the ways in which the structures of 
media power limit and frame the activities of audiences is in constant tension with the 
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active dimension of audiences and their response to media messages.  It is a 
dichotomy that plays out in this investigation about media piracy.  How is the new 
media audience positioned when it is both consuming and producing content, or 
insofar as this investigation is concerned, when it is burning, copying, uploading and 
sharing content claimed by a third party?  In political economic terms, theorists have 
tried to define the file-sharing environment as a form of economic claims-making 
because the environment illustrates exchange relations associated with a set of means, 
whether it is music, films, games or software.111  The claims making becomes 
disputable when it impinges on others, in other words when it bears on someone else’s 
interest.112  
In a conventional political economic framework, critical approaches consider 
the audience as a commodity, emphasizing the “work” engaged by traditional 
audiences via the consumption of media content, given the monetization of audience 
attention by media structures that occurs in the media marketplace.113  However, the 
notion that the audience “works” exclusively through watching is no longer valid.114   
User generated content is playing an increasingly central role in the business models 
and strategies of media industries, advertisers and marketers. Terms like “prosumers” 
and “crowd sourcing” are a few of the ways that theorists try to illustrate the changing 
dynamics of the audience.  Napoli is correct in that the ability for audiences to produce 
content is not necessarily new (VCRs, video cameras, tape recorders) but the powerful 
distribution possibilities availed to individuals in the last decade because of the Web.    
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The notion of the consumer-producer and its reciprocal conforms to traditional 
interpretations of political economy because the audience is framed as being in service 
to or “monetizing” the media industries.  But in the world of illegal file sharing and 
bootlegging, defining the role of the audience is more difficult because file-sharers, 
peers, and other equivalents are not necessarily serving the media empires. With film 
piracy, individuals who are not part of the Hollywood film complex are nonetheless 
actively engaged in the production and distribution process.  Laikwan Pang describes 
how pirated films in Asia are part of a larger production and distribution system that 
falls outside the control of the US-centric cinemascape, which explains the fierceness 
of copyright discourses with regards to the criminalization of piracy.115  While pirates 
usually rely entirely on the official distributors for their advertising, they must work on 
the dubbing and subtitling themselves because the screener copies that serve as the 
master sources generally lack subtitles.  The subtitles and dubbing are added to the 
DVD at the eleventh hour, and the added features demonstrate how people outside the 
United States understand Hollywood movies.  For the moment, framed within a 
prevailing and countervailing power structure, the audience is demonstrating 
variations of resistance when it engages in piracy whether it is legal, economic, or 
political opposition.   
In the case of the MPAA, I have spent some time discussing the organization’s 
political modes of engagement in order to monopolize cultural flows.  The amount of 
foreign films distributed within the United States totaled less than 1% in 2010 versus 
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63% of Hollywood films in the international market.116  With film piracy, the Pirate 
Bay operation illustrates how the battle over existing pricing and distribution regimes 
extends to the state. As an example, around the world many followed the day-to-day 
activities of the Pirate Bay court case, culminating in 2009 when a Swedish Court 
decisively delivered a guilty verdict to the file-sharing service charged with 
contributory copyright infringement.  The decision came after an enormous amount of 
pressure was placed upon the Swedish judicial system to take down Pirate Bay, 
including when letters of protest from the heads of trade groups all over the world 
were sent to Swedish Justice Minister Asa Tortensson, charging that Pirate Bay was a 
place of collusive activities between state and anti-market.117  Future investigations 
will need to consider piracy in accordance with both traditional and new media 
definitions of political economy. 
The MPAA made the termination of Pirate Bay a top priority in 2006 as it 
pursued a host of other p2p networks for copyright infringement.  Dean Garfield, head 
of legal strategy and vice-president of the MPAA, managed the litigation team that 
eventually shut down Pirate Bay’s operation in Sweden, and was able to use 
information generated from another file infringing case involving Torrentspy in order 
to identify the names and locations of Pirate Bay’s founders. In the next section, I 
talked with Mr. Garfield about his priorities with the MPAA when he stepped into the 
role as Hollywood’s chief copyright prosecutor.           
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Dean Garfield 
I spoke with Dean Garfield on the telephone for one conversation in August 
2010 regarding his tenure with the Motion Picture Association of America (2003-
2008).  Mr. Garfield worked first with the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) as Vice President of Legal Affairs before he was recruited to become 
Executive Vice President and Chief Strategic Officer of the MPAA in 2003.  The 
Motion Picture Association of America is a broker between the six major film studios, 
building consensus and developing strategies over the global and domestic film market 
while also providing ongoing oversight on film ratings, trade, its partnerships with 
U.S. distribution and exhibition circuits, and its ongoing piracy campaign.  When 
Dean Garfield was hired away from the Recording Industry Association of America in 
2003 to serve as vice-president and head of the MPAA’s anti-piracy division, he was 
acutely aware of the media industry rhetoric consisting of the celestial jukebox, or 
“media anytime anywhere” campaign and spoke with me regarding how the MPAA 
could not successfully deliver on these promises.   
The “celestial jukebox” rhetoric proclaims that consumers of the future will 
experience unparalleled freedom, the freedom, for example, to access media whenever 
and wherever possible, constituting a fair exchange between producers of media 
products and consumers.  While the consumer will experience the freedom and 
flexibility of unconditional access, copyright owners will have a more exact measure 
of demand for their inventory, as well as the assurance that the technology is rigidly 
securing the media streams.  Yet online media stores and a host of other merchants 
continue wrapping their media files in Digital Rights Management software, software 
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that is antithetical to the celestial jukebox and ultimately translates into an unfair 
exchange weighted to the advantage of the media industries.  Likewise, never-ending 
contract disputes between the various actors prevent viewers from being “free” any 
time soon, in this case where content is easily distributed to mobile platforms such as 
phones and computer tablets.     
At the MPAA, Mr. Garfield was responsible for planning and enforcing 
litigation that led to the formal dissolution of several landmark file-sharing services 
including Torrentspy, Kazaa, Grokster and Limewire.118  In this interview, Mr. 
Garfield spoke with me about the objectives he pursued as head legal strategist and the 
public face overall of the organization’s campaign against media piracy.  At the time, 
the MPAA was trying to distance itself from the public relations debacle provoked by 
the RIAA, who used litigation and technological encroachment to dissuade music fans 
from illegal file sharing.  The RIAA mishandled their consumer base on several 
counts, using litigation excessively.  This unfortunate strategy, coupled with the 
RIAA’s inability to protect their digital products caused fans to rapidly bypass 
conventional, brick and mortar music stores in favor of acquiring music digitally.  I 
first ask Mr. Garfield if his colleagues at the MPAA ever discussed that he be out in 
front, publically, in the campaign against piracy, and mention that people could easily 
equate Jack Valenti’s name with film piracy because he was operating as the front man 
for he campaign.  His successor, Dan Glickman, was less of a public persona, which 
left a considerable void that someone needed to fill.  Garfield indicated that Glickman 
was very concerned with the issue but was faced with a film industry that experienced 
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a fairly significant downturn in revenue and he spent more time trying to come up with 
solutions for driving and understanding why the industry was losing large sums 
money.  Garfield also reported that he could not recall ever being approached by 
members of the MPAA to be the “public face” in the piracy campaign:     
DG: You know, I don't recall whether it was that well-calibrated (he chuckles) I 
think it was--you know, we had many a strategy session and at the time I was 
also transitioning between running our litigation efforts on a global basis and 
also running our strategy (laughs again) and so I think because of the dual role I 
played with the organization it just happened almost by default. Played out that 
way.  I mean one of the discussion points internally was making sure that 
whatever we did, since much of our focus was on education, would resonate 
with the folks we thought that were engaging in piracy.  And so the fact that I 
was in my early or mid-I was still in my early 30s I guess you know, it made 
sense for me to be out front on all these issues. The other thing was that I 
developed a relationship as it turns out (he laughs) with a lot of the developers 
of the sites that were most problematic for us. And so I just developed a deep 
understanding of what they were doing-- some personal relationships-- some of 
those guys are people that I keep in touch with, and so I think because it was 
easier to play that role.119 
 
 
In the interview, I asked Mr. Garfield to discuss his priorities with the piracy 
campaign when he became chief strategic officer of the MPAA in 2003, using his 
experience at the RIAA to plan future decisions with regard to public relations and 
legal strategy: 
 
DG: One of the things we tried to do at the Motion Picture Association was to 
learn lessons from the experiences of other industries, and certainly the 
recording industry because they were one of the first to be significantly 
impacted, certainly on the revenue side by the digital transition and the ability 
for people to, on a mass basis, to rip content. And some of those lessons were, 
you know, one making sure our communication with consumers was clear and 
making sure they recognize that the industry wanted to provide a wide range of 
consumer choices and meet consumer demand. Two was to be as clear as 
possible about the repercussions of engaging in piracy both for the long-term 
health of the content they were interested in but the kinds of people that piracy 
generally supported because there was a lot of evidence and still a lot of 
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evidence that those who are heavily engaged in piracy are involved with 
organized crime. There's actually a report out published by the RAND 
Corporation making this particular connection. And so those were some of the 
lessons that we learned. The one other important lesson was that technology 
was going to be an important part of the solution set but not the only solution. 
So recognize that whether it be technology or litigation which were two tools 
that were used by the recording industry, it had to be broader than that.120  
 
Here, Garfield describes the technological and legal apparatus as being part of 
the solution set, but not the only solution for the MPAA and their enforcement of anti-
piracy measures.  Garfield is very clear that reaching out to film goers was crucial at 
the start of his tenure, and that educating customers about appropriate use of 
copyrighted materials was the best method to improve the negative public perceptions 
brought on by the MPAA’s previous missteps with its fan base.  More importantly, 
Garfield expresses that the film industry was not in the position to deliver on the 
promises of the “media everywhere” campaign despite the fact that the consumer 
electronics industry had already laid the foundation.  All in all, according to Garfield, 
it was impossible to deliver on the promises of a celestial jukebox because the battles 
over intellectual property were much too pervasive and copyright laws were constantly 
being rewritten to meet the needs of a digital marketplace.  Later in Chapter 4, I 
discuss some of these important legal cases involving copyright that directly 
challenged the DMCA.   
During my conversation with Mr. Garfield, I introduced Tarleton Gillespie’s 
idea of a trusted system centered on content protection, which I argue for in this 
dissertation. The “trusted system” refers to the relationships between the 
technological, legal, economic and cultural arrangements that make all the elements of 
a regulatory regime work together.  These exclusive arrangements are important 
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because the MPAA relies on the strength of this “regime of alignment” to distribute 
and ultimately protect its video products.121 The trusted system is the interlinking of 
the technological, the legal, the institutional and the rhetorical in order to carefully 
direct consumer activity according to particular agendas.  The system creates a 
scenario in which legislators and courts of law also consent to play a supportive role 
with privately organized arrangements that profess to be serving the public interest, 
but the arrangements are not designed for those ends.122 
After the RIAA’s failure to successfully implement a scheme that would 
protect copyrighted music in digital formats, the MPAA threatened to withhold all 
film content for Internet distribution until a sufficient regulatory framework was put 
into place. The incorporation of DRM for Internet film distribution provided the first 
obstacle to individuals seeking to make unauthorized film copies.123  The recording 
and film industries’ use of DRM only played a minor role in a comprehensive four-
pronged strategy that sought to limit the control of their products. The passage of 
DMCA legislation also played a crucial role in the regime of control, which prohibited 
any content user from circumventing copyright encryption schemes. Also, legal efforts 
were employed to prosecute any users who were sharing and downloading content. 
The production of tools and networks that facilitate sharing and copying were banned.  
The incorporation of technological barriers that interfere with content production and 
exhibition, as well as devices used for exhibition manufactured in turn, prevented 
casual copying. The contractual arrangements between the content industries ensure 
that the guidelines imposed through law and technology are followed, and the special 
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interests representing the content industries convince legislators that such systems are 
compulsory.124  I asked Mr. Garfield to respond to the viability of the “trusted system” 
and its pre-existing assumptions:   
MC:     Looking at these elements as collaborative units in terms of all working 
together, the legal, the technological, you have the contractual agreements between the 
different players--looking back on your efforts with the MPAA, did you see any 
particular problems either from a legal, a technological standpoint from some of the 
individuals you were trying to work with, to produce content with, did you see leaks in 
the system at times? Or are you fairly comfortable with all of these elements working 
together and the strength of those partnerships? 
 
DG:     Here's my initial impression: there were many problems (laughs) and I'm 
intrigued by--I’m not familiar with the idea of the trusted system-- but I'm intrigued by 
it because it all suggests that these are integrated systems that work well together and 
presumably would work better over time together as they become more integrated and 
trust is built. My sense is, in hindsight, is you had these pillars and some sort of system 
in place and that you had institutions, well-established institutions, you had a legal 
regime and all of these people and personalities and technology, but the relationships 
were, and the integration of all of those systems were fairly new. And so we were 
figuring out what kind of system we wanted to create in a time that was pretty chaotic 
and disruptive. And so there were many occasions in which it worked fairly well but 
perhaps more occasions where it just didn't work well at all. I would say that it worked 
better at the MPAA than it did at the RIAA but that may have been just a factor of 
time in that we had more time for cohesiveness and integration and trust to develop 
among the various systems. The law was exceptionally unclear: you had legislation in 
the DMCA that was untested particularly as it related to the challenges of the time, so 
we were all trying to figure out in grappling with some solid foundation, while all the 
while realizing that whatever solutions we were coming up with at the time were 
intermediate because the real long-term solutions were ones that we could not 
immediately deliver, which is allowing people to enjoy and appreciate the content 
wherever, whenever they wanted to.125  
 
Garfield’s comments about his day-to-day experiences reflect chaos at the 
MPAA that is not made plain in Gillespie’s investigation.  Readers may come away 
with erroneous ideas that the MPAA’s regulatory framework is monolithic or 
immutable, but the DMCA, which is the cornerstone of the MPAA’s trusted system, 
was implemented several years before digital distribution became plausible for the 
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masses.  Following the DMCA’s passage, the RIAA and MPAA’s subsequent lawsuits 
against individuals and companies tested the legislation’s margins.  For instance, 
during the precedent-setting cases featuring p2p file sharing services Napster and 
Grokster, both defendants sought protection under section 512 of the DMCA, 
otherwise known as the Safe Harbor Provision, which essentially pardons an online 
service provider for the illegal activities of its users.  This exemption, which I discuss 
in detail in Chapter Four, was initially granted as a limited concession to free-speech 
advocates, librarians, and other advocacy groups.  The Napster case was the first to 
challenge the definitions of the Safe Harbor Provisions. Napster subsequently lost the 
case as the service was not officially determined to be  “transmitting, routing or 
providing connections for a system or network controlled or operated by an OSP” 
(online service provider), but instead it pointed users to one another in order to 
exchange digital materials.126   In the case of Grokster, the Supreme Court reversed the 
9th District Court decision and proceeded to narrow the definitions of the safe harbor 
provisions, which was a major departure from the Sony vs. Betamax case, which I will 
discuss later.   
One of the central issues to take away from this dissertation is that although 
repeated challenges to the DMCA legislation gave way to some rather minor 
exemptions, the Library of Congress ultimately made room for the alterations.  
Unfortunately, despite the Internet-provided tools to make communication faster, the 
DMCA is not adapting to the Internet ecosystem fast enough.  
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In reality, following the official signing of the DMCA legislation, almost two 
years passed before the enormously popular file-sharing service Napster received word 
it was the target of a colossal lawsuit brought on by eighteen music companies on 
December 6, 1999.127  The RIAA was not interested in quashing the p2p service and 
actually participated in informal discussions for many months with Napster executives 
regarding how it could legally incorporate the p2p file sharing technology into its own 
business model.  With Napster, the press generally endorsed Napster’s open source 
technology and declared that it laid the foundation for future, lawful sales of digital 
music.  In the May 15, 2000 issue of Business Week, Napster founder Shawn Fanning 
is even featured on the cover along with four other most influential people in the 
“electronic” business.128  At the same time, the courts were uniformly supportive of 
the DMCA and the publishing industries and shut down the service as it tried 
unsuccessfully to negotiate a partnership with Bertelsmann, the world’s fifth-largest 
media conglomerate.129          
   
“Who Makes Movies?” Campaign 
Previously, Mr. Garfield discussed how the MPAA needed to redraft its public 
relations operation to connect more directly with consumers.  The MPAA knew that 
movie fans were tired of being depicted as the public enemy in piracy advertisements, 
which provoked the organization to launch a new series of public service 
announcements. In this next section, I ask Mr. Garfield to address a specific 
commercial crafted by the organization that attempted to show the economic harm 
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from piracy affecting ordinary people who work on Hollywood production crews.  The 
campaign, entitled Who Makes Movies? (2005), was jointly helmed by several 
international associations and by various motion picture workers’ guild heavyweights, 
including the Directors Guild of America, the International Alliance of Theatrical 
Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts, the Motion 
Picture Editors Guild, the Screen Actors Guild and the Writers Guild of America. In 
all of the public service announcements, the argument is that film piracy directly 
jeopardizes “below the line” workflow.  The campaign consists of five individual short 
films featuring Hollywood blue-collar crewmembers describing how their livelihoods 
depend on a full schedule of workdays.  The subjects of the spots include a set painter, 
a director of animation, a grip, a make-up artist and a stuntman, all explaining their job 
responsibilities and offering sometimes intimate details about their backgrounds. For 
example, a set painter divulges that he met his wife while working on The Big Chill, 
all the while imploring viewers that illegal downloading diminishes the earnings of 
ordinary workers.   In the following section, I ask Mr. Garfield about this particular 
campaign: 
MC:   There was one particular campaign that the MPAA created, and I'm not sure if-- 
were you still there when the MPAA started to put faces on the individuals that were 
dealing with piracy losses?  I'm speaking specifically about the commercials that 
featured gaffers, and lighters and scenic designers-- 
 
DG:  Yes. (Laughs) No, no--I was there.  
 
MC:    Okay.  Because it seemed to me--and I have to ask you this because as someone 
who actually saw the commercial… and it's my understanding the folks that were 
being featured were being hurt by piracy--at least from an economic standpoint-- and 
it was certainly being argued that these folks were losing-- I'm not sure what they were 
losing. They were losing something in the commercial. But it seemed when looking at 
it from an economic perspective it was always my understanding that the folks being 
featured were being paid on a per job or per day basis, so I wasn't really understanding 
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how they were losing money due to consumer piracy. And maybe that's something you 
can explain and help me understand.  
 
DG:    (laughs) Yeah. I think the idea is--I can always try. I don’t know how good it 
will be because I didn't look at the book (laughs).  I think the idea is that everyone 
loses- so if there are less dollars coming in and your costs are remaining fairly 
constant, or going up, then you have to make cuts somewhere and you may make 
those cuts, not in saying I'm going to not work with this particular makeup artist or 
grip but you'll say, which is played out to be true is I will produce--and I think all the 
studios have done this--I will produce 12 movies each year rather than 20. And so 
even though that grip may be working on a contractual per film basis, it just means 
that there are 8 less movies he or she can compete to work on.  So that's the economic 
argument. 
 
MC:    And the argument is less output is due strictly to piracy, or other factors? 
 
DG:     Oh sure. I mean, come on. You have a minute to tell a story and that story is 
about piracy so that's the story you tell.  It's a lot more complicated than that because if 
you look at also public records-what the MPAA put out every year (which the research 
group reported to me, so I know this to be true) is that the cost of production was 
increasing, at the same time that the sector was being challenged, so it wasn't just that 
we were losing money because fewer people were going to the theater--that was true--
but we were compounding it by paying actresses and actors otherwise spending more 
money to make each movie. We told a simple story, recognizing that it was a lot more 
complex than that. But commercials are also partial truth. 
  
MC:  I had to ask. 
 
DG:    No.  No. It’s reasonable. It’s reasonable. Truth be told, internally a lot of folks 
(laughs) thought those commercials were kind of hokey, and whenever you went to the 
theater and you saw it, the reactions suggested that the general public thought they 
were a bit hokey, too.130  
 
 
Many consumers felt the MPAA was being disingenuous through the Who 
Makes Movies? ads, venturing to manufacture sympathy among audiences who, 
despite being previous rhetorical targets for the film industry on many occasions, still 
went to the theater.  Although general box office attendance was down for 2004, 
                                                            
130 Dean Garfield, telephone interview by Matthew Cohen, July 15, 2010, transcript. 
 
 
 
89 
overall ticket gross exceeded previous years because Hollywood raised the price of an 
individual movie ticket.131  
 At least three videos were released by individuals via the YouTube platform to 
counter and lampoon the organization’s new and “improved” piracy ads.132  The 
YouTube mock public service announcement includes an actress working in 
pornography films, a person made to look like a zombie, and a writer.  The “writer” 
gag is an industry specific joke in which the screenwriting profession is typically made 
out to be invisible among the larger film complex.  Another video, “Who Steals 
Movies?” features a bootlegger who worries incessantly that his career will end if the 
MPAA’s piracy campaign is successful.133   
 Garfield’s admonition that the public service announcements were “hokey” 
again reflects disunity at the MPAA that has not been made public.  Although not 
necessarily throwing mud on the wall and seeing what sticks, the MPAA was clearly 
struggling with public relations as it retooled its new and improved piracy ads to 
resound more effectively with consumers.             
Through my discussions with other individuals in the industry who are dealing with 
content protection it seems like that there is some unanimity that--a lot of these people 
felt that Twentieth Century Fox specifically had very different ways or very different 
views in terms of how to manage content and that sometimes stances taken by that 
particular studio may have prevented things from moving forward.   
 
DG: Hmm.  I don't know. No. I mean, I was the person managing the litigation. Look, 
we all approached it from different perspectives and came away different.  The one -- 
the unique thing about where we were is that we heard from everyone because at the 
time I was coordinating a lot of this litigation and so, unlike some of the other studios 
or people, they saw it from their perspective. I would say that, sure, each of the studios 
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had their own personality and their personality probably stood out-- at least Fox, to the 
extent that a studio can have a personality, but certainly a culture. They probably stood 
out because they were more aggressive in advancing their perspective at certain points 
in the litigation. But I don't think that necessarily resulted in delay and prevented us 
from doing anything. I think more than anything, they just wanted to be really 
aggressive (laughs). And there were other studios, perhaps, more… and that's not to 
suggest that Fox wasn't cerebral-- but more cerebral. Warner Bros., for example, had a 
litigation team that included folks who spent hours and a lot of time grouping over 
these issues and were very cerebral about it and so you know, you've got those sorts of 
dichotomies where groups of folks who have thought about it think here's a particular 
road and it may end up because they thought about it for so long, it may it end up 
being a little more conservative and others like Fox who think we've got to be as 
aggressive as possible and take this approach in advancing our agenda. I think it 
worked because the issues were so new and so complex that schism and diversity in 
perspective actually helped us to navigate it all in a way that made sense-- because we 
weren’t pulled to any one extreme, at least on a consistent basis. The reality was there 
was no law or guiding principles, so we were all figuring it out. 
 
MC: Is there one particular disagreement that you can talk about? Anything in 
particular with the studios? 
 
DG: There were tons. (Laughs). 
 
After the creation of Edison’s Motion Picture Patents Corporation (MPPC) in 
the early twentieth century, the drive towards the “Americanization” of the domestic 
market was aided by the legal codification of film as intellectual property, and 
Hollywood continues to prosper internationally because it understands that content 
protection is part of the infrastructure that binds otherwise competing companies 
together, and it has a willing servant in the state.134  Studio moguls who would 
otherwise balk at cooperating with one another agree on the importance of enforcing 
intellectual property and lessening the international trade restrictions on audio video 
products. To no one’s surprise, when Hollywood’s war with technology is placed 
within the context of IP enforcement and free trade, there is a resounding clash, as 
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when Hollywood complains that new communication technologies cause 
programming to flow too freely.135   
The Hollywood studios also band together when it comes to promoting joint 
ventures such as web distribution start ups (BitTorrent), and co-production (such as 
the agreement to furnish Los Angeles studio space for the Indian Bollywood industry. 
Co-production terms also included a joint effort to fight film piracy.)136 Before the 
1950s, film output was dominated by the major studios, which tended to use their own 
stages, facilities, and staff on productions, but further production capacity in these 
locations was provided by smaller independent companies that made only a few films 
a year.137  The independents could not own or even afford to occupy entire studios for 
the entirety of filming, and relied on rental studios and some of the larger Hollywood 
studios (like Universal) that could rent space and provide labor support to the 
independent producers.   
The studios also cooperate with one another when their films are produced in 
international locations.  More recently, the three Matrix films coproduced by Warner 
Bros. and Village Roadshow were made at Fox Studios Australia in Sydney.  20th 
Century Fox and Disney Television have both produced a collection of movies of the 
week at the Warner Roadshow Studios in Queensland. When sufficiently motivated, 
the film studios work together.  In order to lower the amount of restrictions and trade 
barriers that affected the Hollywood industry after World War II, the MPAA’s 
foreign-office distribution equivalent, the Motion Picture Association (MPA), was 
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created.  The association consists currently of Disney, Sony, 20th Century-Fox 
International,  Paramount Pictures, Universal International Films and Warner Bros. 
International Theatrical Distribution.138 
MC: Is there one where you can actually articulate to me where there was a problem 
and a solution that was implemented? 
 
DG: A big one was that each stage in the Grokster litigation for example, we lost twice 
before we ultimately won at the Supreme Court. So, there were divisive agreements on 
one, what legal theories to advance? And then two, who should be our lawyer?  At the 
District Court, (and this is all part of the public record) the person who argued the case 
at the District Court was David Kendall. The person who argued the case at the Court 
of Appeals was Russ Frackman. What happened to David? (Laughs) And the person 
who argued the case at the Supreme Court was Don Virelli. So what happened to 
Russ? So, you know I think some of the smaller disagreements ultimately rolled up 
into choice of counsel at each stage that we were unsuccessful. Those were really 
challenging because each of those counsels had long-term relationships with particular 
studios and particular record companies because that case in particular was one in 
which both the entire industry was aligned. So is the motion picture industry, the 
publishers, and the record companies and so were a lot of strong personalities that had 
to be managed, and what was due after each loss became the tension.139 
  
This rather intimidating “alignment” of the content industries versus Grokster was 
owed to the millions of copyrighted music and film properties being traded via the 
online platform, to the chagrin of both industries.  At the district level, David Kendall, 
the primary lawyer representing the six film studios, specifically stated that his 
plaintiffs had no problem with the peer-to-peer technology if the content being shared 
was “proper,” but in this scenario, Grokster defendants were essentially running a 
cybernetic Alice’s Restaurant, and the menu featured his client’s protected content.140   
Garfield talks about how changes in counsel and disagreements over legal 
strategy were brought on by the MPAA’s failure to win the Grokster case at the 
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district level.  The MPAA initially lost in federal district court when a judge ruled that 
the decentralized nature of the file sharing service made it difficult for Grokster to 
supervise and control content being uploaded and shared by its users.  When the 
studios appealed the decision in 2004, a different attorney, Russ Frackman, 
represented the plaintiffs and adopted a different interrogation to advance the studios’ 
claims: Could Grokster knowingly build, operate, and profit from a business that was 
constructed and depended on preventable, massive copyright infringement?141   
Using Sony research that came out of the Universal vs. Betamax case, 
Frackman argued that 75% of Betamax users were more interested in the device’s 
time-shifting capabilities than copying and profiting from the device’s recordings.  
Additionally, Frackman asserted that there was no evidence the device’s 
“infringements” could be separated from legal behavior.  Thirdly, unlike Grokster, 
Sony did not pursue a relationship with its clients following the sale.  A consumer 
simply purchased a VCR or VTR device at a consumer electronics store, and this 
constituted the extent of the relationship, as there were no more direct exchanges 
between the two parties.  With Grokster, according to Frackman, the company actually 
gave away the software; in fact, Grokster licensed it for the very purpose of 
capitalizing on its price of free.  And Frackman argued that unlike Sony, who had no 
knowledge of how many infringing products were made available via the Betamax, 
Napster knew that 90% of its files were copyrighted.142 Napster, of course, was the 
first dominating emblem of copyright owner’s fears because its principal aim was to 
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enable anyone with a computer and a connection to the Internet to copy music for free 
from another Napster user.143   
Despite Grokster’s claims that it was impossible to monitor the content being 
shared, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the content industries. The central 
problem of how to prevent access and use of certain kinds of content transitioned to 
how to monitor access and use.  Following Grokster’s surprising court decision, 
technical projects from around the world were enlisted to help see the idea of a 
celestial jukebox come to pass.  The systems were designed to provide an ecosystem 
that recorded and rewarded the individual digital works being used, in other words the 
logging and remuneration to the appropriate party.  The technical measures protecting 
the content, however, were an essential piece of the puzzle still missing with this new 
“control lightly, audit tightly” attitude, as well as the need for developing controlling 
legislation that reinforced technical protection.  Two consortiums, the DVD-CCA and 
the CPTWG, were implemented by the MPAA in the mid-1990s to take charge of the 
content protection issues related to digital videodiscs.   
 
DVD-Copy Control Association and the Content Protection Technical Working 
Group (CPTWG) 
In the following section, I investigate the various consortia centered on content 
protection technologies for the film industry, in this case the DVD-CCA (DVD-Copy 
Control Association) and CPTWG (Content Protection Technical Working Group).  I 
also interview a founding member of the CPTWG, who played an essential role from 
his participation in the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) consortium.  The 
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SDMI, as you will see, failed to arrive at consensus in order to protect .mp3 files 
online; likewise, the Recording Industry Association of America’s inability to 
transition away from the economic juggernaut made from compact disc sales became a 
tale of what not to do while the content industries as a whole studied how it would 
capitalize from Internet distribution.   
The DVD-CCA and the CPTWG are the two primary organizations responsible 
for holding discussions centered on content protection technologies for film, originally 
coming together when the film industry began discussions with the Consumer 
Electronics industry in 1996 regarding the technical specifications for Digital Video 
Discs (DVDs).  Both organizations commenced out of initiatives put forth by the 
MPAA.  A third organization, the DVD Forum, is based in Japan and is an 
international organization where hardware manufacturers, software firms, and content 
providers discuss improvement to the DVD format and its technical specifications and 
innovations.   
The CPTWG and DVD-CCA organizations focus their energies on copyright 
protection, bringing together intellectual property attorneys, engineers, and 
representatives from the consumer electronics industry.  The organizations schedule 
joint meetings on a quarterly basis, occurring at a hotel in downtown Los Angeles near 
the Los Angeles International Airport.  On Tuesday, January 11, 2011 I attended the 
public session of the CPTWG’s coalition. The meeting occurred at the Westin Hotel-
LAX.   
In the next section, I discuss my observations and overall impressions as an 
attendee at the CPTWG gathering.  I should state that the CPTWG and DVD-CCA 
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operate in a clandestine fashion.  For instance, when I visited the CPTWG website, 
CPTWG.org, I discovered that only a partial portion of the day was open for citizens’ 
participation.  As an aside, the website is not operating at the time I am writing this.  
When the site actually functioned, it was clear that the MPAA paid no notice to it, as 
there were multiple, non-working “dead” links supposedly containing archived 
information from previous meetings.  Additionally, the official CPTWG site stated 
that the next meeting would be held in July 2010, but I was reading this information 
and six months had passed with no new meeting announced.  Clicking through crudely 
devised web content, I was finally able to locate an MPAA contact, Jill Whitley, who 
arranged through e-mail for me to attend the gathering.   
When I checked in at the Westin Hotel, the front desk staff informed me that 
there were no consortium materials available that described the agenda for the 
meeting.  Later, I was able to glean from one attendee that the consortium opened their 
meetings to the public because of external advocacy group pressures, and for now, a 
two-hour window exists at each meeting for citizens to attend the event.  The CPTWG 
does not admit individuals affiliated with the press. 
Via the hotel elevator, I arrived at the second floor and examined the various 
events scheduled at the Westin conference center.  One medium-sized conference 
room was reserved for the DVD-CCA, and in another, larger room down the hallway 
was a much larger room set-aside for the CPTWG.  I briefly thought of Kirby Dick’s 
This Film is Not Yet Rated (2006) where the director surreptitiously chronicles the 
banal, day-to-day activities of MPAA film ratings board members.  I knew that I was 
definitely interested to see what a DVD-CCA meeting looked like and found myself 
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knocking and then walking directly into their conference room.  I estimated eight to 
nine individuals to be situated around a conference table, with a large tablet of paper 
poised on a tripod at the front of the room.  This was the DVD-CCA, the organization 
that developed copy protection, or CSS (content scrambling system) code for DVDs   I 
was quickly redirected to leave when I asked if the DVD-CCA meeting was open to 
the public.  The man with whom I spoke did not introduce himself or tell me what 
organization he represented.   
Next, I went to the CPTWG meeting room and met Jill Whitley, Motion 
Picture Association of America (MPAA) representative, who told me that she did not 
know specifically what was happening at the working group meeting.  She then asked 
me to put my name and e-mail address on a master list so I would be informed of 
future CPTWG activities.  I have not received any correspondence from the MPAA 
since the January event, although, as I mentioned, the MPAA purposefully suppresses 
information and does not make the affairs of these consortiums public.  Ms. Whitley 
informed me that the “regulars” would be in attendance, a cross section of people from 
companies like Toshiba and Hitachi, although the annual Consumer Electronics 
Tradeshow (CES) occurring simultaneously in Las Vegas would prevent some 
individuals from attending this particular CPTWG meeting.  Ms. Whitley told me to 
come back at 10 am when the meeting was scheduled to begin. 
When the meeting commenced, a gentleman read a memorandum reminding 
attendees that the organization was not a government entity, and no individual could 
speak of any particular company’s product marketing or business plan (trade secrets or 
proprietary information) nor speak to a member of the press regarding the meeting’s 
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proceedings.  We were then told to introduce ourselves in a round-robin fashion, and 
finally the moderator, intellectual property attorney James Burger, launched into the 
formal agenda.  Representatives from Hewlett-Packard, Pioneer, Phillips, IBM, LMI, 
Disney, Toshiba, Sony, Panasonic and many other high profile companies were in 
attendance. 
One of the characteristics of industry niche-specific gatherings like this is the 
almost code-like humor that is generally only understood by the professionals in 
attendance. As an example, in his seminal album Comedy Isn’t Pretty, comedian Steve 
Martin jokes that he just returned from attending a hardware convention and then 
launches into a routine using acronyms and industry speak that both alienates and 
makes the audience laugh because the comedian’s expressions are incredibly esoteric.  
Mr. Burger’s opening comment to the group reminds me of Martin’s routine as he 
quipped that he normally plays military music when the CPTWG meeting begins 
because the compositions are in the public domain.  Mr. Burger then spoke about the 
various pending, high-profile lawsuits that involve the music and film industry, 
including EMI vs. MP3 Tunes, an important legal case that will set future precedents 
regarding cloud-based music services.  In the case, EMI, a multinational music label, 
claims that MP3 Tunes is violating copyright laws by offering a virtual locker service 
where consumers can sync personal digital music and video collections to the cloud 
and access them from anywhere. EMI claims that MP3 Tunes should be held 
responsible for any of the infringing content stored in the lockers.  MP3 Tunes is 
relying on the DMCA Safe Harbor Provision.  To qualify for the exemption, an OSP 
must not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, but it 
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is difficult in some cases to prove what a “direct financial benefit” actually is.144  In 
other court cases, the defendant had to be depicted as providing a draw or incentive to 
consumers that induced the infringement to occur.  The safe harbor provision dictates 
that the service provider take down or disable access to the infringing content when 
the copyright holder has notified it in writing.  As an illustration, Google’s Youtube 
conducts its operations in this way, although Mr. Burger mentions that the Youtube vs. 
Viacom case continues as Viacom attempts to reverse a decision ruled on in 2010 that 
found Youtube to be in compliance of DMCA statutes.    
Other cases mentioned at the meeting include the four major U.S. television 
networks (CBS, ABC, NBC, FOX) against Internet video company Filmon, which had 
a temporary injunction filed against it to stop streaming television channels over the 
web.  The company does not charge consumers for the service and generates its 
revenue through advertisements.  In an amusing moment that detracted from a 
somewhat dry session, Mr. Burger mentioned that the judge chastised the defense for 
copying large amounts of the plaintiff’s briefing to its own brief.   
During lunch, the engineers discussed some of the major developments at the 
Consumer Electronics show, and conversations about the latest 3-d televisions tend to 
dominate discussions.  Brad Hunt, former CTO (Chief Technology Officer) with the 
MPAA (1999-2007) tells me that Hollywood is excited about the upcoming DECE 
initiative (Digital Entertainment Content Ecosystem) that allows a consumer to buy 
digital content online and make unlimited copies of such content, which can be played 
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on up to 12 different devices registered to the consumer's account.145  Apparently, the 
content is bound to the consumer's domain, and the ecosystem supports multiple 
DRMs in order to solve the DRM interoperability problem. Mr. Hunt has blamed 
DRM interoperability for being intrusive and frustrating consumer attempts to play 
purchased content on different devices. At a 2006 Digital Home Developer's 
Conference, Mr. Hunt argued that piracy was the inevitable outcome of the movie and 
music industries’ inability to provide an interoperable DRM solution. UltraViolet, 
which in the brand name for DECE content and devices, will encourage a reversal in 
the downturn of DVD sales, according to Mr. Hunt.  Before the meeting concluded, I 
introduced myself to Mr. Burger and he agreed to speak with me at a later time about 
the CPTWG’s history.  
 
Interview With James Burger, IP Attorney, Charter Member of the CPTWG and 
SDMI Coalitions 
 I conducted the following interview with Mr. Burger in late January 2011 
where he spoke with me about his background with the CPTWG organization.  He 
first distinguished the various consortia centered on Digital Video Disc standards and 
technical specifications. 
MC: Are you an official member of the CPTWG? 
 
JB: I’m as official a member as one could be.  I’ve been to every meeting except one. I 
can tell you, if you’re curious how many people attended the last meeting? Well over 
100.  The DVD forum is two sets of organizations. The DVD Forum and the DVD-
CCA. The DVD forum was really the general set of specifications as to what 
constitutes different types of DVDs. With respect to copy protection, that is the DVD 
CCA. These are two different organizations and it’s easy to get confused. 
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MC: Can you explain the official role of the copy protection technical working group? 
 
JC: It’s an interesting question when you say “official” because it’s never had 
organizational papers or stuff like a formal body. Essentially what happened to take 
you back in time is through--I don’t know the exact dates because our industry wasn’t 
much involved in the development of the DVD technology. There were two competing 
standards for a while--Sony and Philips. And then Toshiba, Matushita. And some 
others were battling out the standards. In the first place in our industry, the IT industry 
chose to stand on the sidelines. So they settled on a joint standard, ultimately, and of 
course they--and I’m oversimplifying here- but they went to Hollywood, and 
Hollywood took a look at the DVD and said, “This is really great-it’s digital, it’s 
cheaper to make at the end of the day as opposed to making a VHS tape. The quality is 
much better. And the color- even on NTSC. You know the joke about NTSC? The old 
analog TV standard-never the same color. And we have surround sound stereo. It’s a 
smaller package. It’s easier to ship. Better to put on the shelf. It will also make people 
rebuy their VHS collection because it’s so much better. You know, everything is 
wonderful! Wait. It’s digital. People can make copies of it if we don’t protect it. So 
they went off and then negotiated (they, meaning the MPAA members) went off and 
negotiated with the consumer electronics industry to figure out a copy protection 
standard, and the consumer electronics industry had this familiarity with a technology 
called… I stumble over technology-a technology called “serial copy management 
system” which was what was in CDs. And it’s just two bits, but you have to look for 
that tells you whether the “in clear “material can be copied and under what conditions. 
And they were very simple conditions-- you know--it was only two bits so you can’t 
have a lot of states. So you have two bits and the device has to look for those two bits 
and decide based on those bits how to treat whether it can copy or not copy the 
material. They brought that same system into-without consulting our industry into the 
DVD and they had a draft statute-- it was about 39 pages, and a draft out of 49 
technical reference documents telling everything that you had to do to protect the 
content.  And they gave us two weeks because they wanted to get it into Congress-this 
was like April of 1996-they gave us two weeks to get into-to tell them what we 
thought. And there were two reactions. The technical reactions were ridiculous 
because the two bits came with every 1 million bytes essentially or bits. So you had to 
keep going back and forth iterating and looking for these two bits. Which, at that 
point, overwhelms the process of a PC. This was 1996 and we didn’t have gigahertz 
processors. The technical people didn’t know whether to laugh or cry and the other 
thing was the content was in the clear. I mean what junior high student couldn’t write 
a routine to flip the bits? The whole thing was ridiculous.146  
 
 
 
I should mention that Mr. Burger’s concerns about consumer privacy are sometimes 
overshadowed by economics, which is illustrative of the trusted system’s “command 
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and control” stance when it comes to the protection of its properties.   In 2005, he was 
interviewed in J.D. Lasica’s Darknet and described the MPAA discussions that led to 
the construction of the first DVD player. Burger tells Lasica that a representative from 
Universal Studios actually floated the idea to other participating committee members 
that a Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite chip be placed in every DVD player 
and computer sold with a DVD drive, and Hollywood could then enforce its system of 
copyright control from the sky.147  Burger recounted the reaction of the various 
computer and electronics people at the table who listened to this “audacious” idea of 
inserting a tracking mechanism in millions of consumer machines.  “We all looked at 
each other, a little dumbfounded,” say Burger.  “Because of the privacy issues?” asks 
Lasica.  “Oh, no.  Because of the added expense. Do you know how much GPS-chips 
cost back then?”148  
Burger tells me that the consumer electronics industry did not initially agree 
to the MPAA’s statuette listing the rules and regulations over the newly minted DVD 
player, and when it could record and not record content.  Consequently, Burger had to 
inform MPAA president Jack Valenti as designated representative for the Consumer 
Electronics Association and following this, the CPTWG formed:  
So I had the pleasure of getting up in front of Jack Valenti at the mirrored 
Versailles conference room of Patton Bo--I was representing Sony at the time-- 
to stand up and say there's no way our industry is going to agree with this 
legislation. Now, we had managed to negotiate our way out under the Audio 
Home Recording Act, although it took the ninth circuit to remind Carey 
Sherman and the RIAA that we did but I knew this time weren't going to get out 
of it. Hollywood was absolutely crazy about this. So I said, “Look, here's what 
we’ll agree to do. Form an organization with our best technical people, 
encryption people, and computing people, with your best engineers. Plus, our 
businesspeople and lawyers, and let's create self-protection. In other words, 
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encryption for the movies. And then that organization will turn this all over 
ultimately to a private entity which will license the keys and algorithms and 
we’ll have content protection rules so people want to build a device that has a 
DVD in it to do recording and stuff, but does not want to play movies that don't 
have to agree. And I said at the time, “And by the way, this will be broken. It's 
not a question of “if,” it's a question of “when.”  But the point being is that it 
will hopefully keep honest people honest and it will give you time to get on the 
market, and all that proved to be true and so that's when we formed CPTWG.  I 
think it took us almost 3 years to get to a final organization and then we were 
negotiating over issues for years later.149 
 
 
 In the next section, I ask Mr. Burger to explain the purpose of the 
CPTWG group and the influence it has over the film industry.  I was especially 
concerned with how the overall influence of working groups and consortia like 
this organization are not considered to be collusive or anti-competitive:   
 
JB: In the very beginning, this came about- the MPAA and consumer electronics 
industry back in 96 had agreed that they would get a law passed to require every 
digital device capable of making a recording to comply with the ridiculous CGMSD 
and so that would be what we would call “tech mandate” so we said was “look, what 
you do is you encrypt the disk and you create a license so if you want to play an 
encrypted disk you have to get a DVD CSS license. You’re free to get it or not get it. 
We would’ve said, here’s this distribution system that we all agree to use but you have 
to agree to comply with this DRM otherwise you can’t play. But it isn’t that you have 
to do it.  It’s a quid pro quo.  Look, I’m not a big fan of DRM. My personal DRM 
would let you play anywhere, but if you attempted to put it on the Internet it would 
say, “Matt, you really shouldn’t share that song with your million closest friends.” But 
I’m not God, and I can’t make that happen. It isn’t like there is some government 
mandate. 
 
Me: No. No. But there is pressure akin to a film not complying with the MPAA 
standards and getting slapped with an NC-17 rating. And then a director can’t 
distribute his film widely. You really have to play ball. 
 
JB: Well, right. That’s true. You do. What is the alternative to that? We don’t get a 
new format? That was the whole thing with DVD. And there was a credible threat. 
You have to be careful with these things, I agree. But there was a credible threat. 
Disney and Fox, still, even with DRM held out for almost 2 years before endorsing 
DVD. Then they saw how much money everyone else was making. The old expression 
“New York money talks, bull shit walks.”  
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Mr. Burger is distinctly neo-liberal, extolling market principles, advocating a 
strong anti-government stance, speaking of government interventions or “tech 
mandates” as overall barriers to technological progress.  Mr. Burger’s complaints are 
noted, but I write in Chapter 1 of this investigation that as computer use and 
networking spread across North America in the late 1990s, the United States 
government adopted a “hands off” approach when it came to imposing restrictions on 
Internet content and growth, which it saw differently than FCC-regulated media like 
telephony and broadcast television.  This marked a time when the FCC effectively lost 
its influence and jurisdiction to private industry with regard to the Internet’s future 
course.  As it stands, the organization is having difficulty in 2011 regaining a foothold 
to even pass net neutrality rules by reason of a successful conservative campaign 
questioning the FCC’s authority to mandate such legislation.  
In the technology arena, the mandates proposed by the FCC in the last decade 
reflect the political dispositions of the party majority, and the President appoints the 
FCC chair to act in accordance with the party’s fundamental beliefs about the mass 
media.  To illustrate, during George W. Bush’s eight years as president, he nominated 
Michael Powell, Republican and former ant-trust lawyer, to serve as FCC chair from 
2001-2005.  For the record, Powell once ascribed the “digital divide” as being no 
different than a Mercedes divide that afflicted him.150  Unfortunately, not everyone 
who wanted a Mercedes could have one, according to Powell.  Under Powell’s 
leadership, technological mandates such as the “analog hole” initiative (an issue that 
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Burger certainly finds fault with as it directly affected consumer hardware) forced 
consumer electronics companies to stop manufacturing blu-ray players with analog 
outputs by 2013.  Powell also supported increased fines for obscenity and indecent 
content by the nation’s broadcasters.  He supported a change in media ownership rules 
that allowed even greater consolidation of the media industries, in this case loosening 
the rules that restricted companies from owning a certain number of television 
stations.  In the case of radio, Powell supported the grandfathering in of previous 
legislation that permitted companies like Clear Channel to own 1200 stations, or one 
out of ten radio stations by 2003.151 Arguably, Powell became the most controversial 
figure in the FCC’s 77-year history. A 2008 study shows the consequences of Powell’s 
decision to deregulate the television and radio industries in terms of diversity 
initiatives.  Women comprised 51% of the entire U.S. population but owned only 67 
television stations, or 4.97% of all stations.152  Racial and ethnic minorities comprised 
34% of the U.S. population but owned a total of 43 television stations, or 3.15% of all 
stations.153   
Following Powell’s decision to resign in 2005, Kevin Martin assumed the 
vacancy and continued enacting policies that favored existing media monopolies, 
including the telecommunications spectrum giveaway that prohibited smaller 
competitors from participating because spectrums were too altogether too expensive.  
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When Martin resigned in 2009, he was in the process of deflecting a House Committee 
report accusing him of abusing his power and suppressing reports.154  
In Wired Shut, Gillespie chooses to center a proportion of his research on the 
consumer electronics industry and how it operates in tandem with the MPAA, the film 
studios, intellectual property attorneys, and engineers to ensure the viability of the 
trusted system.  With his investigation, the end user is the home consumer.  However, 
the MPAA’s protection of its cultural products ventures beyond home video, and 
Wired Shut does not feature content protection as it relates to the professional theater 
exhibition circuit, which still remains relatively important but now a secondary income 
source even though the National Association of Theater Owners (NATO) consistently 
complains that technologies like day and date VOD (Video on Demand) and the 
gradual tweaking of Hollywood’s release patterns will gradually destroy professional 
theater exhibition altogether.  Major shifts in release strategies, film production and 
distribution techniques have already occurred because of film digitization, and 
digitization in turn affects the post-production process and the methods that a film 
eventually reaches the professional theater circuit.  The Digital Cinema Initiative 
program encompasses much of what I mention: the MPAA’s campaign to convert 
movie theaters to the digital standard radically reframes Hollywood production, 
distribution and exhibition workflows.     
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Digital Cinema Initiative, John Hurst, and Cinecert 
Next, I turn to computer engineer John Hurst, Chief Technology Officer at 
Cinecert in Burbank, California.155  Mr. Hurst is responsible for educating, testing, and 
ultimately transitioning film studios and exhibitors to a digital film standard, all the 
while creating various methods to improve the security for Hollywood’s film 
properties.  In the trusted system framework, Mr. Hurst helps devise the “trusted” 
portion of the system in which computer code is the law, acting as the necessary speed 
bump that prevents a majority of copyright infringing activities.  From a technical 
standpoint, Hurst is involved in redistributing intellectual property in a digital format 
according to complex encryption algorithms and forensic watermarking that are 
designed to prevent unauthorized parties from viewing a Hollywood film.  The copy 
protection I mention is completed in a film’s post-production process.  For video, 
whatever playback device is deemed appropriate obeys the rules established by the 
copyright owner when the film content first becomes available, in other words the 
“digital rights.” 156  For now, only the NSA (National Security Agency), according to 
Mr. Hurst, potentially has enough resources to defeat the copyright protection scheme 
utilized by Hollywood to keep a film from falling into the wrong hands.157  
Metaphorically, where the “East Coast Code” is the republic, symbolizing the 
policies and statutes coming from Washington, DC, the “West Coast code” is the 
infantry, designated by software and technical protocols that are developed in Silicon 
Valley.  Lessig explains that he East Coast code is the code that Congress enacts, and 
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it passes various statutes directing people, companies, and bureaucrats how to 
behave.158  The West Coast code is the code embedded in the software and hardware 
that makes cyberspace function.159  It is the code that engineers enact. If a copyright 
infringing activity is prevented by a video product’s digital rights protocol, then the 
first tier of the trusted system is operating properly.  I met with Mr. Hurst in March 
2010 in Burbank, California.   
In the first portion of my interview, Mr. Hurst describes the transition from 
analog to digital media as inevitable and uses the economy of scale argument to 
describe the audio industry and its highly touted digital audio workstations and tape 
(DAT) (early 1990s) as the “beginning of the end” for the film medium:  
 
MC: Where do you think the future of film is going in terms of exhibition? 
 
JH: Well, it’s going to go all digital. And I tell you I have a little crystal ball called the 
audio industry which tells me everything that’s going to happen in the motion 
picture industry. So-through the 90s-we started the 90s in the audio business with 
digital audio workstations being a real high-ticket item. Very big money, very 
specialized and very prone to cantankerous-ness--it took a lot of time and effort to 
use them. By the end of that decade, digital audio workstations were the way to do 
things for everybody. Everybody had moved their work over to them except for 
those who were still enamored by the artistic benefits of analog. So, you take away 
the people who like analog for artistic reasons who comprise a hundredth of a 
percent of the analog tape market, and you look at the major users of analog tape, 
which are broadcast and radio networks and governments and schools--the 
complete ascension of digital recording as cheap and reliable over the course of the 
90s caused all those institutions to switch over to digital and they stopped playing 
tape. And the economy of scale that made tape possible to produce dropped out, and 
while you had people left that wanted to buy tape it was impossible to construct a 
business that could make it for the price that anyone would consider possible to 
pay. So the same thing is going to happen in film. As the majors continue to 
increase distribution digitally, they’re going to be decreasing distribution on film. 
Institutional users, documentary shooters, small films--all of them are moving to 
digital formats because it’s cheaper. And all you’re going to be left with are people 
who need film for artistic reasons, and they’re going to be stuck in the same place. 
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The economy of scale is going to drop out of the market because all the institutional 
users have gone away, and it will become financially infeasible to make film. So, I 
think that there’s more of a demand for it, and more money involved in it than there 
was for analog tape, so I think there will be boutique producers of film for many 
decades to come. But it will be outrageously expensive. Because the number of 
people willing to buy it and able to buy it will be a fraction of what it is even today. 
Deluxe and Technicolor know this--they’ve been slashing and burning prices on 
prints. Kodak is completely freaking out because they see the loss of film as the loss 
of their blood. Film is completely dead: it’s just a matter of time.160  
 
 
As we talk about the future of film delivery and exhibition, I ask Mr. Hurst about the 
consumer electronics industry and the ways that the MPAA tries to lock down content 
with encryption.  Hurst tells me that while he has no qualms with working with the 
studios to provide content encryption with Hollywood films designated for the theater 
circuit, he has purposefully avoided working with the consumer electronics market 
because of consumer rights issues such as fair use and privacy, and how the overall 
move to digitize media affects the end user.  Hurst tells me he still loves compact discs 
and will not buy media via Internet outlets like Itunes because of low quality and 
interoperability issues, as well as the concerns I just mentioned.   
The argument for digital cinema, Mr. Hurst explains, hinges on economic and 
security fundamentals.  Film distribution now involves the major film studios 
delivering movies to theater chains via United Parcel Service (UPS) or Federal 
Express.  The film’s content resides on encrypted hard drives, in this case drives 
manufactured by Seagate, rather than 35 mm reels.  A digital film that runs two hours 
is approximately 200 GB in size, and it costs just a few dollars to digitally transmit.  In 
the days before digital distribution, an average film reel cost $1,300 to duplicate, with 
a typical 35 mm print order of 2000 prints costing $2,600,000 minus the shipping, 
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insurance, and projectionist labor to assemble it on a platter and move it from theatre 
to theatre.161       
Although the transition to digital cinema is a logical business proposition for 
Hollywood, many complain that the move brings with it profound aesthetic and 
historical consequences.  Mr. Hurst tells me that because all of the digital playback 
equipment is usually leased to theaters, the studios therefore dictate the terms of what 
can and cannot run.  This is another kind of extreme regulatory lock down where 
devices are wired shut through contractual licensing terms that end up raising the 
barriers to entry for independents and local film production.  The MPAA calls the 
DCI program a “control lightly, audit tightly” system of content management because 
the multiplex exhibitors are free to move films from one theater to the next and 
computer systems log everything that theater employees do. In the event of a piracy 
disagreement, the studios have extensive logs that can be pulled from their 
equipment, similar to a “black box” that records every action on an airplane.  The 
exhibitor circuit has never been as tightly regulated as it is now in the digital age, 
with the Digital Cinema Initiatives program. 
In this next section, Mr. Hurst describes how the delivery of encrypted digital 
product is much cheaper, as bonded couriers are no longer needed. Additionally, 
security is more rigorous. Physical theft of the content is pointless in view of the fact 
that sophisticated code prevents a user from being able to access the drive: 
JH: One of the advantages of encryption is that physical deliveries can be handled 
through common mode couriers such as FedEx and UPS. Whereas I'm not sure if 
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you're familiar with the delivery of 35mm film? 35mm film is delivered by a bonded 
carrier. Right? And the reason is you don't want that 35mm print disappearing for 
however long it takes to telesine it. (Telecining involves placing a video camera in a 
projection booth in order to bootleg a film.  For precise audio, the camera records the 
TDD (Telecommunications Device for the Deaf) feed) So in the case of the digital 
master it's even more straightforward and lower cost--you don't even need specialized 
equipment to copy it. So there is already an increased risk, and adding encryption 
eliminates that risk and also makes delivery cheaper by using common carriers, 
allowing you to use satellite broadcast without extra encryption, for example. Lots of 
ways it can be moved around now because it's really inaccessible to an unauthorized 
party. 
 
MC: So that brings up-with this new system of distributing the film electronically-
having it play on this very secure system- who are the studios afraid of now? Is there 
the possibility that hackers could get control of a film? 
 
JH: Sure. In any security system, the primary benchmark of the system is the cost of 
implementing this system versus the cost of exploiting the system. So our goal here is 
to make it so expensive--we can’t make it impossible to hack, right? Any major 
government could crack the system, no problem. I'm sure the NSA (National Security 
Agency) could crack it in seconds flat. That's what they're there for. I'm a little less 
worried about the Russian mob. They have a lot of resources, but they don't have tens 
of millions of dollars to spend on the kind of software to crack this. Their alternative 
is, then, is to go camcord it.  The goal is to make it so expensive as to drive people to a 
cheaper way of doing it, which has its own remedies. One of the things you might not 
be aware of is that each media block as it decrypts the picture and prepares it to go out 
to the projector puts an invisible forensic mark onto the picture which contains the 
time of day and the media block serial number. So camcords are now coming back, 
and the forensic people know the screen and the day and the time where that rip was 
taken. So, not only is it now fantastically expensive--I mean it's much more expensive-
-for example to imagine cracking a media block than it is to imagine stealing a 35mm 
print getting the telesine out of it. You have to develop all sorts of customized 
electronics, for instance. It's a brutal task. So they're pushing it back towards 
camcordering it. The studios are fine with that. Because the quality is low, and with 
the forensic marking makes it easy to find which screens are becoming popular with a 
particular crew.162 
 
Various film studios have incorporated forensic watermarking on their 
products going back to the early 1900s.  France’s Pathe´ studio (1896), for instance, 
painted an individual rooster on its set pieces and the symbol, in turn, fronted the 
studio brand. Pathe´ periodically lost films because of theft and felt powerless trying to 
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protect its products from being counterfeited.  Sometimes, the thefts were not 
discovered until a studio did its inventory.  In 1917, several New York film exchanges 
reported high amounts of missing films, with Pathe´ reporting six of its Gold Rooster 
features and two complete serials missing.  Universal Studios reported that it was short 
some 300 reels, while Mutual reported that 300 films were also seemingly missing 
from its stock.163  A print of Wild and Wooly (1917) was actually stolen from a 
Brooklyn theater lobby while awaiting shipment.164  Some of these piracy scandals 
included thieves who sent the stolen material out of the country once they got hold of 
the merchandise.  Morris Cohen of Detroit was arrested in 1919 for receiving stolen 
prints and, after posting $5,000 bail, an investigation determined that the stolen 
movies were being sent to San Francisco and on to Japan and other countries in the 
Orient, which had sizeable traffic in stolen films.165  As an aside, a typical practice for 
thieves was to erase the identifying marks on the merchandise.  D.A. Barton, an 
assistant prosecutor from San Francisco, was later able to encourage the film studios to 
place serial numbers on films in order to track their means for distribution.  Following 
the use of serial numbers, the aforementioned international piracy racket came to an 
abrupt end. 
The arrival of the Internet brought with it a digital world where tools allowed 
consumers to create high-quality material, to make copies that were unrecognizable 
from original works, and to share and distribute the products worldwide.  The tools 
essentially allowed consumers to become producers, and to interact personally with 
their media products.  In many circles, the digital world prompted individual attitudes 
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regarding intellectual property to shift, especially with young people who now see 
authorship and ownership as a shared, collaborative experience.166  Today’s 
generation, however, receives mixed signals from the media conglomerates when it 
comes to the use of their products.  On the one hand, they are encouraged to wear 
corporate logos and brands but if they wish to cut and paste a corporate logo to their 
web site, they get a cease-and-desist letter.167 Media companies are not prone naturally 
to understanding the borrowing and appropriation inherent in participatory culture.  
Copyright laws obviously need to draw the distinction between appropriation for 
creativity’s sake and those who do it for commercial gain.      
 
J.D. Lasica’s “Darknet” and Alexander Galloway’s “Networks” 
The MPAA spent an extraordinary amount of time and money defining and 
inserting its own definition of piracy into the world lexicon.  Consequently, the word 
has been reexamined, redefined, and redressed by authors who promote more 
favorable perspectives of the word and tend to illustrate the piracy issue as stemming 
from a battle over distribution control rather than intellectual property.  In Chapter 
One, I addressed how “piracy” comes pre-loaded with a variety of political, social, and 
economic overtones. At one point, the Recording Industry Association of America 
actually fused the word with a means: piracy was actually uploading and downloading 
unauthorized materials using p2p file sharing. This was not the first time that a media 
organization called out a certain technology as being used explicitly for illegal 
activities.  In the late 1970s, that MPAA warned that sexual deviants used VCR 
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technology when they checked into motels and recorded oodles of pay per view X-
rated films. With the massive rhetorical campaign put in place by the RIAA and 
MPAA to fight piracy, more research was needed that addressed the individual 
activities and motivations of the criminalized.   In Shujen Wang’s Framing Piracy, 
Globalization and Film Distribution in Greater China, the author describes several case 
studies where individuals throughout Greater China buy or distribute counterfeit 
product, and their motivations are documented.  One couple in their late forties are 
former peasants turned physical laborers who barely earn enough money to watch their 
beloved Taiwanese and Hong Kong television shows on video compact disc (VCD).  
Another man in his early thirties is part of the “floating population” in Beijing, earning 
approximately $120 a month selling pirated merchandise, which is a better income 
than many other jobs in his caste. The people here are not glamorous by any means 
and are consciously making decisions to improve their tough living conditions in 
Asia.168   
When J.D. Lasica’s Darknet: Hollywood’s War Against the Digital 
Generation was published in 2005, Lasica shifted the focus of media piracy onto 
America and its illegal piracy networks. In the book, the author spends a considerable 
effort defining a “darknet,” which he explains is a world that exists outside the 
limelight of Big Media where people trade files and communicate anonymously in 
underground or private networks.169  The author tells readers that darknets forewarn 
where the digital marketplace is headed, a place where media is locked down and 
where the telecommunications industry and its networks serve the interests of 
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Hollywood and the recording industry.  Lasica pins the cause of darknets squarely on 
the shoulders of Washington DC and a political system that favors the publishing 
industries over the rights of individuals.  He argues that more and more activity on the 
“open” Internet will be pushed to the underground if current anti-innovation trends 
continue, which was the concern voiced by a majority of individuals after the Grokster 
case where creators of software were judged for users’ actions.  As a matter of fact, 
Lasica published Darknet in 2005, the same year that the courts decided that Grokster 
was guilty of copyright infringement. 
In the introduction to Darknet, Lasica states that his interest in digital 
copyright issues takes him beyond the conventional role of detached journalist. He 
tells readers that as a writer covering both the entertainment and technology sectors for 
newspapers and magazines, he himself has been implicated in the enormous culture 
war between media people and techies.170  Lasica’s book is an illustration of the 
culture wars developed between Big Media and consumers, too, although Lasica terms 
the opponents of Big Media as the technologists, or “techies” who have a much 
different view of digital culture.  While big media is exclusive, controlling, and top-
down, the “techies” are inclusive, participatory, and bottom-up.171  By offering case 
studies of individuals throughout the book who are regularly involved with technology 
and ultimately shifting the balance of power away from the media industries into the 
“regular” people’s hands, the author intends also to debunk the rhetoric employed by 
big media.  Readers should reconceive of these “pirates” as victims of a situation 
where resistance is played out through the construction of secret digital repositories or 
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societies where members use and interact with their media according to their own 
terms. The author frames the darknet as a populist movement in which breaking the 
law is a natural byproduct where the major entertainment companies and their political 
allies exert control over existing technologies.   Hence, users do everything within and 
sometimes outside the law to escape these constraints.172   
 In Darknet, the case study of Bruce Forest is especially captivating and 
illustrates the point of how difficult it is find a unified ideology among pirates.  Forest 
is an active member of six major piracy groups, and a channel operator on Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) for forty piracy channels.  But Forest is actually a stooge for big 
media: He is paid to commit piracy by a major media company and works both sides 
of the fence in return for permission to swap movie and music files without 
punishment and to run his own private two terabyte private server filled with 
thousands of songs, music videos, movie files, television shows and computer games.  
In exchange for this privilege, Forest writes a two hundred-page report for his 
corporate client every two weeks where he outlines his most recent findings, that is 
what his “friends” are doing and saying in these networks. He then recommends 
strategies to protect the company’s properties.173 The case study that features Forest 
exemplifies how the media industry collaborates with the opposition. We are not privy 
to the arrangement between the anonymous employer and Forest and what convinced 
Forest to backstab his fellow members. Readers gain access to these criminalized 
people through the traitorous Forest, who now serves authority.    
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 One of the darknet members explains the existence of the darknets this way: 
people from every social class or budget are able to connect and work for a common 
purpose, with some individuals actively contributing to the network, and others simply 
taking from it.  The point is that each darknet member gets equal access to great 
movies and entertainment, according to the anonymous source.  This is obviously a 
Utopian world, where people can move freely without restrictions.   
 What we learn from Lasica is that the subjects in Darknet have multiple 
motivations as they live out some of their existence in these networks.  And by 
demonstrating the variance between the individual case studies in terms of economic 
and social class, he validates his own romantic notions of the darknet being a populist 
movement, nothing more and nothing less. In the end, we see that this “movement” is 
similar to an anti-tax caucus or Tea Party movement where the individuals hold 
multiple grievances against authority, but there is no unifying principle except that 
resistance is de rigeur.  Lasica’s interview subjects violate the DMCA for multiple 
reasons: the current high market prices of media products, the anonymity and 
convenience afforded through Internet access, or an ideology of resistance to 
corporatism.  The motivations elude any particular label except resist, resist, resist.  
 The techies who reside in the darknet in Lasica’s book are similar to the hackers 
described in Alexander Galloways’s Protocol. Galloway’s thesis is that the founding 
principle of the Internet is control, not freedom, and that controlling power is found 
within the architecture of the Internet, or the technical protocols that make network 
connections and disconnections possible.174  Hackers reject situations where access to 
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technology is limited.  The purveyors of proprietary technologies simply want to 
dictate the how, when, and where of an individual’s access to content.  The hackers in 
Galloway’s book are almost identical to the techies in Lasica’s.  The unifying 
principle, again, is resistance, this time against proprietary technologies and large 
corporations. For the hacker, the unifying goal is to defeat a proprietary code.  For the 
pirate, the goal is to circumvent the code and access the underlying property.  The 
individuals I present in the section are distrustful of authority, they are educated, and 
they value their autonomy.   The motivations to pirate or to hack a proprietary code 
elude any particular label, however.     
 
Interview with Simon Petersen 
Next, I interview two individuals who counter conventional practices of media 
production, distribution and exhibition.  Simon Petersen (pseudonym) is a thirty-year-
old painter by trade who resides in metropolitan Denver, Colorado.  We spoke on the 
telephone in March 2010 for one hour. Mr. Petersen describes himself as a 
“consultant” who assists individuals, mainly friends and friends of friends who are 
interested in startup businesses that sell bootleg digital videodiscs (DVDs).  In terms 
of the production-distribution-exhibition supply chain of bootleg DVDs, Simon 
describes himself in the “end user” market, selling physical media to individuals. 175  
When I first meet with Simon, he lets me know up front that his role in bootlegging is 
“unromantic” and dispels notions that his job is particularly interesting.  In breakneck 
speed, he also rejects any moral or ethical arguments against piracy when it comes to 
public service announcements crafted by the MPAA.  Simon’s answer to this is: “All 
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right, and so they create this hoopla about how this is so bad blah blah blah because 
somebody’s pockets are being dug into. Somebody’s losing pennies on the dollar or 
whatever.”176   
SP: This is all hand-to-hand stuff, Street. You might be in a barbershop; you might be 
at a gas station, a popular gas station. That’s where this stuff ends up being distributed. 
And if you have, if you’re known to have the latest movies and the best copies of 
movies, then sometimes people call you. They get used to buying stuff from you, so 
they call you. So, like I said, that’s the end user; that’s probably the lowest level of 
piracy. I don’t have access or privy to experiences on the higher-end.177 
 
Simon describes his skill set as highly marketable and rare: He has the ability to 
independently acquire, produce and distribute discs without assistance. 
SP: Let me give you an idea of what my experience is in this industry is. It’s very 
simple. Everybody knows you can get bootleg DVDs and bootleg CDs. Bootleg CDs 
are kind of a thing of the past, I mean antiquated. Bootleg DVDs are more popular. 
The price point is excellent--five dollars a DVD. Basically, you have people that sell 
bootleg DVDs anywhere from thugs to people that are trying to make a living--very 
conservative about how they do it. You have bums out on the street just trying to make 
it. You know--just make a couple of bucks to eat. All right? But those DVDs have to 
come from somewhere. Either they’re producing it themselves with a burner, or 
they’re getting it from somebody else making a dollar or two dollars off the DVDs. 
Now I’ve come in contact with both, you know? People that hustle-I’m just gonna put 
it to you like a hustler-they can hustle anything whether it’s clothing, whether it’s 
music, whether it’s DVDs, whether its electronics. They buy low, sell high. That’s 
what a hustler does. Okay? And these are lucrative. But these hustlers might not have 
the technical knowledge to actually produce the DVDs themselves. Okay? All right. A 
gentleman that I know of through another contact, he was very conservative about his 
business. He makes a lot of money doing it. And he has the technical expertise to 
produce the DVDs himself, and he deals with the clientele directly. You know, he’s 
built up a clientele of people, and he calls them and says, “Hey! These are some of the 
movies I have this week. What can I get you?” And he delivers them all. And that’s all 
he does all day is deliver DVDs. He might just put out a little list of all the DVDs he 
has. A very simple, crude, printed up list and you know his lifeline is in stone. It’s 
only via phone at that level rather than sending an e-mail and having to answer “Do 
you have this?” or, “Do you have that?”  So, I’m kind of letting you know the 
environment I’m in. The end product, basically, is somebody calling you, you know, 
who has the DVDs and you call them up and you say, “Do you have this?” Or the 
person who has the DVDs approaches you at a gas station, a barbershop, or because 
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you’ve bought from them before that person calls you up and says, “Hey, this is what I 
have this week.” Okay? That’s the sale process. Now, I dealt with individuals that 
want to understand more about the technical side of creating the DVDs. They’re like, 
“Well, I can get access to the content-how do I produce my own DVDs?” They want 
to actually do the burning themselves. There’s one or two ways you can have access to 
the media itself. You need to find it on the Internet yourself, produce it yourself, i.e. a 
crude method of producing media yourself is taking a video camera into a movie 
theater and recording the movie. But that’s, like I said, crude and there are more 
sophisticated techniques of acquiring the media. Now, the other way you can do it if 
you know the person who has--who’s selling DVDs, and they have access to the 
media, you buy the DVDs from them, and then you sell them as your own. If you’re  
bootlegging DVDs and I feel like you always have the current movie and you have the 
best selection, I’m just gonna buy from you.  I’m gonna say, “Okay, I want these 
DVDs this week. I’m going to buy it from you, and I’m going to burn these DVDs.  
I’m going to duplicate them. I’m not going to let you know that I’m buying them and 
duplicating them and selling them because that would be crossing you.178 
 
Simon’s discussion of besting his competition is not particularly unique here.  Rather, 
it is the peculiar concept that bootleggers actually copyright their own products, which 
Simon speaks of in the next excerpt: 
SP: The best bootleggers try to copyright their DVDs! 
 
MC: How can you enforce copyright if, you know you’re in a business that already is 
considered illegal? How does that work? 
 
SP:  Technically, it’s technical knowledge.  First of all the most basic copyright is you 
don’t know how to produce what I’m producing. Okay? So another way to do it is if, 
for example, there’s software out there that I can author to make a home movie and 
put it on a DVD. Right? Some of the software allows you to create a copyright. A very 
crude copyright. It’s nothing like the technology that the DVD producers are using. 
But it is a way. It’s an added way to say that so that a person like me is going to have a 
little bit of trouble duplicating a DVD. 
 
MC:  Does that just involve invoking some sort of symbol on the disc packaging, or 
the menu showing a copyright symbol? 
 
SP: No. It’s just not being able to copy it. Just like it’s difficult to copy a DVD. 
 
MC: Oh. You’re talking about some sort of preventative encryption. 
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The notable irony one can take away from this passage is that my subject conflates 
notions of copyright with the technical copy protection schemes designed to safeguard 
intellectual property.  While it is true that both copyright and code are part of a general 
regulatory framework—I have spent some time discussing that copyright was initially 
designed to provide a limited amount of time to protect a work before it became part 
of the public domain-- a copy protection scheme determines which people can access 
which digital objects.  The programming actually regulates human interactions and 
depends on the values it is designed to protect.179  Copyright gives a copyright holder 
the exclusive rights over the work, including the exclusive right to copy the work.  
Another person may not copy the piece without obtaining the author’s permission.  
The right, as Lessig argues, is protected to the extent that the laws support it, and is 
threatened to the extent that technology makes it easy to copy.180  If the law is 
strengthened while the technology remains constant, the right is stronger.  At the same 
time, if the copying technology becomes better and more accessible yet the law 
remains constant, the right becomes weaker.  In this sense, copyright has always been 
at war with technology.181  While Simon resists Hollywood and its system of control 
as he distributes his own products, he actively fights his competitors by using 
Hollywood’s copy protection code to create a limited monopoly on information, which 
he encourages, in the name of making information widely available.  While Simon 
may be employing economic resistance by diverting a modicum of profit from 
Hollywood, he is in fact integrating a business model that mirrors his opposition.  
Therefore, as I maintain in Chapter One, Simon is managing and operating a parallel 
                                                            
179 Lessig, Code Version 2.0. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
 
 
 
122 
or co-existing trusted system: Mr. Petersen rips the feature films from DVD’s and 
burns the properties to brand new writable discs, and takes the digital rights 
management schemes, in this case the Content Scrambling System (CSS) code, and 
writes it to newly minted media.  The CSS code is employed on the majority of 
commercially produced DVD’s.    
The 1995 White Paper, which I discuss in Chapter Four, originated from a 
gathering of government officials and people from the content, technology and legal 
industries to discuss the future of the Internet with respect to protecting intellectual 
property in cyberspace.  Two of the recommendations that came from the meetings 
involved mixing technology and the market; in this case, recommending the provision 
of legal support through financial subsidies and special legal protection for copyright 
management schemes.182  Using indirect regulation, the market subsidized the 
development of the software tools, and the law was designed to regulate the properties 
of other software tools.  The copyright management schemes would be supported by 
government funds, with the imminent legal threat that criminal sanctions would be 
applied to anyone who attempted to crack the schemes.183   
As I speak with Simon, I learn that “copyrighting” a bootleg DVD involves 
several steps. First, an individual acquires the software that allows editing the disc’s 
contents.  The software permits the user to invoke some form of branding, and finally, 
he can construct a technological barrier by encrypting the disc’s contents.  By putting 
a technological “stop sign” on the disc’s contents, the producer intends to be the 
preferred supplier to his patrons, and the patrons in turn will be dissuaded from 
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copying material that has been appropriated time and time again.  This is a method of 
branding bootleg products, according to Simon: 
You can create that stuff. You can create that yourself. Okay? But if I can break the 
codes of a DVD from a store, I can break the code from a would-be pirater trying to 
copyright their own, the copyright of their bootlegs. You see? And somebody that may 
not have as much technical expertise as I do wouldn’t be able to. You see what I’m 
saying? So I think it’s pointless, but in a way it’s not. You’re protecting your territory. 
So, there’s the basic--there’s the barrier by a lack of technical knowledge. You can 
also create another temporary barrier by creating some type of encryption yourself, all 
right? You can also--you can do stuff like put a little preview that might have like a 
logo, like branding the bootlegs so that somebody--if you just copy the DVD 
straightforward the customer sees the original maker. Okay?“These are my bootlegs!” 
You know? And then the person sees that says, “You’re not making these! I want to 
go to the person making this firsthand.” So, little stuff like that. And that’s just basic. 
That’s just basic business. You’re protecting yours.184 
    
Although this investigation is about film piracy and the ways that the MPAA 
is trying to curb unauthorized actions on the Internet, it is important to look at some of 
the sophisticated distribution methods that the pirate underground uses to distribute 
and exhibit copyrighted product.  In this particular case, mobile platforms such as 
iPhones and tablet computers have become popular platforms to watch films and 
television shows.  By simply unlocking a phone’s operating system through a hack 
that is acquired online, consumers all of a sudden can perform new functions that the 
mobile phone manufacturer strictly prohibited when the product was designed.  In the 
case of the iPhone, various engineers that were not affiliated with Apple but 
nevertheless were Apple enthusiasts, designed software through the Cydia repository 
permitting the phone to multitask at least a year before Apple finally updated its 
firmware to perform the very same function.  Some of the hacks that are available 
either test or clearly violate the law—a GPS location spoofer, for instance, permits 
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users to watch Major League baseball games despite the broadcast blackouts imposed 
by television broadcasters.  In another example, users can download copyrighted 
content via software that has a file-sharing platform imbedded within the product.  The 
content comes directly from the seemingly buoyant Pirate Bay and is downloaded to 
an individual’s mobile phone.       
 
Dan Mickell and Movie Land 
In this next section, I turn to Dan Mickell (pseudonym), a high school student 
living in the Ottawa province in Canada.185  Dan would not talk with me on the phone 
despite my assurances that his confidentiality would be preserved, but he was easily 
accessible via his business e-mail address, which was listed with Paypal and the Cydia 
repository where his television and film streaming application is available for 
purchase.  Dan is a senior, and anticipates going to college and earning an engineering 
degree.  Currently, he creates and sells television and film software applications on the 
Cydia network.  The Cydia network is a software distribution movement that offers 
free and paid programs that are meant to extend the capabilities of Apple’s various 
iPhone models. Mr. Mickell created an application, Movie Land, which permits 
consumers to stream and download unauthorized films to mobile phones.  Currently, 
there are over 32,000 registered users of this application.186  Recently, federal 
regulators ruled that it was lawful to hack or “jailbreak” an iPhone, declaring that 
there was “no basis for copyright law to assist Apple in protecting its restrictive 
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business model.”187  Jailbreaking allows an individual to hack into a phone’s operating 
system, extending the capabilities of the mobile handset through running applications 
not authorized by Apple. This important ruling was added to a list of Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act exceptions with regard to anti-circumvention provisions.  
Apple maintains that its closed marketplace or “walled garden” is what has created the 
success for the iPhone to flourish.  Before the decisive ruling, Apple warned that the 
nation’s cell phone networks might suffer “potentially catastrophic” attacks by 
computer hackers both domestically and abroad if iPhone owners jailbroke their 
devices.  
My conversations with Dan consisted of e-mail dialogue maintained over a 
series of months (April-July 2010): 
DM: Well, I'm 18, finishing grade 12, then going on to college for who knows what. I 
started out myself making small applications like my Free Flix App, which is nothing 
like Movie Land in the sense that all it does is link to other websites, and movies etc. I 
put together Movie Land myself, and still today, it is only run by me. I host the movies 
myself on my servers offshore in the Netherlands where they don't care about the US 
laws. That way it is not illegal, and I can't be hunted down for copyright etcetera.  I am 
nothing big, really. I just download movies for personal use, which is not illegal here 
in Canada.  I convert them, etc, then upload them to my server in The Netherlands 
where they are then posted on Movie Land for others to enjoy. Just a side note, that all 
the money I get through this application goes towards the off shore server, which cost 
$100+ a month.  I mean, I'm only 18, and next year I will be going off to college or 
university for computer studies, to which someday I will own my own company like 
Netflix or something along those lines. I'm yet to get any kind of warning or threat 
from anyone including the movie companies or the government, but if I do, no 
biggie.188 
 
 
Dan tells me that Canada’s rules centered on IP as they are written in April, 2010 
allow him to download movies for personal use.  Dan’s knowledge or lack thereof 
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regarding Canadian copyright law provoked me to further research current Canadian 
statutes with regard to ripping and burning, including file sharing.  I learned that in 
June 2010, Canadian copyright regulators ruled that the downloading of copyrighted 
music from peer-to-peer networks was legal in Canada, although uploading material 
was not.  Additionally, while the DMCA prohibits the circumvention of anti-
encryption measures on physical media, this only governs U.S. citizens.  Canada, on 
the other hand, has been reluctant to enforce measures that expand digital copyright 
protection.  However, while the June 2010 law allows Canadians to make personal 
copies of their music, the law makes no room allowing individuals to make personal 
DVD copies.  I do not expect Dan, at eighteen years old, to have legal expertise on file 
sharing, although it could be argued that he has a vested interest.  I note from our 
conversation in April that Dan is wide of the mark describing Canadian file sharing 
laws:   
DM: Well, in Canada, the law states that as long as you download movies or music for 
personal use, it is not illegal, so then when I upload them to the server overseas, it 
becomes public and not personal, but since the movies are overseas, Canada can't do 
anything about it.  I used to run a warez forum (warez-ghost.com) that was hosted 
offshore, so I knew about offshore hosting. After a search on Google, I came across 
OpenVServers, and decided to contact the owner and set up a dedicated server for 
anything I need. If it is illegal here or not, I host everything there anyways.  As to 
where I get my movies, I simply get them through torrents, like piratebay.org then 
convert then to mp4 myself. Nothing too special really.189 
 
The .mp4 is a file format known for its interoperability and superior quality, even 
when compressed.  The file is therefore advantageous because it “travels” well, 
meaning that its small size/high quality combination make it a preferred standard 
among file sharers. 
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After three months, I return in July 2010 to the Cydia site where consumers 
can purchase Movie Land.  I see that Dan no longer accepts PayPal for transactions, so 
I contact him. Recently, the U.S. Government has terminated the operations of 
thousands of servers and web sites based on suspicions of various activities such as 
terrorism, the distribution of child pornography, sales of pirated goods, and other 
illegal acts.  PayPal received occasional criticism in previous years for allegedly 
operating as a sanctuary for these sorts of illegal activities.  When I spoke to Dan, he 
told me that PayPal initially suspended, and then banned him from future 
participation.190 
MC: Can you explain more specifically about the suspensions and limitations placed 
on you with PayPal? On what grounds were you suspended or limited, as you say? I 
have to be able to explain it clearly in the dissertation.  Why were you asked to show 
ID, as well? 
 
DM: I was banned on grounds of "highly suspicious" activity. I called them, they said 
they have removed my account because they can't protect me, or some stupid 
statement like that. It was the most ridiculous thing ever. I did some research awhile 
back, and I'm not the only one getting randomly suspended for suspicious activity. 
When I was limited from transacting, they asked me to supply 3 pieces of photo ID, a 
bank statement, and a utility bill, as well as prove my address and phone number was 
correct. I did, so they unlimited me. About a week later, the exact same thing 
happened, so I said "Screw it. PayPal is such bullshit" and moved on to something new 
and less irritating.  
 
MC: Did you ask them to define “suspicious activity?”  Did they ever say what they 
thought you were doing?  Any idea who notified them in the first place, or do they 
have a way of tracking unauthorized activities? 
 
DM: Yes I asked them. All they kept telling me was "suspicious activity." I asked 
them to break it down for me, and they wouldn't. They had no clue I was selling 
movies. They tell me it is just a "random security check" and my account was chosen, 
which is complete bullshit. They see that I'm making money, and just want to steal it 
by limiting my account so many times I just leave. Which is what happened. PayPal is 
a joke.191 
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Cut from the same cloth as my previous interviewee, Mr. Petersen builds his 
own software, Movieland, which takes advantage of previously hacked iPhone 
handsets.  An individual can acquire a hack through an underground repository that 
alters the iPhone’s baseband, or cellular modem firmware, extending and providing 
new capabilities to the iPhone OS.  Mr. Petersen’s Movieland enables the phone to 
download and stream films and television shows from a dedicated server housed in the 
Netherlands. This is all highly illegal, of course.  Mr. Petersen used to distribute his 
software via Paypal, but his business was shut down because the well-known vendor 
became suspicious of illegal activity. Following the inconvenience, Petersen began 
offering his program through another secure checkout site.  Movieland customers are 
required to pay a subscription fee in order to access Hollywood content that pirates 
have either tele-synced or culled from industry insiders.  Petersen’s service tries to 
model itself after established Hollywood subscription services like Netflix or Hulu, and 
customer payments are made with a credit card. Although both of my featured 
individuals operate in their own individual piracy networks and employ DIY (do it 
yourself) modes of engagement to counter conventional media making practices, they 
manage their own trusted systems that co-exist with Hollywood’s. 
In cyberspace, the Internet naturally harnesses the power of decentralization 
and defies central control but in the face of a determined power, the architecture alone 
is not enough of an adequate defense to hold off what individuals find most dear about 
it, which is its openness.192  In the history of other information empires, there have 
always been classic battles positioning a succession of optimistic and open media that 
in turn became closed and controlled industries.  In the early twentieth century, new 
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information industries including telephony, radio broadcast, and film all evolved from 
someone’s innovation.  By the 1940s, these technologies were firmly entrenched in an 
established, seemingly permanent form, and the industries purposefully excluded 
competitors.  Telephony became the sole domain of the Bell System.  NBC and CBS 
were the dominant radio broadcasters and used the FCC to launch a natural 
progression into television.  Hollywood, by the 1940s, was a vertically integrated 
institution and had control over every inch of the film business, from the actors to 
exhibition.  
  But these centralized industries became targets for assault by other 
entities.193  The weapon for the assault may have been a certain invention or 
technology that broke through the defenses and became the foundation for an 
insurgent industry, like p2p file sharing and Internet piracy.  But the invention is not 
necessarily the sole impetus of an insurgence.   The federal government can also 
decide to intervene and stop information cartels and monopolies, and the pieces that 
are broken up eventually configure into other monopolies. In 1921, the Federal Trade 
Commission announced an investigation into the trade practices of Adolph Zukor’s 
Paramount Pictures for monopolizing the motion picture industry and restraining, 
restricting and suppressing competitors in the distribution of motion picture films.  For 
those individuals who may not necessarily be interested in film, the film industry is 
very similar to other information empires that go from being open to tightly controlled 
industries and back. 
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Conclusion 
I argued in Chapter One that after reading Wired Shut, readers may come away 
thinking that the MPAA is monolithic and immutable, but that is not the case.  In this 
dissertation, it was my intention to interview individuals that live their professional 
lives endorsing the goals of the MPAA and the copyright industries because while the 
MPAA plays a prominent role creating the backdrop for the trusted system, its 
relationships with its affiliates are more difficult to pinpoint. The individuals working 
within this regulatory framework have largely been ignored in the research, and I 
present interviews from Garfield, Hurst, and Burger to illustrate their perspectives as 
legal and technical experts.  In addition to coordinating the legal activities of the 
organization, Mr. Garfield was largely involved with public relations and helped to 
craft the MPAA’s rhetorical operation.  Specifically, Garfield talks with me about the 
Who Makes Movies? campaign and how it was largely seen by the MPAA as a failure.  
During his tenure, Garfield was especially interested in using technology to attract 
jaded consumers whom the MPAA historically equated as thieves.  John Hurst, who 
continues working as an engineer in Hollywood protecting the film studios’ properties, 
intentionally veers from working with the home electronics market because from a 
personal standpoint, he does not support digital e-commerce and believes that it 
represents negative consequences for the consumer because fair use is devalued. He 
sees the shift that favors digital media in economic terms and is deterministic as he 
explains the inevitability of the analog medium passing on.   
As for the individuals who operate in the parallel trusted systems, Simon and 
Dan distrust media executives and the tired methods arising from conventional media 
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distribution models. They divert a modicum of the corporate profits to their own 
pockets for sustainability, all the while bringing available and affordable media to 
consumers.  That is not to say that my subjects’ motives are based strictly on 
ideological grounds.  Simon revealed that a bootlegger has the earning potential of 
$50,000 USD or more annually.  What is clear is that overregulated markets provide 
assurances to the underground markets. In this chapter, the seemingly contradictory 
forces of legitimate selling versus bootlegging are shown to be interdependent, 
providing a source of checks and balances.  As an example, the motion picture 
industry has been known to partner with people formerly engaged in piracy.  The 
partnership allows bootleggers to have access to media via legitimate channels on the 
assurance they will act lawfully.  Correspondingly, the motion picture industry takes 
advantage of their bootleggers’ skill sets, including the specific technological 
knowledge related to computing as well as their information on other people engaged 
in illegitimate media sharing activities.  In this contest over digital information, each 
party covets the other’s power, and the activities of one group often intersect with the 
other as they engage in homologous goals.  
In reality, Hollywood cannot stop piracy by using a strong regulatory regime to 
prevent copyright infringement.  Instead, a technology created by industry may 
actually provide legal alternatives to peer-to-peer file sharing to the point where it is 
no longer seen as a threat.  A recent research report indicated that film rental company 
Netflix’s movies and television shows accounted for more than 30% of Internet 
bandwidth traffic in homes during peak evening hours, compared with 17% for web 
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browsing activities.194  As late as last year, surfing and peer-to-peer file sharing had 
accounted for more bandwidth than Netflix’s streaming subscription service, so 
interpretations of the study may conclude that illegal file sharing activities are 
declining due to better options being offered from Hollywood.  At the same time the 
report comes out, Internet providers are following the lead of wireless telephony and 
will soon place limits on consumer bandwidth usage, charging penalties to those who 
surpass the maximum allotted amount.  The course of the Internet will continue 
moving from open to closed paradigms based on the information empires that dictate 
the rules.  The one certainty is that for now, the media industries have determined that 
their properties will not be associated with an individual’s hard drive, and American 
consumers will come to accept the decision that the majority of their information flow 
will be IP-based.195 
In the following chapter, I discuss some of the key lawsuits involving the 
DMCA brought forth by the Electronic Frontier Foundation with regard to film and 
media products.  This chapter also discusses several landmark cases involving 
general digital goods where companies were sued and put out of business for 
manufacturing DVD ripping products deemed to be violating the DMCA.  These 
cases are significant because defendants claimed that use of their products fell under 
the category of fair use, a defense that is not wholly recognized by the courts.  The 
DMCA, brought forth from copyright lobbyists representing the computer and music 
recording industries, is the cornerstone from which the MPAA’s trusted system 
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functions.  The copyright legislation threatens to prosecute individuals who violate 
digital copyright statutes, it prohibits the tools and networks that share and facilitate 
copying, and it authorizes the use of DRM.  All of these arrangements must be in 
place for the media industries to regulate unauthorized copying.   
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Chapter Four: The Significance of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and 
its Deliberations, Ramifications, and Exemptions 
 
Introduction 
Unaccompanied by any particular fanfare, public scrutiny or civic debate, 
President Bill Clinton signed legislation S.2037, otherwise known as the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, into law on October 28, 1998.  The bill was the final 
product of a series of negotiations occurring over a five-year period. The negotiations 
were rooted in legislation derived from preliminary “Green Paper” draft 
recommendations put forth in July 1994 by the Lehman Working Group, a committee 
consisting of copyright lobbyists for the computer and music recording industries.196  
Bruce Lehman, who was then Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of 
Patents and Trademarks, was at one time a lobbyist for the software industry.  The 
recommendations from Lehman’s group were a preliminary analysis of copyright 
issues impacting the Internet as well as suggestions for copyright revisions in the 
future.  
As Clinton signed his signature to the body of regulations, the president 
offered his remarks to the press on the DMCA: the act would offer strong protection to 
creators of published works against piracy in the digital age.  Pointing to technology as 
the reason for instituting the rigid series of regulations centered on copyright 
protection, Clinton offered an unembellished statement to the press after the DMCA’s 
passage: “Through enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, we have done 
our best to protect from digital piracy the copyright industries that comprise the 
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leading export of the United States.” 197  I have argued throughout this dissertation that 
the copyright industries have always been a powerful special interest group wielding 
tremendous influence over the public interest. The DMCA negotiations mirror 
previous historical points when the entities involved in arbitration did not represent the 
public interest, or for that matter the end user.  Made plain, American copyright 
legislation involves an assembly of lawyers sitting around a bargaining table settling 
disagreements, and many critical questions pertaining to the consumer are simply not 
investigated.  The negotiation process concludes when some parties are deemed the 
“haves” while others become the rather unfortunate, quintessential excluded parties. 
The DMCA was not the first body of legislation to deal with the growth of 
digital technologies and the resulting concerns over intellectual property theft.  In 
1991, copyright owners filed a suit contending that digital audio tape recorders (DAT) 
encouraged individual consumers to copy digital products without permission, and 
consumer electronics manufacturers agreed to implement copy-protection technology 
and to pay royalties to compensate copyright owners for forgone sales under the 1992 
Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA).198  Additionally, in 1998, before the 
implementation of the DMCA, the RIAA filed an unsuccessful lawsuit to enjoin the 
very first MP3 player, the Rio, but the 1998 DMCA incorporated two requirements 
that compensated for the RIAA’s lack of success.  The DMCA mandated that 
consumer electronics makers implement the use of copy-protection schemes, and 
broadly banned the making, selling, and trafficking in of the tools that facilitated 
infringing acts of copy protection circumvention. 
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Following the enactment of the DMCA, a full two years passed before the law 
began colliding with citizens and their civil liberties.  This chapter presents some of 
the key lawsuits involving the DMCA brought forth by the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation with regard to film and media products.  Additionally, this chapter 
discusses several landmark cases involving general digital goods where companies 
were sued and unceremoniously brought to an end for producing DVD ripping 
products that were deemed to be violating the DMCA.  The cases are important in that 
the defendants claimed that use of their products fell under the category of fair use, a 
defense that is not wholly recognized by the courts.  As a result, the DMCA is 
repeatedly challenged and only amended in apparently mystifying circumstances.  By 
mystifying, I mean to say that it is still unclear what prerequisites would have to exist 
and be convincing enough for the Copyright Office to amend the inflexible legislation.  
Of course, the DMCA is an essential ordinance that needs to be in place for the 
trusted system framework to function.  It allowed industry to impose new controls on 
consumers that were never available under previous copyright laws until the 
legislation passed in 1998.  By simply circumventing technical protections, persons 
found guilty now faced potential monetary fines of $500,000 and/or a 5-year jail 
term.199  The enactment of the DMCA brought with it stronger technical self-
enforcements, and the content industries gradually felt more confident that the much-
ballyhooed “Valenti logic” would promote beliefs about the perilousness of the 
Internet and cause enough of a moral panic that a majority of consumers would obey 
the law.  The Valenti logic is persuasive (read: propaganda) and claims that the safety 
and market economy of the Internet ecosystem is constantly threatened by plundering 
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pirates.200  The resultant underlying anxieties about the Internet reinforces consumer 
perceptions of righteousness among big business, or in this context the content 
industries and Hollywood.   
Linux Protests 
After the passage of the law, a series of small protests followed along with 
some comparatively bizarre legal entanglements that reflected the DMCA’s potential 
harm.  First, a group of “affable” Linux operating system users from New York City 
and the Washington D.C. area converged on Capitol Hill on March 28, 2000 to protest 
the DMCA, which they said was unfairly restricting the development of DVD 
software for the Linux OS. 201  Explaining to passers-by that the DMCA was a serious 
setback for consumers while at the same time trying to generate attention from the 
Library of Congress, members of the New York Linux Users Group (NYLUG), the 
Washington DC Linux Users Group (DCLUG) and the Northern Virginia Linux Users 
Group (NOVALUG) staged a three-hour rally on the steps of the Library of 
Congress.202  Essentially, the protesters argued that the Linux operating system 
prohibited users from accessing the contents of DVD discs, insisting that individual 
ownership of the product permitted the user to engage in fair use activities.  In terms 
of premonitions, this rather unassuming group of Linux enthusiasts had every reason 
to be concerned about the DMCA and were acting on well established suspicions that 
the new legislation could permit a few organizations who held copyrights and also 
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controlled distribution technologies (such as the MPAA with DVD video standards) to 
gain an unassailable stranglehold over their respective markets, to the detriment of 
independent content producers as well as consumers.203  The protesters wanted the 
DMCA to be revised so the legislation was more balanced, in this case so it was 
strictly confined to protection against copyright infringement rather than the 
technological access controls.204  The MPAA had already fought against the 
distribution and use of DeCSS code in 2000, which was de-encryption software that 
permitted users to unscramble DVD discs protected by CSS, or content scrambling 
system code. The film association eventually won a preliminary injunction that 
required several men from Norway to remove Internet postings that leaked the code 
for cracking the DVD encryption.205    
Speaking about the Linux protesters was Mark Litvack, the MPAA’s legal 
director for worldwide piracy, who argued that the group was complaining about “our 
ability to protect our members’ products.”206 The DVD-CCA is mentioned at length 
later in this chapter because it filed numerous copyright lawsuits against businesses it 
deemed to be breaching the DMCA provisions.  The memberships among 
Hollywood’s technical, legal, hardware and content producers like the Copy Protection 
Technical Working Group and DVD Copy Control Association created a strong 
alliance against preliminary protests like this one.  Both organizations began in the late 
1990s as Hollywood began producing and distributing digital video content.  
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EFF’s Preliminary Lobbying Efforts with DVD Encryption Scheme  
To extend the protests initiated by the various Linux groups, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation wrote letters to the Copyright Office as part of a comment period 
on the exemption to prohibition on the circumvention of copyright protection systems 
for access control technologies.207  Generally, as the representative of several of the 
nation’s very first defendants charged with violating the access control restrictions 
under the DMCA, the EFF was concerned with attempts to make copying of all audio 
and visual works illegal.208  In this case, the EFF protested the various technological 
measures incorporated on DVDs, namely the CSS code that the Linux protesters were 
concerned about.  According to the EFF, the CSS did not prevent the unauthorized 
copying of DVDs, but instead controlled the devices on which movies may be viewed, 
requiring the manufacturers of the authorized devices to restrict functionality so that it 
prevented any copying, including copying for fair use purposes.209  The technological 
protections applied to DVDs, according to the EFF, were harmful to individuals’ 
abilities to make non-infringing uses and ultimately tipped copyright’s delicate 
balance significantly in favor of the copyright industries at the expense of free speech, 
innovation and competition.210 
The EFF also argued that first sale doctrine was completely forgotten by the 
DMCA.  Essentially, the first sale rule, which governs intellectual property in the brick 
and mortar world, terminates the author’s rights to control a work after its first sale.  
By imbedding code in DVDs and the mechanisms for play back, CSS effectively 
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asserted its control over a DVD forever.211   The EFF also objected to the 
establishment of associations such as the SDMI and DVD-CCA.  Coalitions that 
follow DMCA mandates, imposing broad proprietary and technical standards and 
specifications, prevent competitors from making open source devices that compete 
with and interoperate with closed, proprietary ones.212  The EFF argued that any 
systems that are designed to prevent users from making fair use of their property 
should be exempted under the DMCA’s anti-circumvention ban.   
Additionally, the EFF took issue with DVD region codes, the broadcast flags 
embedded within a DVD to control the geographic area where the content is played.  
There are multiple reasons for incorporating regions, officially as an effort to support 
Hollywood’s ongoing use of its release windows.  Region coding prevents piracy by 
allowing the copyright holder to block individuals from purchasing film content in 
places where the title has not been released.  More importantly, a manufacturer can 
demand a higher or lower cost according to location and the specific market.  Thirdly, 
region coding prevents consumers from purchasing the same title from a region where 
a different company may own the copyright.     
The EFF’s efforts to amend the DMCA in the year 2000 failed.  Realizing that 
the odds were stacked against the organization because of the extensive exemption 
requirements, it promptly renounced the DMCA lobbying process in 2006 and 
declined to participate.  In 2009, the EFF finally claimed several victories, and the 
concluding portion of this paper addresses these triumphs along with the DMCA’s 
ramifications and ongoing consequences over the fourteen-year period of its existence. 
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During discussions to make film content available via legitimate online 
consumer platforms, lawyers for the MPAA maintained that content producers would 
not make their digital content available if they had no assurances it could be 
protected.213 "The new technology presents dangers to copyright owners," said MPAA 
attorney Charles S. Sims. "Seeing what happened with the music industry, it requires 
no great feat of imagination to see what would happen with motion pictures.”214 All 
along, free speech advocates claimed that the DMCA violated fair use and free speech 
rights and, although the DMCA now grants exceptions to educators when it comes to 
ripping DVDs, the exceptions mean that under the DMCA, “not all personal uses are 
fair use.”215 Therefore, the rules that applied before the Internet regarding personal 
property are no longer valid.  This is the paradigm shift over property that I speak of 
repeatedly throughout my dissertation. 
The first section of this chapter features two of the preliminary cases 
illustrating the DMCA’s collision with academic free speech and innovation.  Russian 
doctoral student Dmitry Skylarov became embroiled with the U.S. government over a 
digital product he designed that allowed consumers to make copies of their electronic 
books.  Both he and Edward Felten, a Princeton professor that is featured in the second 
case study, became primary defendants in the DMCA’s attempt to enforce ownership 
claims on their scientific investigations.     
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U.S. vs. ElcomSoftSylarov 
Dmitry Skylarov, then a young Russian computer scientist, stood up and 
approached a lectern in order to give a technical paper at a Las Vegas conference in 
2001 and was arrested by the FBI for breaching the DMCA shortly after he finished.216  
Skylarov, who was visiting the United States to make a short presentation about a 
program that he designed for consumers to make backup copies of their e-books, was 
baffled by the public attention that ensued following his detainment and arrest.217  Mr. 
Skylarov worked for the Moscow-based ElcomSoft,, who was eventually sued for 
selling the program, which bypassed the copy protection features of Adobe’s popular 
e-book software.218 The trial is notable because it was the first criminal prosecution 
brought forth under the DMCA. 
The ElcomSoft program was developed as part of Skylarov’s Ph.D. research, 
and the court indictment accused him and his employer of creating software for 
purposes of both commercial advantage and private gain.  ElcomSoft, which sold 
assorted software utilities over the Internet, stated that it never intended to break the 
law, and while individual charges were eventually dismissed against Mr. Skylarov, the 
case against his employer proceeded to unfold in a San Jose, California courtroom.  
Mr. Skylarov agreed to testify in exchange for a pardon.219  In all actuality, Adobe’s 
software permitted e-book publishers to set their own individualized level of 
protection that resulted in users being able to make copies for private use on different 
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computers and lend copies to friends.220  It would seem that Adobe’s decision to sue 
was based on the unsanctioned and public dissemination of company intellectual 
property.  Adobe later recanted and asked that all charges be dropped in the ElcomSoft 
matter, yet the FBI appeared determined to prosecute. Meanwhile, some of the 
international reporters writing about politics deemed Skylarov to be an unlikely poster 
boy for American freedom.221 
The ElcomSoft case represented many things to many people closely following 
the proceedings. First, it carried the potential for setting future court precedents 
regarding the then fledgling e-book market, which was undeveloped and untested.  
The case was also the latest in a long line of controversies regarding how information 
should be circulated to researchers and the public.  Finally, the legal matter also 
touched on whether the publication of a computer program could be protected as free 
speech, which had been a sanctioned position held by previous courts.   Freedom of 
expression issues seemed especially legitimate in the ElcomSoft case, with scores of 
“fair use” claims causing the DMCA to be revised in Europe, particularly in Ireland 
with the passage of The Copyright Act 2000 that contains dozens of exceptions to “fair 
use.”222  However, as one writer argued, an exception or  “odd feature” to the U.S. 
authored DMCA is that it protects copyright protection systems more rigidly than the 
copyrighted work itself. 
A federal jury in San Jose eventually rejected the government’s initial attempts 
to enforce criminal sanctions against ElcomSoft, and it subsequently acquitted the 
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small Russian software company.  At the acquittal, the jury maintained that the 
government failed to prove that ElcomSoft willfully intended to violate U.S. 
Copyright law, which was the standard required to convict under the DMCA 
provisions.223 
I mention the Skylarov case for a variety of reasons.  First, as I discussed 
earlier, it represented the first high profile situation that the federal government 
deemed worthy enough to pursue in the name of the newly imposed DMCA.224  I also 
illustrate the Skylarov matter because the DMCA delivered severe repercussions to the 
defendant prior to the court ever reaching a verdict.  Skylarov, who had no prior legal 
record, spent six months in an American jail before he was released and was able to 
reunite with his family in Russia.225  And in Russia, Skylarov’s product was 
considered perfectly legal, which illustrates the beginnings of a cultural schism 
brought on by the law.  The DMCA’s harsh legislation quickly gained notoriety 
among the international community, and many researchers began voicing their 
concerns about travelling to and from the United States to present academic works that 
may be interpreted as violating intellectual property laws.  I mentioned in jest that 
Skylarov was depicted as being an unlikely poster boy for American freedom, but at 
the same time if his arrest and detainment are placed in historical context, it occurred 
just prior to the World Trade Center tragedy when over 5,000 people were killed in the 
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Twin Towers.  After the Skylarov arrest, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced 
the creation of nine Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Prosecutorial units 
and proceeded to mount a campaign to loosen restrictions over government telephone 
and web surveillance, and Ashcroft pushed for legislation that went on to violate the 
civil liberties of Americans, tightening the rules around travelling to and from the 
United States and making the situation especially arduous for people in the 
international community.  The combination of the fallout from the September 11 2001 
attack along with the ramping up of the DMCA made the web out to be an especially 
contested environment during this period.  
The Elcomsoft lawsuit also prompted a cascade of bogus legal activity to 
follow shortly thereafter, illustrating the DMCA’s broad yet cryptic jurisdiction. When 
the lawsuit concluded, a sundry of illegitimate claims were filed claiming the DMCA 
had been breached, including a Canadian remote control company (Skylink), who was 
sued on behalf of a patent holder of a garage door system (the Chamberlain Group).  
The Chamberlain Group alleged that garage door controls manufactured by Skylink 
were unfairly circumventing the patented Chamberlain access controls.  Skylink 
contended that customers had the right to buy replacement garage remotes from other 
companies besides the Chamberlain group when they lost their original remotes.226   
Another egregious scenario involved a small Charleston-area Internet company, 
crazycooldealz.com, who received a cease and desist order from retail giant Walmart 
because the web site posted inside information just before the Thanksgiving holiday 
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regarding which Black Friday merchandise would be heavily discounted.227  It was 
apparent to the courts, amidst the bullying and threatening from Global Capital Inc. 
that, in this context, Black Friday sales prices were not a form of intellectual property.  
Nevertheless, the holiday season ensures that Walmart and its global competitors like 
Target, Best Buy, Staples and OfficeMax will continue sending cease and desist letters 
over leaked “proprietary” information, although not on the DMCA’s behalf.  Another 
small web retailer, bfads.net, keeps a cease and desist tally of the letters it receives on 
an annual basis and notes overall that the takedown letters have a much friendlier tone 
these days, coming from what it calls the “repeat offenders.”228 
 
RIAA vs. Felten 
While the ElcomSoft case slowly drew to a conclusion, in a case bearing close 
resemblance came yet another lawsuit situating Princeton University computer science 
professor Edward Felten against the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA).  Professor Felten, a tenured faculty member, had originally volunteered to 
participate in a competition run by the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) to 
investigate the rigorousness of certain copyright protection systems.229  The 
competition was not sanctioned by the official SDMI group but rather from SDMI’s 
leader, Leonardo Chiarglione.  The SDMI initially came together on December 1998 
when the RIAA announced it would work with major players in the electronics, 
hardware, networking, and digital content industries, including AOL, Matsushita, 
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IBM, and AT&T to produce an all-encompassing framework that would protect 
copyrighted music in existing and emerging digital formats.230  In September 2000 the 
SDMI coalition narrowed their findings down to four kinds of watermarks and two 
non-watermark supplements they contended could serve to identify and analyze both 
regular and compressed files and operate in an environment that was supposed to not 
call attention to itself, in this case, not interfere with the overall consumer 
experience.231  Leonardo Chiariglione, the individual known for destroying the music 
industry’s physical media business by creating the mp3, agreed to head the SDMI and 
eventually issued a challenge to anyone who could successfully attack and crack the 
proposed technologies. 
 The challenge became known later as the “Hack SDMI” contest.  Ironically, 
Mr. Chiarglione had partnered with a consortium of panicked record labels who were 
trying to salvage their old business models amidst the new age of file sharing and 
downloadable music, for which Chiarglione was responsible.232  
Meanwhile, Edward Felten and his students attempted to use the “Hack SDMI” 
challenge as a class project and eventually broke all the watermarks and subsequently 
produced an academic paper containing the results.  Felten chose to present the paper 
at an academic conference rather than compete for the official $10,000 prize money.233  
A member of the SDMI who failed to communicate his intentions to other coalition 
members sent Felten a letter warning him that if he revealed his results publically he 
risked breaking the law.  Felten then asked the courts to intervene. Yet in a peculiar 
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change of position the SDMI consortium claimed they had no objection to his paper 
and asked the courts to dismiss the case.234  James Burger talks about the SDMI’s 
tactical errors when it warned Felten:  
That whole incident with Felten was really dumb: writing that letter, 
threatening, the thing that Oppenheim did.235 And unfortunately Carey Sherman 
was out of town at the time. And eventually, they (SDMI) sent a more 
conciliatory note. But look, it makes it a constitutional issue and that’s part of 
the reason why the research exception is there.  It gives it a First Amendment 
safety valve. Things like fair use and the whole kind of copyright issue revolves 
around two constitutional provisions. It revolves the patent and copyright 
clause. But it also revolves around the First Amendment, freedom of speech. 
The government can’t restrict speech. Copyright is a government law. Fair use, 
for example, is a safety valve. Right? It allows a lot of expression.  As an 
author, you don’t get a monopoly on your expression. You get a limited set of 
rights. And, for example, literary criticism, parody, speech-like things are fair 
use. You can’t cut that off. The government has no ability because of the First 
Amendment. So here you have another provision, which has a safety valve for 
research and it’s the worst case you could present, attempting to sue a professor 
who has done research and wants to publish a paper. I mean, that’s really not a 
good case.236 
 
 Gillespie explains that the SDMI’s tactical changes were largely due to Dr. 
Felten making arrangements with the Electronic Frontier Foundation to provide a legal 
defense, and consequently the case generated more negative publicity for the already 
maligned record industry.  The EFF stated that it challenged the constitutionality of the 
DMCA’s anti-distribution provisions and asked a federal court to give Felten and his 
research team the right to present their research at a USENIX Security Conference in 
August 2001.  The USENIX Association represented approximately 10,000 computer 
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research scientists and actually became a co-plaintiff in the Felten case.237  Felten 
contended throughout his ordeal that the paper was not any sort of blueprint for 
cracking SDMI’s technologies and the research would be unintelligible to a lay 
person.238  Instead, Felten said his academic investigation was meant to not only 
benefit the scientific community, but also the record companies because, as it stood, 
the technology was weak and would be widely defeated.  Felten argued that if the 
record industry intended to support the technology, it had a right to know if the copy 
protection actually worked. 
The Felten matter never materialized into formal court proceedings.  The 
Justice Department eventually dismissed the claims by Felten’s defense team all the 
while giving assurances that the DMCA could never stifle its future academic 
research.  The Justice Department also insisted that legal threats made from the SDMI 
prior to Felten’s publicity barrage were invalid.239 
The SDMI eventually came to an abrupt halt because of the publicity 
nightmare provoked by the Felten case along with members of the coalition who were 
unable to meet specific deadlines, which ultimately made it difficult for the coalition 
to keep pace with technological innovation.240  Uncovering the truth about the SDMI’s 
various personalities and specific activities that transpired over a two-year period is 
difficult because there is no paper trail or documentation made available to the public.  
Gillespie notes that members of the consortium were not bound by specific contract 
obligations and could walk away if they felt their interests were not adequately being 
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served.241  Shared economic interests were not enough of a compelling incentive to 
create cohesion, especially when the market was unclear and the potential for profits 
was unsure.  Strong possibilities existed that anyone could walk away from the 
coalition and sell their own proprietary encryption to outside interests; therefore 
incentives and outside oversight were sorely needed.  The SDMI was eventually put 
on official hiatus, never to meet again. 
James Burger represented a large portion of the computer industry at the SDMI 
discussions, and complains about the RIAA’s inability to work with the coalition and 
incorporate a business model that embraced online music sales as the recording 
industry’s primary income source rather than simply supplementing compact disc 
revenue, which remained substantial but decreased significantly in the mid- 1990s: 
JB: We all walked in a little naïve. I was representing most of the computer industry. 
A lot of online companies like America Online, some online music companies and 
some cellular phone companies. And we all thought:  “Wow!  This is cool. Secure 
Digital Music Initiative. They (the recording industry) want to get online. And we 
understand they want to protect the stuff online but we could  really do a great 
business. In fact, IBM invested something like $20 million in a program called Project 
Madison which had all the backend software, the client software, the server software 
for distributing music.242 That wasn’t what they were there for. They were there to see 
how they could protect their existing CD business,  not to establish a new online 
business. I mean, you have to understand that the music industry in 1998, ‘99, 2000 
had never made more money on CDs. It’s a little irony, you know. I don’t argue with 
that because they kept saying, “We can’t make as much as on CDs.” I mean, they were 
making a fortune on CDs! They pump out a CD and probably the cost of getting it on a 
truck was $.25 a CD. Then, magically when the trucks got to the store and the 
backdoors opened, they were worth $15-$20. I’m looking for those trucks for my 
clients! It’s magic! I’m trying to be sympathetic, which is always hard for me because 
I was there, but, look, telling  somebody who’s never done better and looks at 
the projection for the next couple of years that their business is going to be through the 
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roof and I’m telling them they have to destroy that business is a very tough message to 
give and a very tough message to hear. But it was true. And what I kept trying to say 
to them was, look-- people are excited about music. There are a few people who 
always rip people off, but let’s put them aside. They’re not the majority. People are 
doing this because they’re excited about music! They love music.243 
 
There were assorted motivations at play as the 447 participants took part in the 
Hack SDMI Challenge, but it is compelling that the SDMI incorporated an equivocal, 
highly-disputed word to advertise its competition. The specific term “hacking” 
resonates with society in seemingly contradictory ways in that some associate the 
meaning with terrorism, while others view it as a kind of freewheeling intellectual 
exploration at the highest and deepest potential of computer systems.244  Hackers are 
supposed to be anti-commercial, not loyal supporters of the popular culture industries. 
They hate the commercial ownership of software because the code is limited by 
intellectual property laws, where profit is the primary motive of the code.  What 
hacking reveals then, according to Galloway, is not that systems are secure or insecure 
or that data is free or proprietary, but that with protocol comes an exciting ability to 
leverage possibility and action through code.  The hackers in the SDMI contest did not 
think about the long-term ramifications of offering their help to the coalition.  For 
them, the priority was to defeat the code.245 
The next section looks at a well-known legal case, DVD X Copy against 
Hollywood, which touches on the legality of making digital personal backup copies, 
fair use, and free speech.  During the lawsuit, 321 Studios, creators of the software, 
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argued that they tried to comply with Hollywood’s stipulations but in retrospect 
asserted that studios were too afraid consumers would break the law. 
 
DVD XCopy vs. Hollywood  
In 1999, 321 Studios, a company that was widely known for manufacturing 
DVD video rip and burning products, anticipated that it would face litigation brought 
forth by MGM Studios, Tristar Pictures, Columbia Pictures, Time Warner, Disney, 
Universal City Studios, Pixar Studios and the Saul Zaentz Company and, therefore, 
filed a pre-emptive complaint, or action for declaratory relief, claiming that the 
DMCA was an infringement on consumers fair use rights. 246  The maneuver may have 
been a way for 321 Studios to ensure that a court of 321 Studios’ choosing would 
handle any suit involving DVD Copy Plus.247  Before filing the measure, the company 
made its product DVD Copy Plus, a software application that copied DVDs onto CD-
R discs, available via its own web site as well as through major consumer retail chains 
such as CompUSA and Fry’s Electronics.248  The company eventually amended the 
suit and asked that a court also rule on a similar product it was producing, DVD X 
Copy, which allowed DVDs to be copied onto DVD-Rs and DVD-RWs.       
321 Studios had taken a strong position all along that it did not condone the 
illegal copying of DVDs and that its product was to be used for personal backup 
copies only.  It is quite clear that the company expended efforts to follow the law.  The 
company’s founder, Robert Moore, was an avid DVD collector and understood that 
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making personal backup copies of a DVD was not illegal as he was not distributing the 
backup or reselling for profit.249  321 Studios also incorporated a mechanism that 
placed an invisible watermark embedded in the disc’s contents that indicated what 
computer made the backup.250  Every year, Academy Award members receive DVD 
screeners, which incorporate similar kinds of watermarks so if DVD material is burned 
and subsequently uploaded to a server, the digital material can be identified and 
matched to an individual’s IP address.  
 
DVD XCopy’s Inability to Decipher Rental Discs 
Before DVD Xcopy came to market, decrypting the CSS code and then ripping 
a DVD to a hard drive was a difficult process, but 321 Studios incorporated the 
technology to decode DVDs, transfer, compress and burn a recordable DVD disc 
within a simple point and click interface.  The UI may have been helpful, but the 
software could not identify a rented movie from a legally owned DVD, although the 
company professed that it was ready and would “love” to work with a Netflix or 
Blockbuster to render rental discs as incapable of being copied.251 There were 
certainly enough red flags on the product to remind consumers that DVD X Copy had 
not reached compliance, and therefore was not endorsed by Hollywood.  Besides 
watermarking, the product carried a label made by 321 Studios on its exterior that 
asked consumers to respect the rights of artists.  Also, a disclaimer, also from 321, 
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appeared for 8-10 seconds before launching into the featured film indicating that the 
DVD should be used solely for backup and personal use.     
In May 2003, seven of the Hollywood studios countersued 321 Studios 
claiming that DVD XCopy violated the DMCA.  The case eventually went to court, 
and a judge issued a verdict on February 23, 2004, deciding that 321 Studios’ product 
was indeed a violation and that the company must stop all sales of DVD XCopy in the 
United States.  The company permanently closed its doors in August 2004.   
Despite the injunction and eventual shut down of the company, many DVD 
burner offshoots similar to DVD X Copy gradually came to the market and are still 
available to purchase online. No entity has interfered with the continued operation of 
the DVD XCopy website, which actually ranks and recommends alternative software 
for users who wish to rip and burn their media products.252 
 The DMCA’s treatment of DVD copying and fair use is constantly debated 
because it is a knotty topic that affects untold numbers of people, and the legislation 
broadly skims over paramount issues. Confusing and contradictory in its 
interpretation, on the one hand the copyright office appeared to mollify certain 
constituents and granted fair use exceptions to the DMCA for film professors, but on 
the other, did not bother explaining how teachers could lawfully acquire the 
circumvention software in order to break the code. To suggest that one may copy, in 
order to appease those who argue for the undeniable right to ideas and facts, while at 
the same time denying access via encryption to the sought after material is akin to 
stating that one may speak in public to exercise free speech rights and then deny the 
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speaker an audience.253  Utilizing DRM on digital materials in order to combat piracy 
is inappropriate at any time because the technology is too restrictive to consumers.  
Besides protecting copyrighted materials, DRM also blocks materials that should be 
free for the taking (commentary, facts, ideas, quotes) and when it is challenged, the 
DMCA trumps DRM technology in terms of its legal force. If the material is not 
copyrighted in the first place, how does the law seemingly approve the product 
receiving DRM protection? At this point, the DMCA does not make room for non-
copyrightable works in the legislation.  Therefore, if the cultural works are digitized, 
the publisher may claim that they are copyrighted despite proof that they already exist 
in the public domain.  This kind of fraudulent activity happens all of the time. 
 
Copyright Fraud 
There are countless examples of copyright fraud occurring in the marketplace 
all of the time, although not every example is explicit. A Barnes and Noble e-book 
version of Alice in Wonderland (public domain material) contains a warning that the 
electronic book may not be read out-loud, making it impossible to enforce.  A library 
at a public school avoids purchasing Shakespeare’s Macbeth after seeing a notice that 
the play cannot be copied, which is only partially true, which means it is mostly false 
because the publisher did not indicate what portions of the added text or illustrations 
were forbidden. Or perhaps the most clear-cut case of copyright fraud is where the 
U.S. Government’s 9/11 Report is available for $1.99 per copy via an electronic 
bookseller. There are too many kinds of fraudulent activities occurring here, and 
appropriate consumer protections are non-existent.  In instances of clear copyright 
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fraud, users unknowingly seek licenses and pay fees to reproduce works that are 
actually free for the taking.  Trumped up notices of copyright can be found on modern 
reprints of Shakespeare’s plays, Beethoven’s piano scores, greeting cards that front 
Monet’s Water Lilies and even the U.S. Constitution.254 
For the victim, there is no recourse against acts of fraud.  The Copyright Act 
offers no civil penalty for falsely claiming ownership over materials in the public 
domain, nor is there compensation for those who make payments for permission to 
copy materials that they are actually entitled to use for free.  Strong copyright regimes 
create a permissible environment for copyright fraud, and while falsely claiming 
copyright is technically criminal under the Copyright Act, prosecutions almost never 
happen.255  There are no “legal protectors” of the Public Domain, or a Public Domain 
Infringement Force that works with the FBI.  The government is supposed to protect 
the public domain, but no person has been assigned the responsibility. 
Before I continue, let me make some distinctions about materials with an 
official copyright demarcation versus public domain materials.  Copyright gives the 
copyright holder exclusive rights over the work, including the right to copy it.256   The 
protection does not grant complete control over all uses of the work, however, and 
those rights are subject to important limitations such as fair use, limited terms, and the 
first sale doctrine. 
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The public domain is a vast and undifferentiated set of contents; a blob of 
unnamed size and dimension.257  It is not what many think, a gigantic vault of valuable 
materials readily available for perusal.  The value of its contents is debatable, with 
some believing it to be the font of all creation while others contending it to be a virtual 
wasteland of undeserving detritus.258  It is, for the most part, unchartered research 
terrain.  The domain is ephemeral, in that it is different sizes at different times and in 
different countries.  It grows when patents and copyrights expire, and shrinks through 
government directives, for example, when the U.S. courts determined that business 
methods could be patented.259  The boundaries of the public domain are obscure, 
which is my point.  Some intellectual creations that courts have treated as if they 
resided in the public domain actually do not exist there.  Some content is widely 
available to use and appears as if it is in the public domain, even though it is 
technically copyrighted, for instance when a company decides to post material on a 
web site with no restrictions or cost.  Some artifacts have a variety of public domain 
classifications.  A scientific article may comprise of three to four categories of public 
domain contents. 
Although many of the public domain materials are available for individuals to 
use, they could come with a financial cost.  A hypothetical scenario involving a 
filmmaker who wants to use WWII combat footage that is housed in the public domain 
must first seek permission from the original studio where the movie was produced, and 
the director is then subject to pay a licensing fee.  The owner of the work, regardless 
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of whether the material exists in the public domain, also has the option to refuse 
access, especially if the item in question is the only existing copy.260   It is here where 
the distinction between copyrights versus access blurs, with the distinctions coming 
off as insignificant to free speech advocates when it comes to creativity and freedom 
of expression. 
In the world of digital goods, the technological controls that determine access 
and use of products aid and abet incidences of copyright fraud.  Although not 
everything that is digital is copyrightable (Pro-CD Inc. vs.Zeidenberg, for instance, 
prevented the copyright protection of CDs containing white page listings from 
thousands of telephone directories in digital form), the vendors of digital information 
like Amazon and Itunes tend to give themselves vast protections that intellectual 
property laws would normally disallow.261 When coming up against the copyright 
notices and technical encryption schemes, a large number of people simply stop dead 
in their tracks rather than try challenging the law.  The White Paper dismissed any call 
for a fair use exception to anti-circumvention legislation with the comment that “the 
fair use doctrine does not require a copyright owner to allow or to facilitate 
unauthorized access or use of a work.” 262  Copyright owners extended this idea, 
indicating that fair use might allow some use of an unauthorized copy of a work in 
exceptional circumstances, but it did not permit theft of the copy.  If an individual 
purchased a book, or checked it out from a library that purchased it, he could claim 
fair use but at the same time, fair use did not permit him to break into the author’s 
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house to steal his own personal copy.263  Circumventing technical protections 
schemes, the copyright owners argued, was akin to breaking into an author’s home or 
stealing a book, and fair use never permitted this.  Although the housebreaking 
metaphor was apt in some cases, it was inappropriate as an ordinance.  Property laws 
give homeowners legal control over who comes in, which permits the further use of 
protective devices like locks and burglar alarms.  But, without property, the metaphor 
is no longer valid.  Jessica Litman describes it this way: If a well-trained attack dog 
prevented strangers from seeing a painting that had no owner (the Mona Lisa in the 
Louvre, for instance) the museum guards would conceivably kill the dog.264  As 
Litman argues, the housebreaking metaphor allowed the supporters of unconditional 
protection against circumvention to glide over the issue of what was behind the lock or 
to examine whether people were entitled to see it. 
The digitization of information does not categorically pose a threat to the 
public domain.  The initiative to digitize government information supposedly creates 
more transparency and accountability in Washington.  Sharing digitized scientific data 
from around the world leads to innovation, and an overall enhancement of the public 
domain.  As for the digitization process in the world of commodities and cultural 
works, the scenario is not as rosy.  Firms can gain control over information already 
residing in the domain and then apply technical controls and licenses.  As an example, 
the LEXIS and Westlaw databases contain hundreds of thousands of public domain 
judicial opinions and legal texts that the database owners control through licenses and 
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digital access controls.265  Those who counter the availability of a free and open 
database argue that if the U.S. government exercised its eminent domain power and 
made the information available without restrictions, who would ultimately pay for the 
database’s upkeep, improving the tools?  In this context, the argument for privatization 
gains traction although it is appalling and bodes badly for a free and open information 
society. 
Pamela Samuelson suggests that the competition between government and 
private enterprise over the public domain may have a positive impact because the 
public domain could offer key information to those who cannot afford to pay, holding 
in check the monopolistic tendencies of the market players.  But I do not think 
competition is at all possible here.  My dissertation illustrates that with the role of 
copyright, especially, the ruling coalition sold off big government to private enterprise 
and created a government-by-entrepreneurship model, a “less government in business 
and more business in government” scenario where government is secondary to big 
business and is therefore fallow and ineffective.266  Is the Federal Trade Commission 
successfully holding off the monopolistic tendencies of the market now?  Monopolies, 
by the way, are perfectly legal in this country.  It is the ways that monopolies are 
acquired or abused that gains the attention of a U.S. regulatory commission. 
In the following section, I examine several cases where the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation came to the aid of companies and/or individuals being sued by the MPAA 
or its consortium.   
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MPAA vs. The People 
In 2003, the MPAA announced that the six major Hollywood film studios 
would seek joint legal action against hundreds of different individuals involved in 
using peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing platforms to acquire films online.  At the time, 
the MPAA turned a blind eye to the recording industry and its various missteps with 
fans, including the more than 6,000 lawsuits the RIAA filed against individuals using 
P2P technology since September 2003.  If they were inclined to study the past, film 
executives would have thought twice about their decision to litigate because the 
recording industry’s album sales decreased about 16% since 2000, according to 
Nielsen SoundScan.267   
In Chapter 3, Dean Garfield mentioned that litigation was one of the assorted 
tools the MPAA used to defend Hollywood against film piracy. The film organization 
displayed certain impudence by going after individual downloaders for breaching the 
DMCA.  Calling something a crime in the context of the Copyright Wars is not meant 
to describe acts that violate statutes but instead is a political strategy to redefine social 
norms in a way that will lead the state to intervene and criminalize behavior that is not, 
in fact, criminal.268  Hollywood was the ideal organization to develop, shape, and 
market the social and political campaign against piracy and illegal downloading, and 
litigation was used as a means to gain control over p2p technology in order to 
perpetuate existing business models.269  The incorporation of the DMCA access 
provisions is not so much about a concern over the copying of works but maintaining 
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Hollywood release patterns. We saw this litigation war over technology happen 
already with the Betamax case, where Jack Valenti deemed VCRs as a threat to large 
corporations and more broadly, to the American public.  American society, in fact, did 
not have to be saved from VCRs.  The studios were more concerned about eliminating 
a competing format because the film studio MCA had already committed itself fully to 
the videodisc.  MCA owned all the patents for a video laser disc player called 
DiscoVision and took the lead with Universal Pictures in 1976 by filing a lawsuit 
against Sony.  MCA previously considered using Sony as a partner to manufacture 
their laserdisc player.270 
The EFF intervened in the lawsuit to defend the privacy and due process rights 
of the individuals included in the lawsuit and argued that Hollywood could not claim 
that file sharing was about to make Hollywood go out of business since DVD sales 
increased 33 percent and box office receipts had also increased from the year 
before.271 A judge in Northern California dismissed the case based on an earlier 
lawsuit involving satellite provider DirecTV in which the plaintiffs could not establish 
a link between the various defendants or prove that they acted in concert.  The 
plaintiff’s only evidence was judged to be circumstantial because all the defendants 
allegedly used the same Internet Service Protocol (ISP) but did not engage in distinct 
and related conduct, which was insufficient evidence for the United States District 
Court. 
In yet another massive lawsuit, the music and film industries went after 
Grokster and initially suffered a tremendous defeat as I wrote in Chapter Three, but 
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the legal counsel representing the MPAA incorporated a distinctly different legal 
strategy when it appealed the decision in district court, and the Supreme Court 
eventually overruled the previous verdict and decided that software creators were 
liable for what users did with their software.  
 
MGM vs. Grokster 
In the MGM vs. Grokster case, the Electronic Frontier Foundation defended 
StreamCast Networks, the company that created the Morpheus peer-to-peer file-
sharing platform.  Twenty-eight of the biggest global entertainment giants brought 
lawsuits against the creators of Morpheus, Grokster, and KaZaa products, attempting 
to trigger a colossal precedent when it came to individuals using technologies to 
engage in copyright infringement.272 As was mentioned previously, the Supreme Court 
ruled according to a previous landmark trial, Sony Corporation of America vs. 
Universal Studios (otherwise called the Sony Betamax ruling), arguing that a 
distributor could not be held responsible for a user’s behavior so long as the 
technology is also capable of substantial non-infringing uses.273   As a result, the Ninth 
Circuit determined that both Grokster and Morpheus distributors could not be held 
responsible for any individual’s copyright violations.   
 The court case received an extensive amount of publicity, which was aided 
with additional financial support from billionaire Mark Cuban against MGM.  Cuban, 
owner of the Dallas Mavericks, Landmark Theaters, and HDTV cable network 
HDNET, insisted, like many of his supporters in both the academic and corporate 
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world that the case was situating the big content companies against the little ones, 
cautioning that courts could stifle or shut down future innovations.274  The Electronic 
Frontier Foundation noted that it needed clarification over the rules for technology 
innovators, arguing that the Supreme Court simply overlooked these important 
questions and, as a replacement, crafted a new doctrine of copyright infringement 
called “inducement.” 275 Using inducement to craft its decision, the Supreme Court 
agreed that Grokster should be held responsible for facilitating copyright 
infringement, and steadfastly urged that the companies be held accountable for 
actively encouraging individuals to violate copyright.276  This decision was a major 
departure from previous legal precedents and set an agenda where even if the 
technologies are capable of non-infringing uses, it is besides the point if the defendants 
are found to be actively encouraging piracy.  A classic case of inducement, according 
to Judge Souter, would be advertising an infringing capability or providing 
instructions how to engage in infringement.277  The court’s rhetoric, overall, suggested 
that the intent to commit inducement needed to be blatant rather than the court 
presuming or imputing the fault.  But it was apparent despite the court’s decision that 
the author of a software program who claims its use to be fair use could still be held 
liable without the proper software filters put in place.  In this hypothetical scenario, 
even after the sufficient discovery phase where the internal evidence illustrated no 
intent to infringe, a court of appeals would find the defendant innocent, but if he was 
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thinly capitalized, or, in other words, broke, the damage would be fatal to his career.  
For creators of software, the threat of liability after the Grokster case made their 
professions especially precarious. 
In the MGM vs. Grokster case, what made legal uncertainty particularly 
distressing to innovators was having to operate under the glaring eye of the copyright 
statutory damages regime where plaintiffs did not have to prove actual harm and could 
instead collect statutory damages, which in a court could amount to $750-$30,000 per 
allegedly infringed work.  Statutory damages, von Lohmann argues, become a 
corporate death penalty because insurance is unavailable for risks of that magnitude, 
and a claim against one product could potentially sink an entire company. 
 
Copyright Statutory Damages 
Aside from the exorbitant expenses of copyright claims, plaintiffs can also 
pursue employees’ personal assets because the corporate “veil” that normally shields 
corporate officers, directors, and investors, is pushed aside in copyright cases.  
Copyright owners can and do bring secondary liability claims against individual 
company members, arguing that each personally played a part or should be held 
responsible for the acts of the corporation he or she controls.278   To illustrate, the 
music industry continued pursuing secondary copyright infringement claims against 
the officers, directors, and primary investors responsible for Napster despite the fact 
that the company had already been liquidated.279 
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Besides the heretofore discussions about liability, what was missing in the 
retrospective analyses was a discussion about the ways in which p2p technologies 
would be beneficial to the content industries.  How did the courts become so involved 
in deciding the market entry policies for new technologies?280  If Congress formulated 
a “joint care” policy that allowed the music industry to incorporate forensic 
watermarking on their products, software producers would be excused from liability if 
they successfully blocked the sharing of the marked files.  The courts might then allow 
the software producers to use the Safe Harbor Rule but would still be in the business 
of setting policy, but only provisionally by refusing to find contributory liability in 
these cases.281  After the Grokster case, the lack of any oversight from Congress in 
which it brokered a fair agreement caused many to wonder why the media industry’s 
lobbying forces prompted judicial mandates rather than congressional legislation.  
Unfortunately, the judicial decision-making from the Grokster case did not touch upon 
policy and went on to pardon the content industries from exorbitant financial burden, 
with the courts shifting the costs to the fledgling software producers and their 
consumers. 
As I discussed earlier, the legal battles over DVD copying, fair use, and the 
first sale doctrine were just beginning by virtue of the DMCA’s passage, but even as 
late as 2008, the motion picture industry was still very much engaged with using 
litigation against consumer hardware manufacturers who failed to follow the MPAA’s 
specific protocols designed for video playback devices.  I recently watched an episode 
from the CBS television series The Untouchables (1959-1963) where “B” movie tough 
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guy icon Charles Mcgraw, who plays a mob syndicate boss, tells a cowering member 
of his consortium, “So long as you do what you’re told, keep your mouth shut, come 
up with the dough on time, we’ll get along fine.”  The RealNetworks vs. DVD-CCA 
legal battle emphasizes the role that the powerful DVD-CCA consortium plays as it 
supports the MPAA trusted system framework and its cartel. 
 
RealNetworks vs. DVD-CCA (aka RealDVD Case)  
In September, 2008 the motion picture industry brought suit against 
RealNetworks, which designed a product that permitted customers to make copies of 
their DVDs, storing them on the hard drives on their computers for later playback.  
The company was also planning to debut a line of consumer products that featured a 
DVD player with a hard drive contained inside the device.  RealNetworks thought it 
had engaged in due diligence and applied and received a license from DVD-CCA for 
its new product line, and it assumed the earlier court rulings from the DVD-CCA vs. 
Kaleidescape case would serve as ample legal support for the company.282 In 2007, the 
DVD Copy Control Association (DVD-CCA), the organization responsible for 
creating the CSS encryption code for scrambling DVD video content, sued 
Kaleidescape, a Southern California company.  According to the company who 
manufactured the device, the Kaleidescape movie server was more like an Ipod in that 
it allowed the consumer to make a secure private copy of every DVD and CD owned, 
and permitted play back in any room within the consumer’s home.283  Besides 
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indexing, the Kaleidescape system created a sophisticated database of information 
about the movies, including cover art and reviews, and allowed customers to search 
the movies they owned using different criteria. Kaleidescape claimed that consumers 
could not upload or transfer movies to the Internet via its device because the system 
was a completely closed mechanism, and it was impossible for individuals who owned 
the device to burn copies of DVDs.  The company made it clear that it worked 
tirelessly so that the system complied with the CSS License agreement, and that it 
obeyed the intellectual property rights of others.284  The Superior Court of California 
eventually ruled in favor of the company and allowed the Kaleidescape System to 
continue being manufactured.     
The following year, on September 30, 2008, the motion picture studios filed a 
lawsuit in Los Angeles seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) to block the 
launch of RealNetworks Real DVD Software.  The lawsuit was purposefully filed on 
the exact day the product was to debut.285 The case was immediately transferred to a 
San Francisco court that granted a provisional order halting the distribution of the Real 
DVD product.286 District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel decided that the Real Company 
broke the DMCA’s ban on trafficking in circumvention technologies when it decided 
to distribute the RealDVD products, and that RealDVD products were not authorized 
by the DVD-CCA license agreements.287 
In early March2010, RealNetworks settled its litigation with the movie 
industry over RealDVD and, besides agreeing to keep the product off the market, also 
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conceded to pay the MPAA and the DVD-CCA litigation costs totaling $4.5 
million.288 The settlement was disappointing to many people because the judge was 
unable to rule on interpretation, that is, to decide between the DMCA’s strict anti-
circumvention law or examine consumer rights under copyright law.289  The first sale 
doctrine, which was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, allows the purchase or 
transfer of a legitimately made copy, bound by copyright without permission once it 
has been acquired.  In the case of purchasing DVDs, buyers in the United States have 
the right to sell or exchange them, and even rent them to third parties.290  The Lehman 
Group’s interpretation of copyright law dramatically altered the concept of property in 
the digital domain and deemed all uses to be public “transmissions,” regardless of user 
intent. The Green Paper changed the first sale doctrine so that it did not apply to 
digital works, and the DMCA essentially nullified the provisions availed to individuals 
through the first sale doctrine when copyright owners demanded the legal tools to 
restrict the owner/consumer of legitimate copies of works from gaining access to 
them, and Congress consented.  Copyright owners insisted that in the digital age, 
anyone could commit massive copyright infringement with the press of a button.  In 
order for their rights to mean anything, copyright owners argued that they were 
entitled to have control over the access to the works, not merely initial access, but 
ongoing control over every subsequent act of gaining access to the content.291  Seeking 
protection over their property, copyright owners received permission to place legally 
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enforceable access control technologies on their products, which completely annulled 
the first sale doctrine.  At that juncture, authors received permission to exercise 
downstream control over who used their products, and The Lehman Group suggested 
that the first sale doctrine not apply to any transmission of protected copies or works, 
private or public, while endorsing the use of DRM technology.292 
 
End User License Agreements (EULAs), Terms of Service (TOS), Internet Click-
Wrap Agreements 
Irrespective of goods sold on the Internet, some copyright owners have placed 
warning labels on packaged DVDs that do not accurately reflect buyers’ legal rights 
even where the first sale doctrine is pertinent.  As I mentioned, copyright owners 
eliminated the first sale doctrine on Internet digital goods with the help of the Lehman 
Group, and various online software vendors now enhance their authority and supply 
supplementary End User License Agreements (EULA) that claim that their products 
are licensed rather than sold, and are therefore not subject to the first sale doctrine.  
EULAs were created in the 1980s as a way for companies to limit warranties on goods 
and disclaim liability.293 These agreements or disclaimers became prolific in the mid-
1980s because of the popularity of software programs and companies’ concerns that 
individuals would try to copy their products. Thus, vendors instituted another method 
of limiting the use of a digital product.  It has been a practice for some, not all, 
vendors to prohibit consumers from viewing the EULA agreement before the product 
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purchase, or agreements lie in difficult to view locations that put individuals in the 
position of being uninformed and at risk for exploitation.    
Keeping in mind that this is still an area of extreme legal confusion, previous 
federal courts issued decisions agreeing that the first sale doctrine runs concurrently 
rather than separate from the EULA.  Other courts argue that the shrink-wrap or 
various Internet click wrap agreements where a consumer scrolls through multiple 
screens of dense legalese, finally clicking the “I agree” statement, are legitimate and 
forever binding.294  Additionally, the Terms of Service (TOS) agreements also attempt 
to bind users without their signature and govern the ways in which consumers use 
online services like e-mail, chat software and wireless hotspots.  When a product has 
the ability to operate both on and offline, it is shocking that the TOS agreements are 
still valid, irrespective of consumer activity.295 
 I present both the EULA and TOS clauses to make the case that the copyright 
laws governing digital properties enhanced the authority of the publishing industries 
and went on to systematically corrode the rights of individual consumers.  In the case 
of fair use and the first sale doctrine, Kaleidascape and RealNetworks drew attention 
to themselves because the products they manufactured allowed individuals to make 
personal backup copies of their legally owned merchandise.  While it was true that 
these products permitted individuals to also copy rented or borrowed discs, those who 
were so inclined could already do so with tools that were cheaper and less 
restrictive.296  Indeed, these technologies had the potential to stimulate DVD sales by 
                                                            
294 Ibid. 
295 Ibid. 
296 “Why Hollywood Hates RealDVD,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, October 10, 2008, 
February 15, 2011, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/10/why-hollywood-hates-realdvd.   
 
 
 
172 
granting individuals the means to archive and manage their digital collections, which 
increases a cinema collector’s overall love and appreciation for the art.  The irony of 
this particularly sad story about lost innovation and Hollywood’s lack of vision is that 
in 2011, Hollywood is doing its best to salvage what it previously destroyed in the 
courts by creating even more copy protection while locking the individual consumer to 
a set of registered devices that relies on authorizations from a server-in-the-sky.  When 
consumers are supposed to rejoice that Hollywood permitted them to play their own 
media on their own, lawfully acquired hardware, it is sadly anti-climatic in the DMCA 
age.  How is this a victory for consumers? As the movie industry is exploiting the 
profit margins between physical and streaming media, it behaves like the RIAA by 
desperately clutching to physical media sales as an antidote to slipping profits.  It is 
only a matter of time before consumers will pass over DVDs altogether. 
Digital Entertainment Content Ecosystem, or DECE, has yet to debut, but the 
industry promises that it will allow consumers with a purchased DVD or Blu-ray disc 
to make one drm-embedded digital copy that will play on different devices.  The 
hardware industry is still working through hurdles with the authorization and 
transmission process, but a former technology expert with the MPAA tells me that the 
industry pins all of its hopes on the new delivery system.  After all, the innovation 
hedges the fence in several ways: Hollywood knows that physical media sales are 
decreasing, in this case the sale of DVD content.  As more people look to either 
legitimate streaming sites or piracy, the move to DECE could re-stimulate DVD sales 
because of the particular burn, transmission, and portability factor.   
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The legal cases discussed to this point highlight scenarios in which technology 
is the starting point for struggles over distribution and exhibition control, and the 
DMCA is marginally or directly defending consumer rights violations.  The Replay 
case involved at least two legal arguments that had already been heard and adjudged; 
the plaintiff’s claims were essentially recycled and resurrected for the digital age.  
From the Betamax case came the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA), which 
mandated that digital devices be fitted with copy protection technologies. But the 
AHRA was essentially out of date for the Internet Age.  For now, media companies do 
not condone file-sharing technologies nor do they see them as being legal, and the 
courts do not recognize p2p technology as a starting point for sharing and learning, 
which is a cultural custom. 
 
DMCA 12-Year Retrospective: Exemptions 
The EFF recently published a DMCA retrospective in which it criticizes cases 
where the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA were invoked against 
consumers, scientists, and legitimate competitors.297 By legitimate competitors, the 
EFF authors argue that the DMCA blocks the aftermarket from producing generics, in 
this case items such as laser toner cartridges, garage door openers, and computer 
maintenance services.  The EFF also criticizes Apple for using the DMCA to tie its 
iPhone and iPod devices to Apple’s software, although a judge later ruled that 
jailbreaking an Iphone or Ipod was legal and that underground software vendors like 
Cydia could continue to operate. 
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The EFF specifically discusses how the DMCA stifles free speech, noting that 
web site providers and bulletin boards concerned about the DMCA’s repercussions 
now prohibit members from discussing copyright protection systems, and scientists 
and security experts no longer publish details about their research.298  The EFF notes 
the irony in the DMCA fallout, asserting that security has actually been weakened for 
copyright owners who depend on security research to protect their works.299 
Every three years, the U.S. Copyright Office allows an appeals process that 
grants exemptions to the DMCA and its ban on the circumvention of antipiracy 
encryptions on cultural works.  In 2003, the EFF lobbied the Copyright Office to 
revise the DMCA’s stance towards four scenarios involving technological 
protections.  The EFF tried to convince Congress to remove the copyright protection 
technology that permitted audio CDs to only play back on some devices, preventing 
access to consumers who have legitimately acquired the compact discs.300  The EFF 
noted how the technology was overreaching in their letter, indicating that the CDs 
worked on some personal computers but not on other operating systems and that the 
technological measures were not designed to prevent the playback of music as much 
as prohibit individuals from making unauthorized copies.301  Therefore, consumers 
had the right to circumvent the copy protection technology on products they owned, 
the EFF argued, since the playback was considered a private performance, which did 
not fall under the category of copyright infringement.  Additionally, the organization 
sought exemptions on the use of copy protection technology on DVDs featuring 
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works already in the public domain permitting exemptions on audiovisual works and 
movies not released on region 1 DVD formats, and an exemption on DVDs where the 
copy protection technology disables the fast-forward functionality of a user’s DVD 
during playback, forcing the consumer to view supplementary, promotional materials 
issued by the studios.  The incorporation of a user operation-blocking (UOP) 
component is part of the overall mandatory licensing requirements set by the DVD-
CCA as well as the DVD Format/Logo Licensing Corporation.   The DVD-CCA 
requires that DVD players and discs include the blocking command framework 
within their architecture.302 
The Copyright Office denied all of the EFF’s exemption requests for 2000 and 
2003; therefore, the organization decided to abstain from the lobbying process in 
2006, explaining that the rulemaking process was simply too broken for them to 
participate.303 In a letter from 2005 that the organization addressed to its supporters, 
EFF identified three fallacies in the DMCA’s exemption process, namely that (1) an 
exemption can be granted for acts of circumvention but the Copyright Office lacks 
the authority to legalize circumvention tools,304 (2) the exemption process is too 
complicated, and the sheer complexity of the rulemaking process requires a 
sophisticated, graduate degree level of understanding regarding legalese and 
copyright law; and (3) evidence has to be gathered that the proposed activity for 
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exemption is indeed non-infringing, demonstrating how people are being hurt by the 
copy protection tools, beyond simply being inconvenienced.305 
In 2009, the EFF claimed three victories in these lobbying efforts.  For the 
purposes of this project, the exemptions involving film and video are mentioned here.  
The Copyright Office ruled that amateur creators who believe that circumvention is 
necessary are not in violation of the DMCA when they use short clips from DVDs in 
order to create new, noncommercial works for reasons such as cultural criticism and 
comment.306  Previously mentioned was Hollywood’s consistent viewpoint, 
historically, that the ripping of DVDS was, without fail, violating the DMCA no 
matter the purpose.  The Copyright Office also granted exemptions to college and 
university professors affiliated with film and media studies departments, allowing 
circumvention for the purposes of making compilations of portions of works for 
educational use in the classroom.307Sadly, the exemption did not allow individuals 
falling within this category to use an entire work as the Copyright Office indicated 
that high quality resolution film clips were not necessary to engage in cultural 
criticism.  The Copyright Office instead argued that “other means” were available to 
educators at colleges and universities, such as screen capture software, and therefore 
circumvention was not necessary.  The exemption also did not cover educators 
employed in elementary and secondary schools.308  For now, the Copyright Office 
refuses to yield in every respect to those designated within the fair use caucus. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I illustrated some of the key court cases that involved the 
DMCA brought forth by the Electronic Frontier Foundation with regard to film and 
media products.  This chapter also highlights several landmark cases involving general 
digital products where companies were sued and put out of business for manufacturing 
DVD ripping products deemed to be violating the DMCA.  The DMCA is an essential 
ordinance that needs to be in place for the trusted system framework to function.  It 
allowed industry to impose new controls on consumers that were never available under 
previous copyright laws until the legislation passed in 1998. With the gradual shift of 
cultural products from the physical to digital universe, consumers experienced a 
paradigm shift that challenged the concept of property ownership altogether when the 
DMCA and its use of digital rights managements schemes was authorized by 
Congress. But copyright, as I mention, has never been about the end user.  In the 
history of copyright, protocol involves an assembly of lawyers sitting around a 
bargaining table settling disagreements, and many critical questions pertaining to the 
consumer are simply not investigated.  During the negotiations, a set of standards 
advocated by designated “interested parties” are codified and eventually enacted into 
law when representatives of certain affected interests come to an agreement over 
commercial and institutional uses of the copyrighted works being discussed.  In her 
seminal work about the DMCA, Digital Copyright, Jessica Litman explains that the 
efforts of negotiating copyright bills are built on a network of compromises.309   
The Copyright Office, a government institution that ideally has responsibility 
to function as the public’s copyright lawyer, is, in reality, a flawed institution because 
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of a limited budget and perpetual turnover as policy staffs often come from and return 
to law firms. The law firms, it should be noted, frequently represent the copyright 
owners and habitually endorse the positions of the content industry.  Similarly, while 
the Copyright Office has the expertise and institutional memory to function as both 
Congress’s attorney and the premier authority on copyright for over a century, it also 
places the values of the copyright owners above citizens.310  In the often-inhospitable 
environment of politics, political survival dictates that the participating actors quickly 
establish who their loyal constituency is, and private industry plays a significant role 
in the democratic process.  The Supreme Court’s recent reversal on the function of 
private industry and political advertisements illustrates the tenuous influence of money 
on politics in the political process.311  Public interest has always been secondary to the 
concerns of industry in matters of copyright legislation, too.  Individual end user 
concerns, or the private use of copyrighted works in an individual capacity, are not 
debated as representatives negotiate the arrangements of commercial and institutional 
applications.            
In the DMCA’s thirteen-year history, the movie industry’s comments have 
typically addressed its battles against piracy rather than frankly discussing the 
ramifications of Hollywood’s distribution control, and the consequences coming to 
those who challenge it. Generally speaking, selling a pirated work is “nothing” to the 
industry, but telling the public how the copy protection technology functions is the real 
threat.312  I certainly witnessed this when I attended a CPTWG meeting and 
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accidentally stepped into a DVD-CCA breakfast where discussions were exclusively 
centered on IP and computer code.  For industry, the value of proprietary information 
cannot be overstated.  The strong alliances that make up the trusted system’s 
enforcement against intellectual property theft allow copyright owners to impose their 
own preferences on consumers, and industry control over its business models.  
The trade groups representing the film, television and music industries know 
that the DMCA is not an effective option that provides a long-term solution for 
copyright protection.  They tend to worry that the long-term litigation costs of high 
profile cases results in an enormous resource drain.313  “The role of lawsuits in solving 
the online theft problem is clearly limited,” writes the coalition that represents the 
MPAA, RIAA, and AFTRA (American Federation of Television and Radio Artists).  
The coalition looks back to the massive civil case against the file sharing service 
Limewire, which finally culminated in 2010 after four years of litigation.314  Although 
the four largest record companies prevailed in the case when a federal court ruled that 
Limewire shut down their network, it was not a scalable solution to the problem.315  
To illustrate, in 2008 the RIAA’s general legal bills totaled $17 million for which they 
recouped a meager sum of $391,348 in what is called “antipiracy” restitution.316 The 
money recouped is the restitution paid by individual downloaders.  Unfortunately, the 
coalition’s solution to the economic drain was to seek even more copyright protection 
from the government. 
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The following, concluding chapter looks at the future role that advocacy 
should play with regard to e-commerce and on the whole, summarizes the findings 
from this dissertation.  Primarily, the chapter argues that the important relationships 
between copyright law, technology, and digital property will continue affecting 
citizens in numerous ways, and that consumer advocacy must reshape and reset the 
intransigent parameters of the DMCA legislation. 
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Chapter Five: Towards a Better Understanding of the Trusted System Framework 
and Copyright Control 
 
Summary 
This dissertation illustrates how the Motion Picture Association of America 
radically revised their methods of patrolling and fighting film piracy because of the 
digitization of media, digitization that was marshaled in by two prevailing 
developments. The invention of the digital videodisc quickly became an extremely 
profitable media for the studios. Similarly, in 1996 neo-liberalism policies based on 
deregulation helped the Internet expand to thousands of customers because telecoms 
began offering bundled services that were previously prohibited by Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) rules.  Both of these innovations allowed 
Hollywood to begin planning how it would bring digital content from the studios 
online.   
At the same time, the MPAA was aware of the Recording Industry Association 
of America’s missteps as it tried to protect music, and it needed a regulatory 
framework in place that assured the studios that their content would not be pirated.  
Although the content industries officially began distributing their music online almost 
a decade ago, much of the research regarding digital copyright still tends to center on 
the technological fences erected by the content industries without asking critical 
questions pertaining to government legislation, copyright law, intellectual property, 
and the various industry consortia supporting Hollywood’s production, distribution, 
and exhibition efforts.   Therefore, in this dissertation, I argue that it is essential to 
recognize the content industry’s power as determined by the political-economic 
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framework of what Tarleton Gillespie calls the “trusted system,” the relationships 
between the technological, legal, economic and cultural arrangements that make all the 
elements of a regulatory regime work together.317 These exclusive arrangements are 
important because the MPAA relies on the strength of this “regime of alignment” to 
distribute video products. The trusted system is the interlinking of the technological, 
the legal, the institutional and the rhetorical in order to carefully direct consumer 
activity according to particular agendas. The system creates a scenario in which 
legislators and courts of law also consent to play a supportive role with privately 
organized arrangements that profess to be serving the public interest, but the 
arrangements are not designed for those ends.318 
In a comprehensive four-pronged strategy that sought to limit the control of 
their products, the recording and film industries’ use of digital rights management 
(drm) only played a minor role. Also supporting the regime of control is the passage of 
DMCA legislation that prohibited any content user from circumventing copyright 
encryption schemes. The DMCA, combined with legal efforts to prosecute users 
sharing and downloading content, along with prohibiting the production of tools and 
networks that facilitate sharing and copying, are similarly prohibited. The contractual 
arrangements between the content industries ensure that the guidelines imposed 
through law and technology are followed, and the special interests representing the 
content industries convince legislators that such systems are compulsory.319 
In order to answer some of the questions about the MPAA’s campaign against 
piracy between 1996-2008, in Chapter Two I looked at the history of the organization 
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and chronicle its rise and establishment to become the world’s most powerful lobbying 
group that promotes American cultural exports.  The U.S. government’s ties with the 
film organization run deep: Besides frequently recruiting high-level government 
officials to helm the association, Hollywood has ties to the U.S. government as far 
back as 1916 when it encountered international trade resistance and sought help from 
Washington to advocate on its behalf.  Although film piracy is historically 
documented back to 1900 and the silent film era, Hollywood did not earnestly pursue 
it until it formed the Copyright Protection Bureau (CPB), an umbrella organization of 
the Motion Pictures Producers Distributors Association (MPPDA, 1922-1045) that 
officially began its piracy prevention campaign in 1940, and operated on contributions 
from Hollywood’s eight film producers totaling $200,000 a year.320 
After establishing the history of the MPAA, in Chapter Three I interview three 
central figures that currently or used to operate within the MPAA’s regulatory regime, 
performing the legal, political, technical, or rhetorical functions necessary to protect 
Hollywood’s film products.  Dean Garfield worked first as an intellectual property 
attorney for the Recording Industry Association of America, and was recruited by the 
MPAA to become Executive Vice President and Chief Strategic Officer for the 
MPAA’s piracy campaign from 2003-2007.  In the interview, I ask him about his 
experiences functioning as a public personality representing the MPAA’s piracy 
campaign. We also discuss the concept of the “trusted system” and how the MPAA 
worked with its partners as a seemingly collaborative unit.  Garfield also talks with me 
about the “Who Makes Movies?” commercial where the MPAA created an advertising 
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campaign that showcased employees who talk about the economic harm from piracy 
affecting ordinary people who work on Hollywood production crews. Mr. Garfield’s 
comments regarding his tenure with the MPAA reflect a certain chaos that is not made 
plain in other interviews, specifically his reflections pursuing anti-piracy operations 
when the Digital Millennium Copyright Act had not been legally tested. 
Also interviewed for this chapter is James Burger, founding member of the 
Copy Protection Technical Working Group (CPTWG), one of two organizations 
responsible for holding discussions centered on content protection technologies for 
film.  The CPTWG originally came together when the film industry began 
discussions with the Consumer Electronics industry in 1996 regarding the technical 
specifications for Digital Video Discs (DVDs) and commenced out of initiatives put 
forth by the MPAA.321  Mr. Burger discusses his background with both the CPTWG 
as well as the Secure Digital Music Initiative (or SDMI, which was a failed attempt 
by the Recording Industry Association of America to construct a secure digital music 
standard via the SDMI consortium), and offers his insight about the role that 
consortia play in the media industry’s attempts to protect its digital content. 
The MPAA’s campaign to stop piracy ventures beyond the home video 
market; therefore, it was important to illustrate content protection as it relates to the 
professional cinema exhibition circuit.   In this chapter, I also interview John Hurst, 
whose Burbank, California-based company, Cinecert, was selected by the six 
Hollywood film studios to convert Hollywood to a digital standard, which Hollywood 
argues is a higher quality, safer, and more economical alternative to film stock.  
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Cinecert is part of the Digital Cinema Initiative (DCI), which is the global name for 
this massive venture.322In this project, Mr. Hurst discusses the future of digital film 
distribution and exhibition, and the ways that film distribution now involves the 
major film studios delivering movies to theater chains on encrypted hard drives via 
United Parcel Service (UPS) or Federal Express, which is cheaper than placing 
content on film platters and subsequently using bonded couriers for delivery.  Besides 
talking to me in detail about the ways that Hollywood secures its films for the 
exhibition circuit, Mr. Hurst describes his professional experience going from a 
studio-recording engineer to working as Chief Technical Officer at a major film 
postproduction house and the ways that digital product uprooted and transformed 
both the music and film business. 
The notion of the consumer-producer and the reverse conforms to traditional 
interpretations of political economy because the audience is framed as  “monetizing” 
the media industries.  But in the world of illegal file sharing and bootlegging, file-
sharers, peers, and other equivalents are not necessarily serving the media empires.323  
For this project, I provide a counterweight to the trusted system and interview two 
individuals who demonstrate economic and political resistance to conventional media 
production and distribution practices. I speak to Simon Petersen (pseudonym) who 
calls himself a “piracy consultant” and professional media bootlegger as well as Dan 
Mickell (also pseudonym), creator of Movieland, which is a software program that 
illegally downloads and streams film and television programs to Apple’s mobile 
Iphone devices.  Both of these individuals operate in their own individual piracy 
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networks and employ DIY (do it yourself) modes of engagement to counter 
conventional media making practices. 
During the interview, Mr. Petersen describes a certain ethical barometer 
among bootleggers that tends to stray left of center when competition becomes fierce.  
As we discussed his professional responsibilities, Mr. Petersen conflated notions of 
copyright with code, and I extended this into a discussion about the ways that the 
DMCA protects the technological encryption scheme more than the copyrighted work 
itself.  By simply circumventing the digital rights management code, individuals face 
potential monetary fines of $500,000 and a 5-year jail sentence under the rigid 
legislation.324 
In my fifth and final interview, Dan Mickell, all of 18 years old, discusses his 
experiences as a computer engineer who sells unauthorized software via e-commerce 
vendors like Paypal and other sites.  Besides discussing Canadian copyright as it 
pertains to his business, Mr. Mickell talks about the ways he uses offshore servers to 
house and distribute films and television shows to the Movieland program, a piece of 
software that is available for $7 USD and is compatible with Iphone mobile phones. 
Recently, federal regulators ruled that it was lawful to hack or “jailbreak” an Iphone, 
declaring that there was “no basis for copyright law to assist Apple in protecting its 
restrictive business model.”325  By jailbreaking the IPhone, it allows an individual to 
hack into a phone’s operating system and extends the capabilities of the mobile 
handset by running applications not authorized by Apple. This important ruling was 
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added to a list of Digital Millennium Copyright Act exceptions with regard to anti-
circumvention provisions.   Mr. Mickell hopes to run a company like Netflix one day,  
In chapter four, I incorporate an historical investigation of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and discuss some of the important legal cases 
that involve the MPAA and its lawsuits against businesses and individuals. More 
specifically, the chapter centers on the DMCA’s treatment of DVD copying and fair 
use, which is constantly debated because the legislation glides over paramount issues 
through confusing and contradictory language.  The chapter also looks at the 
technological controls that determine access and use of products and how the digital 
rights management schemes aid and abet incidences of copyright fraud. 
 
Interpretation of Findings 
My investigation has not just been about a private regulatory framework put 
in place to protect cultural producers from widespread piracy and lost profits, but 
instead is an illustration of 1) how a powerful regulatory regime protects its existing 
business models from outside influence and change, 2) how this regulatory 
framework tightly controls digital film production, distribution and exhibition so that 
content is under the constant custody of the copyright industries, and 3) how this 
scenario creates strong barriers to entry for external competition,  as when an 
independent film festival is refused the option to rent cinema space under the license 
control of the Digital Cinema Initiative (DCI) group, or a DVD Copy Control 
Association(DVD-CCA) contracted hardware manufacturer opposes a copyright 
broadcast scheme that the MPAA deems as necessary to manufacture within a video 
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playback device, or a consumer advocate group opposes the restrictions placed on the 
DVD contents of purchased discs and the Supreme Court denies the group a hearing.  
In all of these examples, the MPAA’s regulatory structure is  solving social problems 
with legal and technical mechanisms that intervene in human activity while 
disappearing beneath business as usual.326  The MPAA’s trusted system is so covert, 
and yet so profoundly thorough that the DMCA goes so far as to prohibit an 
individual from prying off the lid of a DVD player and tampering with its mechanical 
parts. The interlocking of the legal, technological, institutional, and discursive thrives 
in part because individual scrutiny so often only sees each component functioning in 
isolation.327  When Congress gave its authority to the copyright industries to 
determine the rules regarding cultural expression, the copyright industries could only 
envision the value of culture in terms of their own commercial survival and 
success.328  With an act as far reaching as the DMCA put in place, concerns for the 
public interest and fair use can now only be heard every three years as part of the 
DMCA exemption process. 
When I began to research the MPAA and its campaign against piracy, I entered 
the project with several pre-existing assumptions that turned out to be false.  First, 
that the MPAA’s already established dominance over the film market suggested that 
it had easily bullied its way through copyright infringement litigation over the 13 
years of the DMCA’s existence. I was also convinced that the MPAA’s relationships 
with the other members of the trusted system were stable, and that its campaign to 
control content was based on mutually agreed upon objectives, but I was only 
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partially correct.  According to Dean Garfield, there were no established legal 
precedents to assist the MPAA in the digital world of file sharing and electronic theft, 
and the lack of any guiding legal paradigm perplexed the film organization because 
the law was constantly being rewritten in order to mediate market, institutional, and 
individual needs.  And while the music and movie industry received extensive press 
coverage at the time they filed various lawsuits, in the end the money spent to litigate 
outweighed the actual money recouped from one case to the next.329   
It is both baffling and amusing how the music and film associations actually 
overlooked their own economic interests to support the anti-piracy lawsuits, how the 
powerful media institutions on the one hand vehemently pursued a costly legal effort 
in the name of copyright infringement, but could not adequately control their 
spending.  I am suggesting that the media associations are entirely ignorant about 
media piracy based on economics, their dearest subject: the coalition representing the 
MPAA, RIAA, and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists 
(AFTRA) made their pronouncement that “the role of lawsuits is clearly limited” 
roughly 12 years after the DMCA’s enactment; therefore, it was time to stop the 
money drain with the clearly overdue announcement. 
Intellectual property attorney James Burger revealed that before the 
introduction of the DMCA and digital rights management use, many of his colleagues 
in the consumer electronics industry openly questioned the music and film industries’ 
seemingly endless approach regarding the standards and codifications necessary to 
protect digital content.  Burger’s concern was not about individual end-user concerns, 
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but the 49 pages of technical documents crafted by the MPAA that determined when a 
DVD device could record and copy content. And at a meeting with MPAA President 
Jack Valenti, Burger told the MPAA that the Consumer Electronics Industry would 
not adhere to such rigid legislation.330  Now, after the passage of the DMCA and the 
incorporation of the MPAA regulatory framework, the hardware manufacturers who 
disapprove of the content restrictions sought by the copyright owners must accept the 
terms of the contract signed with the DVD-CCA and the Blu-Ray Disc Association 
(BDA) or get out of the game altogether.331   This kind of contractual servitude is 
evident with all the moving cylinders of the trusted system: Gillespie notes that the 
methods that the media industries incorporate to intervene into the practices of their 
consumers to regulate copying, as well as to extract payment, requires the systematic 
alignment of resources around the use of digital content.332 To focus on the technical 
encryption schemes, or the legislation, or the economic arrangements is not enough to 
understand how the MPAA protects its properties.  Gillespie argues that the set of 
associations must be examined. 
The studios’ campaign to stop piracy relied heavily on the DMCA, which had 
not been legally tested and ultimately placed the MPAA in the uncomfortable 
position of finding firm legal footing as it battled a myriad of opposition.  The 
uncertainty of how to proceed with certain elements of the piracy campaign is made 
plain in my talk with Mr. Garfield, from litigation to advertising campaigns.  
Although the MPAA pursued and ultimately shut down Napster for copyright 
infringement, the organization’s legal team was clearly unprepared to handle a case of 
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the magnitude of Grokster, where 8 million unauthorized files were available via its 
p2p networks versus Napster, and the courts deemed only 12,000 infringing files 
were being shared.333  The MPAA found the Supreme Court to be extremely 
supportive of the DMCA and the publishing industries and determined that 
Grokster’s creators were liable for inducement, and the court stated that it was not 
altering the law and yet proceeded to change it by moving the line established by the 
Sony doctrine.334 
The MPAA’s trusted system framework mirrors other industries where 
deregulation, conglomeration, and consolidation created monopolies, erecting 
enormous barriers to competitors. In Los Angeles, by the 1940s, Hollywood was a 
vertically integrated institution and had control over every inch of the film business, 
from the actors to exhibition. But what does this tightly controlled framework mean 
for the future of copyright and consumer rights?  Historically, I am comforted by the 
fact that other information empires have gone from being open to tightly controlled 
industries and back to being less regulated. The Paramount Case, which was tried 
twice in 1948 and in 1962, finally ended when the Supreme Court agreed with 
independent exhibitors that block booking violated anti-trust laws.335  Following the 
decision, Paramount scaled back its company and went into serious financial decline, 
eventually making deals with independent filmmakers to stay financially afloat.  
After its various subsidiaries split, the company was a shadow of its former self 
because the courts forced the studio to sell its theater circuit, the company released its 
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contract players, and it scaled back on its studio releases.  When Gulf and Western’s 
Charles Bluhdorn bought the company in 1966, Paramount suddenly grew and 
expanded again, and the studio produced some of the most critically acclaimed films 
of the time under the supervision of Robert Evans, who was appointed by Bludhorn to 
become head of production.336  In the case of Paramount, it was the government, or 
Federal Trade Commission, who intervened on suspicions that Paramount’s business 
model accorded the studio a monopoly and unfairly restrained trade.  In the case of 
digital rights and copyright control, the weapon for an assault may be a certain 
invention or technology that breaks through the defenses and becomes the foundation 
for an insurgent industry, like p2p file sharing and Internet piracy.  But the invention 
itself is not necessarily the sole impetus of this insurgence either, as I have argued.  
At the same time, consumer advocacy and political action can provide the necessary 
impetus for political change.  Theoretically, the ability for the MPAA to enable the 
trusted system over consumers requires public consent because consent cannot be 
taken by force.337  The trusted system’s ability to evade scrutiny has been called a 
form of “heterogeneous engineering” where the trusted system designers are system 
builders, designing both the material artifacts as well as the economic, political, 
social, and cultural arrangements that will best help the system function 
properly.338For example, the speed bump on a street cannot function alone, although 
it seems to.  Instead, it requires the combination of imposing speed limits and 
financial penalties, of shifting cultural attitudes about speeding, and taxing the sale of 
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sports cars to reinforce the preferred behavior.339 The public “consents” to the 
MPAA’s arrangement to lock down digital content because it lacks enough economic 
and political power to frame the digital copyright debate on its own terms.  While 
looking to the natural progression of open and controlled fluctuations in industrial 
information empires, I can take solace knowing that increasing public knowledge 
about the MPAA and its liaisons will bring political action and eventually defeat the 
monopoly.   There is no arrangement, political or otherwise, that can function 
successfully over time in the face of broad public dissent.  In the summer of 2003, the 
House was deciding to overturn one portion of the FCC’s decision to relax the rules 
regarding media ownership, and the non-profit organization Free Press e-mailed 
hundreds of thousands of people, organized by their congressional district.340  The e-
mails urged citizens to contact their representative in Washington to express how 
urgent overturning the decision was, and an estimated 40,000 callers expressed their 
dissent, and the bill was eventually returned to its previous state.  During the years 
that Michael Powell ran the FCC, especially, digital activism came to the forefront.  I 
am not naïve, and realize that it takes more effort now to reach people about critical 
issues more than ever.  We need individuals who are not afraid of being independent 
to push the boundaries of debate in the future. And if they are scholars doing media 
research at Universities, I can only hope that their stated positions are respected and 
that dissent does not lead to any negative political ramifications. 
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Study Limitations 
There are several limitations to this investigation.  In Wired Shut, Tarleton 
Gillespie discusses the political relationships that form a portion of the trusted 
system, and I was unable to interview a current or past president of the MPAA, 
although I certainly tried.  As a matter of principle, the MPAA president leads the 
rhetorical charge against piracy in the trusted system, and also helps identify 
proponents on Capitol Hill to promote anti-piracy legislation.  An official interview 
would have strengthened this investigation.   
Further, much of my investigation discusses copyright law where I address 
many of the important legal cases that set precedents regarding file sharing, DVD 
copying, fair use, and the first sale doctrine. Although I feature two well-known 
attorneys in my interviews whose work centers on entertainment law and intellectual 
property, I am not a legal expert. For this investigation, I conducted an extensive 
literature review and studied a broad range of legal research and press documents 
regarding the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, as well as the MPAA and its 13-
year history with litigation. Additionally, I frequently spoke with my attorney 
consultants when the various intellectual property legalese ventured beyond my 
understanding.  
 There was limited literature available that addressed the industry consortia 
and working groups like the Copy Protection Technical Working Group (CPTWG), 
an association that helps to design the standards and codifications for software and 
hardware that give the members special interest in the overall outcome and 
encourages an environment for anti-competitive activity.  Additionally, I attended one 
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CPTWG meeting; therefore, my information regarding this organization is limited to 
the one visit. 
 
Suggestions For Future Research 
The results of this investigation have several implications for future research.  
This section will address recommendations in the following areas: 1) The relationship 
between the president of the MPAA and Capitol Hill with regard to copyright 
protection and trade, 2) The relationships between working groups and consortia and 
their influence on proprietary standards that prevent other hardware and software 
businesses from successfully competing, 3) The relationships among licensing groups 
like the DVD-Copy Control Association or the Blu-ray Disc Association (BDA) and 
the institutional power given to the organizations by the MPAA so they become the 
dominant disc format. 
Despite the literature that has been written about the MPAA and Washington 
D.C., the size and scope of the MPAA’s influence on lobbying with regard to trade 
and copyright issues is not clear.  Although there are books about the intimate 
connections between Hollywood and Washington in terms of star personalities (The 
Power and the Glitter by Ronald Brownstein talks about the Hollywood-Washington 
connection in terms of studio heads, actors, and politicians) it is unclear how the 
MPAA, as an organization, identifies a politician who can advocate legislation on its 
behalf.341  When Senator Fritz Hollings (D-SC) endorsed the Consumer Broadband 
and Digital Television Promotion Act (CBDTPA), otherwise known as the “Hollings 
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Bill” in August 2001, it was the most ambitious legislation that imposed copy 
protection on manufacturers of all digital media technologies and was widely 
criticized as a draconian effort to cloak every digital device with DRM trusted system 
surveillance technologies.342Fortunately, the bill never passed the committee stage, as 
consumers and hardware manufacturers alike criticized the broad range of the bill, 
specifically the cryptic language that defined “digital device.”  Nevertheless, the 
MPAA wholeheartedly endorsed the Hollings Bill and, despite the bill’s failure to 
pass, the film organization went on to draft the Digital Transition Content Security 
Act (DTCSA), which required manufacturers of devices that were capable of 
converting analog to digital content to insert a mechanism that identified all 
copyrighted content.343The MPAA, with the help of President Dan Glickman, 
eventually introduced the DTCSA legislation to the House in 2005, and efforts to 
close off the “analog hole” in consumer electronics devices officially began. Future 
research should investigate the ways in which the MPAA enlists the state to enforce 
its content protection agenda.  There is much to be learned about the effect of the 
media industries’ lobbying on legislation, just as more information is needed with 
regard to how the MPAA arranges the discussions with its various consortia to 
discuss new video standards. 
The technical working groups mentioned throughout the chapter that meet to 
discuss technical formats, groups like the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) and 
the Copy Protection Technical Working Group (CPTWG), are thought to be a more 
effective way to coordinate and resolve technical decisions rather than official 
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standards-setting organizations (SSOs) such as the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) or the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which, although 
they value openness and participation in the process, tend to work at a snail’s pace.344  
Gillespie notes that standards are now being negotiated by a wide array of trade 
associations and intra- and cross-industry consortia that, while they are careful not to 
pass themselves off as standards organizations, proceed to develop technical working 
groups within which to pursue shared technical arrangements.  It is not clear how the 
members of the consortia manage to work cooperatively when they are actual 
competitors in the marketplace, nor is it clear how these groups are considered legal 
bodies when it appears that their efforts to set standards and arrange inter-operability 
between devices and content appears collusive and has the appearance of violating 
anti-trust laws. When I brought my concerns regarding collusion and exclusion to the 
attention of Mr. Burger, the founding member of the CPTWG, his response was 
“Then what is the alternative?  Not have a DVD disc format at all?”345  When I 
attended the CPTWG meeting in January 2011, a memorandum of understanding that 
was read out loud to participants stated that no member could discuss their 
employer’s business plans, nor could members speak with the press.  The 
combination of being neutral and non-disclosing is a curious position for a working 
group to adapt as it discusses critical matters pertaining to the public interest.  It is 
clear that more research is needed in this area, although it is very hard to gain access 
to these kinds of consortiums.  As I mentioned, the CPTWG opened its meetings to 
the public because of external advocacy group pressures, and at least for the time 
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being only a two-hour window exists at each meeting for citizens to attend the event.  
Obviously, the CPTWG does not admit any individuals affiliated with the press. 
Finally, the DVD-Copy Control Association and the Bluray Disc Association 
are the primary licensing authorities that impose the specifications on consumer 
electronics hardware so media behaves according to guidelines established by the 
MPAA. Companies with deep pockets tend to battle their opponents in a kind of 
warfare called “standards competitions” where the goal for market dominance is not 
good for the consumer.  When a company loses the competition, like a Sony with the 
Betamax recorder or a Toshiba with the High Definition-DVD (HD-DVD), it 
generally proclaims after defeat that its standard is superior (but the market missed it) 
and avoids plugging the new format as it begrudgingly cedes to the winning group.  
Although Toshiba actually chaired the DVD Forum, it eventually lost out to the 
Bluray standard in 2008 after a prolonged 2-year battle where both technologies came 
to market within a 2- month span in 2006 (April for HD-DVD, June for Bluray), and 
consumers were supposed to decide which format would survive.  Toshiba spent a 
cool 1 billion dollars over the 11-month campaign to be the winner, but its 
competition included industry heavyweights like Panasonic, Pioneer, Sony, and 
Mitsubishi who managed to convince its team that its technology was 
superior.346Toshiba finally announced that it would exit the HD-DVD business 
altogether in March 2007.347 When I attended the Copy Protection Technical 
Working Group (CPTWG) meeting in Los Angeles, I was conferring with a Sony 
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engineer about the HD-DVD vs. Bluray video format wars, and the gentleman from 
Sony leaned over to his Toshiba colleague and whispered, “HD-DVD,” and the 
Toshiba engineer smiled sheepishly, perhaps still reeling from the embarrassment of 
losing.  When a company’s format is proclaimed by the market to be the preferred 
standard, as Bluray did when Toshiba conceded, the winner can flourish in a home 
video market that earns at least $30 billion a year.348  Home video profits actually 
surpassed Hollywood box office receipts in 2005, and the market is extremely 
competitive.  What is the relationship between a licensing authority such as the 
Bluray Disc Group (BDG) to the MPAA and the rest of the consumer electronics 
market, and what are the standard operating procedures?  How do these various 
political, legal, and technical institutions conduct business and confer authority upon 
the licensing groups, making them exclusive? This is unchartered research terrain that 
needs to be investigated. 
 
Conclusion 
As I talk about the areas of copyright research that have yet to be discovered, 
I look back at what I set out to do in Chapter One and encourage readers to not be 
pessimistic about the findings. My investigation looked at the ways the MPAA 
radically altered how it managed its film properties between 1997-2008, a period of 
history where the concept of property radically shifted in the transition from the 
physical to digital world. The MPAA used a system of copyright control that relied 
on trusted systems, interlinking a legal, technical, institutional, rhetorical, and 
economic approach to controlling product in the production, distribution, and 
                                                            
348 Ibid. 
 
 
 
200 
exhibition phase.  Just as the MPAA carefully manages content in its partnerships 
with computer engineers and consumer electronics companies for the home theater 
market, it incorporates a sophisticated “control lightly, audit tightly” approach with 
its theater exhibitors where systems log everything that theater employees do. In the 
event of a piracy dispute, the studios have logs that can be pulled from their 
equipment, similar to a “black box” that records every action on an airplane.  The 
exhibitor circuit has never been as tightly supervised as it is now in the digital age, 
with the Digital Cinema Initiatives (DCI) program.  
Three years ago, former MPAA president Dan Glickman went as far as 
calling digital rights management schemes a consumer “enabler,” because the locks 
on content allowed individuals to watch media anywhere, anytime, seemingly in a 
high definition pipedream.  Regardless of what the technology is called, behind the 
clever veneer of copyright control is a rapid corrosion of consumer rights that, in the 
end, results in an unfair exchange between the content producers and consumers.   
The Electronic Frontier Foundation played a major role in shifting attention 
away from the copyright industries and championing the role of fair use codes and 
DMCA activism. Asserting and defending fair use rights is part of the development 
of a more balanced copyright policy that helps to build, aggregate and share 
knowledge.349  Tomorrow’s generation will depend on advocacy groups that defend 
and bring lawsuits against individuals and companies in order to protect their digital 
rights.  Besides the EFF organization, a system of copyright entitled Creative 
Commons licenses allows the individual owner of a work to use a license that 
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enables a generous or a restrictive approach when it comes to the use of a work, 
allowing copyright owners who want to be generous with the distribution.  Creative 
Commons does not forgo copyright, however.  All Creative Commons licenses 
include some conditions, varying from one work to the next. DRM code is banned 
from Creative Commons licenses altogether, reinforcing that copyright control does 
not require technology to intercede in any way, shape or form. This is the sort of 
future for copyright reform that I envision, one that Patricia Aufderheide describes 
where copyright policies one again encourage new creations, providing ways to get 
unlicensed access to copyrighted works in order to encourage new creators.  The 
scenario I describe will involve an orchestrated campaign to reform copyright. For 
now, the strongest way to intervene in DMCA legislation is to be involved with the 
advocacy groups who have successfully intervened at the Copyright Office every 
three years.  The DMCA margins are being tested, and shifting gradually towards 
the side of fair use. 
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Appendix 1: Transcription of Dean Garfield Phone Interview 
 
July 15, 2010 
 
Me: You’ve talked previously in interviews about the mistakes the 
Recording Industry Association of America made when it came to 
fighting piracy and how these were mistakes you didn’t wish to 
duplicate when you came over to the Motion Picture Association of 
America.  Can you talk more about this? 
 
Dean Garfield:  One of the things we tried to do at the Motion Picture 
Association was to learn lessons from the experiences of other industries 
and certainly the recording industry because they were one of the first to 
be significantly impacted certainly on the revenue side by the digital 
transition and the ability for people to, on a mass basis, to rip content. 
Uhh, and some of those lessons were you know, one making sure our 
communication with consumers was clear and making sure they 
recognize that the industry wanted to provide a wide range of consumer 
choices and meet consumer demand. Two was to be as clear as possible 
about the repercussions of engaging in piracy both for the long-term 
health of the content they were interested in but the kinds of people that 
piracy generally supported because there was a lot of evidence and still a 
lot of evidence that those who are heavily engaged in piracy are 
involved with organized crime. There's actually a report out published 
by the RAND Corporation making this particular connection. And so 
those were some of the lessons that we learned. The one other important 
lesson was that technology was going to be an important part of the 
solution set but not the only solution. So recognize that whether it be 
technology or litigation which were two tools that were used by the 
recording industry, it had to be broader than that. 
 
ME: Besides technology and litigation, what were some of the avenues 
discussed in terms of dealing with piracy and working with consumers? 
 
Dean Garfield: First and foremost working as quickly as the industry 
could to create digital alternatives. You know, a wide range of platforms 
consumers wanted to experience it on. So, people wanted- we were 
transitioning into a mobile society with multiple devices and multiple 
screens so people wanted to enjoy motion pictures on all of those 
platforms.  So recognizing that we were working aggressively to come 
up with technological solutions to be able to provide and supplement 
that desire and encourage that desire. And then two is a lot of education 
so even where litigation was being used on the motion picture side the 
metric for success wasn't the number of people we sued what the size of 
the litigation settlement it was are we having an impact on educating 
people on the repercussions of engaging in piracy. 
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ME: Going back to when you first joined the MPAA, I'm curious were 
you approached by the MPAA to join the organization? 
  
Dean Garfield: Correct. Yes. 
 
Me: For many years I know certainly when Jack Valenti was helping the 
organization it seemed to me that he was the very public face of piracy 
and then when he retired and  then Dan Glickman came on, it seemed 
and correct me if I'm wrong but it seemed that Dan Glickman played a 
very different role and was more in the background and I've been 
reading a lot of interviews that you've done and it seems you became 
more of the public face of the campaign against piracy. Is that fair to 
say? 
 
Dean Garfield:  Ahh... I guess partially. You know, Dan placed a lot of 
emphasis on the issue as well but also when he came in the industry was 
experiencing fairly significant downturn in revenue and so he spent a lot 
more time on trying to come up with various solutions for driving and 
understanding what was going on on the revenue side so I took on more 
of that role with some of the content protection issues. 
 
Me: Was there a discussion that he had with you or other folks with the 
MPAA where they said that they wanted you to actually be this public 
face? 
 
Dean Garfield: You know, I don't recall whether it was that well 
calibrated (he chuckles) I think it was-you know, we had many a 
strategy session and at the time I was also transitioning between running 
our litigation efforts on a global basis and also running our strategy 
(laughs again) and so I think because of the dual role I played with the 
organization it just happened almost by default. Played out that way. 
 
Me: Okay. Yeah. Again, because I'm looking at the various publicity 
campaigns that the MPAA put forth and the way the consumers reacted 
and so those power dynamics are really interesting in terms of who's 
controlling the shots, who's calling the shots so I was just curious if 
there was any sort of internal discussion about you- 
 
Dean Garfield: I mean one of the discussion points internally was 
making sure that whatever we did since much of our focus was on 
education would resonate with the folks we thought that were engaging 
in piracy and so the fact that I was the fact that I was in my early or mid-
I was still in my early 30s I guess you know, it made sense for me to be 
out front on all these issues. The other thing was that I developed a 
relationship as it turns out (he laughs) with a lot of the developers of the 
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sites that were most problematic for us. And so I just developed a deep 
understanding of what they were doing some personal relationships 
some of those guys are people that I keep in touch with and so I think 
because it was easier to play that role. 
 
Me:  You were involved with the whole issue with Bram Cohen and 
BitTorrent, weren't you? 
 
Dean Garfield: Yeah... I still keep in touch with the folks at Bittorrent. 
And Kazaa, 
 as it turns out. 
 
Me: Yeah. Because I know there was a concentrated effort for the 
MPAA to convert BitTorrent into a for-profit venture. And I'm 
wondering after many years later do you think your goals were met in 
terms of… I mean the goal was to lower the occurrences of piracy, to 
take something that was losing revenue for the movie studios and make 
it profitable. Were goals met in terms of lowering piracy? 
 
Dean Garfield: The honest answer is I don't know. I'm no longer privy to 
the data that they get on rates and incidences of piracy. That was 
certainly one of the goals to reduce the rate of piracy. The other was a 
proof of concept, which is would people flock to and take advantage of 
legitimate alternatives that were being developed by the studios?  And 
so that BitTorrent relationship was an early attempt to figure out could 
you convince people to take advantage of legitimate offerings and I 
would say that was a complete success one because it resulted in a move 
towards the adoption integration of content recognition technologies and 
created a whole new space in technology. And then two there are now a 
whole range of legitimate sites that are working to get licensed content 
from the studios. At the time that deal and relationship with BitTorrent 
was struck, neither was the case. 
 
Me: The MPAA actually approached Bram Cohen, isn't that correct? 
 
Dean Garfield: Yeah. Both Bram and Ashwin, who was his business 
partner. Ashwin Navin.  
 
Me: What were Mr. Cohen’s initial responses when you discussed this 
relationship? 
 
Dean Garfield: I don't remember. I suspect my recollection is there was 
some trepidation but the other thing you know we built trust in a 
relationship of trust over time. So it wasn't like hey Bram and Ashwin, 
let's get this done. You know it was, “Let's talk this through. Let’s figure 
it out about how this can work for you and how it can work for the 
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industry. You know, it took convincing on both sides. The studios didn't 
buy into it immediately either. And so, part of the work and leadership 
involved was bringing Ashwin and Bram to the table, but also bringing 
the studios as well. 
 
Me: So the studios had some trepidation then. What were some of the 
concerns of the studios in working with BitTorrent? 
 
Dean Garfield: The same. They're not trustworthy. And that their sole 
commitment was stealing content and making it available on mass scale 
for their sole benefit. 
 
Me: Right. Because you had talked about how the new publicity 
campaign for the MPAA was to embrace technology and it sounds like 
that took a while for the MPAA to realize that technology could help 
move them forward and move their content outward. That old paranoia 
was still there. 
 
Dean Garfield: Yeah. I think there was the recognition-that part required 
less work although it required some work. The more challenging part 
was are these trustworthy people who will use that technology for 
meaningful, positive mutually beneficial purposes? There was some 
concern that that was not the case. There was also-we ended up doing 
something similar with a whole host of other sites including... I'm 
forgetting. They're in the Netherlands. Spy...? 
 
Me: Torrentspy? 
Dean Garfield: No. It wasn't just Torrentspy. Maybe it was. It was a 
really big one at the time. Because I remember going to the Netherlands 
and negotiating with the guys who owned it. (He laughs). And it was 
very similar-a lot of distrust and concern. 
 
Me: Sure. What was the best way to gain trust and to show that the 
MPAA was very serious and wanting to have a collaborative 
relationship? 
 
Dean Garfield: A couple of things. One, staying true to commitments we 
made on our side of the MPAA and then two, was trying to show that 
there was over the long term real upside from a partnership of the 
studios and so that work was less about the MPAA and more about the 
studios. And so the thing that we could do was get them connected with 
the right people-host that introduction, and then the studios would make 
their own independent decisions that made sense for their own best 
interests. But at the very least, we could try to get them connected to the 
right people. 
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Me: So the studios needed to give them content because "content is 
king" as they say. And I know that the MPAA, through the years when 
trying to negotiate contracts with various folks, have always used 
content as their leverage. Either they will give content to whomever 
they're working with, or they will withhold it. That's a pretty effective 
tool to work with people. (Laughs) 
 
Dean Garfield: (laughs) It was less us than the studios.  You know, our 
role was more of as a "convener" which sometimes can be an impactful 
role. The real influences are the creators and those they work with at the 
studios. And sadly… and this remains the case today… there are even 
instances where the studio may want to do something but where the 
folks who are producing or otherwise creating the content would have to 
be persuaded in making their content available on new modes of 
delivery was a good idea. 
 
Me: Yeah. It's very interesting about the various personalities you were 
dealing with at the MPAA, but you also had the six film studios and 
their input in terms of how to deal with the piracy phenomenon. Can you 
talk about some of these personalities that you were dealing with? 
Maybe talk about either in a specific or general way some of the 
agreements or disagreements you may have had with some of these 
folks. 
 
Dean Garfield: Yeah. You know I think they ran the gamut and I don't 
think any of the Studios behaved consistently throughout the process.  
So David Kendall from Williams-Conolly was one of the lawyers was 
heavily involved in this stuff, and he and I were at lunch the other day 
and we don't normally talk about this stuff but it turned out that we did. 
And you know, just noting some of the personalities that were at play. 
(Laughs) It was-the one thing, the one lesson that I learned about 
California was that everyone has talent there.  So no matter whether 
you're in front of the screen or not so there were lots of big personalities 
that you just have to work through and manage. And when you-when it 
involves the law and litigation, it becomes even more difficult because 
you're not always dealing just with the legal issue. You're also dealing 
with-there's the legal issues that were complex enough at the time 
because they were all very new. There were the people and personality 
issues where everyone thought their idea was eminently important and 
deserved to be one that won the day. There were also the business issues 
which is these six companies... at one point, seven-were are all major 
competitors. And so at times, their competitive spirit would play out as 
you were trying to advance a common goal. There are layers and layers 
of complexity trying to get everyone on the same page. 
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Me: You’re a true diplomat. I appreciate that. It takes real talent to work 
with folks like that where everyone believes their right, and through my 
discussions with other folks in the industry dealing with content 
protection it seems like that there is some unanimity that-a lot of these 
folks felt that Fox specifically had very different ways, or very different 
views in terms of how to manage content and that sometimes, there were 
stances taken by that particular studio that may have prevented things 
from moving forward.   
 
 Dean Garfield: Hmm.  I don't know. No. I mean, I was the person 
managing the litigation. Look, we all approached it from different 
perspectives and came away different.  The one -- the unique thing about 
where we were is that we heard from everyone because at the time I was 
coordinating a lot of this litigation and so unlike some of the other 
studios or people they saw it from their perspective. I would say that 
sure, each of the studios had their own personality and their personality 
probably stood out. At least, Fox to the extent that a studio can have a 
personality, but certainly a culture. They probably stood out because 
they were more aggressive in advancing their perspective at certain 
points in the litigation. But I don't think that necessarily resulted in delay 
and prevented us from doing anything. I think more than anything they 
just wanted to be really aggressive (laughs). And there were other 
studios, perhaps, more and that's not to suggest that Fox wasn't cerebral, 
but more cerebral. Warner Bros., for example, had a litigation team that 
included folks who spent hours and a lot of time grouping over these 
issues and were very cerebral about it and so you know, you've got those 
sorts of dichotomies where groups of folks who have thought about it 
think here's a particular road and it may end up because they thought 
about it for so long it may it end up being a little more conservative and 
others like Fox who think we've got to be as aggressive as possible and 
take this approach in advancing our agenda. I think it worked because 
the issues were so new and so complex that schism and diversity in 
perspective actually helped us to navigate it all in a way that made sense 
because we weren’t pulled to any one extreme at least on a consistent 
basis. The reality was there was no law or guiding principles so we were 
all figuring it out. 
 
Me: Wow. Is there one particular disagreement that you can talk about 
that you remember? Anything in particular with the studios? 
 
Dean Garfield: There were tons. (Laughs). 
 
Me: Is there one where you can actually articulate to me where there 
was a problem and a solution that was implemented? 
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Dean Garfield: A big one was that each stage in the Grokster litigation 
for example, we lost twice before we ultimately one at the Supreme 
Court. So, there were divisive agreements on one, what legal theories to 
advance? And then two, who should be our lawyer?  At the District 
Court, (and this is all part of the public record) the person who argued 
the case at the District Court was David Kendall. The person who 
argued the case at the Court of Appeals was Russ Frackman. What 
happened to David? (Laughs) And the person who argued the case at the 
Supreme Court was Don Virelli. So what happened to Russ? So, you 
know I think some of the smaller disagreements ultimately rolled up into 
choice of counsel at each stage we were unsuccessful. Those were really 
challenging because each of those counsels had long-term relationships 
with particular studios and particular record companies because that 
case, in particular, was one in which both the entire industry was 
aligned. So is the motion picture industry, the publishers, and the record 
companies and so were a lot of strong personalities that had to be 
managed and what was due after each loss became the tension. 
 
Me: And because that's a matter of public record, these legal issues, 
these legal battles, it sounds to me like I would be able to figure out 
personalities just by going through some of these court documents. 
Would that be a fair thing to say? 
 
Dean Garfield: Some of it. (Laughs) We tried not to have that reflected 
in the pleadings, but you know just the public record of who argued the 
case was the point I was making. And something prominent was that no 
one was volunteering to step aside. And so where I'm sure David would 
love to have argued at the Court of Appeals, and I'm sure Russ would've 
loved to have taken the case to the Supreme Court… 
 
Me: The whole idea that I'm advancing in my dissertation and I want to 
run this by you to get your opinion about this and see if you can add a 
little bit of your own input here is that my dissertation looks at the idea... 
are you familiar with the idea of a “trusted system?  Basically, the whole 
idea of a trusted system which I think can really be applied to managing 
content with Hollywood and the recording industry and media industries 
in general is that generally there is a collaborative effort to manage 
content through political relationships, through technology, through 
legal frameworks that have been put into place, certainly through 
contractual agreements and arrangements with studios and with content 
producers and hardware manufacturers and all of that. And that all of 
these elements have to work together for this regime-for this trusted 
system to be a cohesive unit and to be effective. So for example, the 
DMCA is the legal portion of the trusted system. With the DMCA, a 
person can’t circumvent any sort of protection, you can't produce any 
tools to tamper with the antipiracy mechanisms, you can't create 
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networks that facilitate sharing, then you've got the whole DRM, the 
incorporation of DRM which is certainly a technological barrier and 
then there's also legal ramifications for messing with the DRM. Then 
you also have the contractual agreements between companies to ensure 
that there are guidelines imposed through law and technology to make 
sure that they are all followed, and then there are special interests who 
are representing the content industries which convince the legislators 
that these systems need to be in place. 
 
Dean Garfield: And how does trust factor into that? 
 
Me: Well, the trusted system basically speaks to all of that. That all of 
these sorts of elements have to be in place, and they all have to be 
working together in order for content to be controlled. In order for it to 
be managed. And if one particular element isn't functioning properly, 
then there is a leak in the system and I'm wondering if you can speak to 
that? Looking back on your time with the MPAA, and the RIAA 
between these different elements that I'm talking about: the legal, the 
technological, where did you see  leaks occur while you were working 
there?   
 
Dean Garfield: When you say leaks, what do you mean? 
 
Me: I mean, looking at these elements as collaborative units in terms of 
all working together, the legal, the technological, you have the 
contractual agreements between the different players-looking back on 
your efforts with the MPAA, did you see any particular problems either 
from a legal, a technological standpoint from some of the individuals 
you were trying to work with, to produce content with, did you see the 
leaks in the system at times? Or are you fairly comfortable with all of 
these elements working together and the strength of those partnerships? 
 
Dean Garfield: Good question. It probably requires more thought than 
I'm giving it. But here's my initial impression: There were many 
problems (laughs) and I'm intrigued by-I’m not familiar with the idea of 
the trusted system but I'm intrigued by it because it all suggests that 
these are integrated systems that work well together and presumably 
would work better over time together as they become more integrated 
and trust is built. My sense is, in hindsight is you had these pillars and 
some sort of system in place and that you had institutions, well-
established institutions, you had a legal regime and all of these people 
and personalities and technology but the relationships were, and the 
integration of all of those systems were fairly new. And so we were 
figuring out what kind of system we wanted to create in a time that was 
pretty chaotic and disruptive. And so there were many occasions in 
which it worked fairly well, but perhaps more occasions where it just 
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didn't work well at all. I would say that it worked better at the MPAA 
than it did at the RIAA but that may have been just a factor of time in 
that we had more time for cohesiveness and integration and trust to 
develop among the various systems. The law was exceptionally unclear, 
you had legislation in the DMCA that was untested, particularly as it 
related to the challenges of the time, so we were all trying to figure out 
in grappling with some solid foundation while all the while realizing that 
whatever solutions we were coming up with at the time were 
intermediate because the real long-term solutions were ones that we 
could not immediately deliver, which is allowing people to enjoy and 
appreciate the content wherever, whenever they wanted to. 
 
Me: I appreciate your input there. It's a somewhat sophisticated concept 
to have you think about in 10 seconds. 
 
Dean Garfield: I'm willing to do it. I mean, it's intriguing. I'll actually 
have to read your dissertation to see how it all fits together. 
 
Me: You know, the whole idea of a trusted system doesn't presuppose 
that these systems are inherently in place.  That is to say, it suggests that 
the relationships build over time because of particular efforts coming 
from somebody who spearheads them.  And the suggestion in my 
dissertation is that it's really sort of the MPAA that wanted to create it, 
and that was based on what the RIAA had to deal with. That the MPAA 
was interested in producing more of a industrial-strength situation where 
they have the law on their side, but also they had technology on their 
side as well to enforce the system. 
 
Dean Garfield:  Yeah. I agree with that. I think it was-the one thing that 
I would say is when I transitioned from the RIAA to the MPAA, I took a 
lot of brain power with me in the sense that we'd just started to build a 
relationship with a group of outside technologists.  I took all of them to 
the MPAA. Kelly Truelove, who was really the brains behind a lot of 
this stuff, and Kelly, and Steve Fabrizio and I would spend hours and 
hours trying to figure this stuff out.  You know, and so early on the 
RIAA had this heavy emphasis on going after individuals, and one of the 
things that Kelly and I realized in the early years of the motion picture 
industry is that there were all these central servers involved. So we 
developed  a strategy around why sue the people if you can go after the 
servers and collapse these networks? And so we had that strategy, and it 
worked like magic.  (He laughs) And then Gnutella came on board, and 
it became decentralized and so that strategy-it became like that worked 
for the moment. And so, part of it was yes, we had, we wanted to have 
the law on our side, we wanted the technology on our side, but I think 
the other element that we wanted on our side was the people. And, you 
know, that took place over time. But I think me and Kelly realized that 
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that was an essential part of this, so, hence the heavy emphasis on 
education, on the motion picture side as opposed to the RIAA, which 
they got to as well. The heavy emphasis on building relationships with 
developers, from these software companies-so, you know, we just 
realized there was no silver bullet and that we had to engage in a 
strategic campaign that had multiple layers to it. But we did, and I think, 
overall, it proved to be fairly effective. And now, there are legitimate 
alternatives which we had in mind all along-they just had to be-you had 
to have legitimate alternatives so you could drive people to something-
not just drive them away.  
  
Me: One more question. There was one particular campaign that the 
MPAA put forth and I'm not sure if were you still there when the MPAA 
started to put faces on the folks that were dealing with piracy losses?  
I'm speaking specifically about the commercials that featured gaffers, 
and lighters and scenic designers- 
 
Dean Garfield: Yes. (Laughs) No, no-I was there.  
 
 Me:  Okay.  Because it seemed to me… that I have to ask you this 
because as someone who actually saw the commercial- and it's my 
understanding the folks that were being featured were being hurt by 
piracy- that- at least from an economic standpoint -and it was certainly 
being argued that these folks were losing- I'm not sure what they were 
losing. They were losing something in the commercial. But it seemed, 
when looking at it from an economic perspective, it was always my 
understanding that that the folks being featured were being paid on a per 
job or per day basis so I wasn't really understanding how they were 
losing money due to consumer piracy. And maybe that's something you 
can explain and help me understand or to clarify.  
 
Dean Garfield: (laughs) Yeah. I think the idea is- I can always try- I 
don’t know how good it will be because I didn't look at the book- 
(laughs). I think the idea is that everyone loses-you know so if there are 
less dollars coming in and your costs are remaining fairly constant, or 
going up, then you have to make cuts somewhere and you may make 
those cuts not in saying I'm going to not work with this particular 
gaveler or grip, but you'll say which is played out to be true, is, I will 
produce-and I think all the studios have done this- I will produce 12 
movies each year rather than 20. And so even though that grip may be 
working on a contractual per film basis, it just means that there are 8 less 
movies he or she can compete to work on.  So that's the economic 
argument. 
 
Me: And the argument is less output is due strictly to piracy, or are there 
other factors? 
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Dean Garfield: Oh sure there are. I mean, come on.  You have a minute 
to tell a story and that story is about piracy, so that's the story you tell.  
It's a lot more complicated than that cuz if you look at also public-what's 
the MPAA put out every year which the research group reported to me 
so I know this to be true that the cost of production was increasing, At 
the same time that the sector was being challenged so it wasn't just that 
we were losing money because fewer people were going to the theater-
that was true-but we were compounding it by paying actresses and 
actors otherwise spending more money to make each movie. We told a 
simple story, recognizing that was a lot more complex than that. But 
commercials are also partial truth. 
 
Me: I had to ask. 
 
Dean Garfield: No. No. It’s reasonable, it’s reasonable. Truth be told, 
internally a lot of folks (laughs) thought those commercials were kind of 
hokey and whenever you went to the theater and you saw it the reactions 
suggested that the general public thought they were a bit hokey, too.  
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Appendix Two: Transcription of Phone Interview with John Hurst 
 
June 2, 2010 
 
Me: Can you tell me what you were doing in Vegas at the convention? 
 
John Hurst: You know, our company develops software products and we 
also have this testing service for digital cinema equipment. Any of our 
customers are at the show because either booths at the tradeshow are 
part of the convention. 
 
Explains Showest: It's a film market. Are you familiar with this 
convention? 
So it's basically where the studios trot out their new releases in the 
theaters, get to see them, and get treated to some perks, and have some 
fun and ultimately decide which films they are going to have on their 
circuits. 
 
They do one show in Europe a year. IBC takes place in Amsterdam. It is 
the European version of the NAB.  
 
Me: So, is this an international digital standard that we’re talking about? 
 
John Hurst: Well, the parts that were published through the SMPTE and 
other standards bodies like ISO and the IETF (Internet Engineering Task 
Force)-those are all considered international-those are recognizable 
international national standards bodies. So to that extent, no standards 
are international standards. So the standard for, for example a digital 
cinema package which is what we called the movie in its distributable 
form, the standard for the key delivery message, those are international 
standards. But certain behaviors of equipment are simply specifications 
and requirements set forth by DCI and the way that those come into play 
is that if you want to be able to show a major studio a picture on your 
equipment, you have to use equipment that they accept. You can't just 
played back on any old piece of gear. There are quality and security 
requirements. In order to be able to meet that requirement, the 
equipment has to be able to do more than what is published in the 
international standards. The dividing line is really about behavior. The 
international standards cover what signal is going between machines or 
would cover how a machine would do a particular process, for instance 
color conversion. But when it comes to its business behavior, those 
kinds of bodies don't get into those issues at all and in fact they try to 
squeeze all sorts of business requirements out of the standard when they 
publish. So it's really DCI standing alone that’s stating these business 
requirements. 
 
Me: Can you explain (business behavior) to me a little bit more, please? 
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John Hurst: So, for example I mentioned in the last call this policy of 
"control lightly, audit tightly" which was adopted by DCI in response to 
exhibitor concern that a digital rights management system gave the 
studios too much control over the operational aspects of the theater such 
as moving a picture to a different screen, for example. So, DCI adopted 
this policy where except under very serious circumstances, the theaters 
are pretty much free to do whatever they want. So, that's the control 
lightly part. The audit tightly part is that the systems log everything but 
theater employees do in a secure and tamper proof way so that in the 
event that there's a dispute and a truck load of lawyers comes in, they 
have these logs that can be pulled from the equipment which because 
they are resistant to tamper and generally useful in figuring out precisely 
what happened. 
 
Me: So the auditing is technology independent-this is not someone 
manually doing this? 
 
John Hurst: Think of it like a black box. A flight recorder. Nobody looks 
into the flight recorder unless something bad happens. Forensically, 
retrospectively. So there is no use of the logs to deal with daily actuals 
and things like that. It is strictly a flight recorder. 
 
Me: John, you had mentioned this idea that when you were rolling out 
this program the studios wanted to control heavily. For instance, they 
want to control in which particular theaters or screens a film would play 
on. And owners couldn't- 
 
John: Well, there was a fear of exhibitors that they would do that. But I 
don't know the studios were publicly stated to do that. The exhibitors 
feared even if they didn't say it that the technological means of doing it 
should be removed. That they couldn't come up later. So, the road we’re 
down right now is examples of conditions that can't be allowed-where 
studios do want to exert control. So, in the realm of control lightly audit 
tightly, we have this list called "dark screen conditions" and these are 
conditions under which the movie should not play, or must not play. 
These are essentially business rules. DCI is saying that when conditions 
are present, you can't play the movie. It's not a matter of technology, or 
standards, or interface. That's just a business decision. So one of them is 
if the projector has filled up with logs and hasn't been emptied by the 
player, then the projector signals that it's not ready to play and the movie 
can’t play until the player has cleaned the logs out of the projector. 
Another example is a key delivery message outside of its validity carrier. 
So if it's not valid or has expired. They're about 10 or 11 of these things. 
Other examples of situations are when the content has obviously been 
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tampered with-you know, the studios don't want a perversion of the 
movie playing. 
 
Me: You know, you bring up an interesting idea here. We're talking 
about security concerns and I'm wondering who are the studios afraid of 
in terms of hacking, etc.? 
 
John: Well, let's say there was no encryption. In the case where there is 
no encryption the movie shows up on a standard hard disk. What's to 
prevent you from making a copy and taking it home? 
 
Me: Sure.  So the projectionists, perhaps. 
John: Sure. Projectionists, delivery carriers. One of the advantages of 
encryption is that physical deliveries can be handled through common 
mode couriers such as FedEx and UPS. Whereas, I'm not sure if you're 
familiar with the delivery of 35mm film? 35mm film is delivered by a 
bonded carrier. Right? And the reason is you don't want that 35mm print 
disappearing for however long it takes to telecine it. So in the case of the 
digital master, it's even more straightforward and lower cost-you don't 
even need specialized equipment to copy it. So there is already an 
increased risk and adding encryption eliminates that risk and also makes 
delivery cheaper by using common carriers, allowing you to use satellite 
broadcast without extra encryption, for example. Lots of ways it can be 
moved around now because it's really inaccessible to an unauthorized 
party. 
 
Me: Yeah. So that brings up-with this new system of distributing the 
film electronically-having it play on this very secure system- who are 
the studios afraid of now? Is there the possibility hackers getting into the 
film? 
 
John: Sure. In any security system, the primary benchmark of the system 
is the cost of implementing this system versus the cost of exploiting the 
system. So our goal here is to make it so expensive-we can’t make it 
impossible to hack, right? Any major government could crack the 
system, no problem. I'm sure the NSA could crack it in seconds flat. 
That's what they're there for. I'm a little less worried about the Russian 
mob. They have a lot of resources but they don't have tens of millions of 
dollars to spend on the kind of software to crack this. Their alternative is  
is to go camcord it.  
 
Me: Right. That's so much cheaper. 
 
John: The goal is to make it so expensive as to drive people to a cheaper 
way of doing it, which has its own remedies. One of the things you 
might not be aware of is that each media block as it decrypts the picture 
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and prepares it to go out to the projector puts an invisible forensic mark 
onto the picture which contains the time of day and the media block 
serial number. So camcords are now coming back, and the forensic 
people know the screen and the day and the time where that rip was 
taken. So, not only is it now fantastically expensive-I mean it's much 
more expensive-for example to imagine cracking a media block than it is 
to imagine stealing a 35mm print and getting the telecine out of it. You 
have to develop all sorts of customized electronics, for instance. It's a 
brutal task. So they're pushing it back towards camcordering it. The 
studios are fine with that. Because the quality is low and with the 
forensic marking it's easy to find screens are becoming popular with a 
particular crew. 
 
Me: So the only supposed-possible people who can crack into this are 
entities-could be large-scale governments-is that what you're saying? 
 
John: Very coarsely and crudely speaking, we can divide exploiting the 
system into two chunks: The first one is defeating the actual encryption 
algorithms, which is the part that's only within the domain of large 
governments. The second one is exploiting some operational aspect of 
the key management. So, for example I have a little subsection of an 
article but I'm writing for the SMPTE Journal entitled “How to Steal a 
Movie." The way you steal a movie is you convince someone who 
makes keys that you are the holder of a legitimate player, when in fact 
you are the holder of a software player in which you control the 
cryptography. If you can convince that body that you have a legitimate 
player, and you deserve to have keys then they'll merrily make keys and 
send them to you. And, so what you would do, for example-let's say that 
you discover a google plex around the corner from you and you're able 
to compromise an employee in there and so you generate the necessary 
cryptographic materials to pretend that you're a player. You figure out 
how that facility submits their cryptographic material to the upstream 
provider like Deluxe and Technicolor to make their keys, you slip your 
information in with the load-you remember when I talked about open 
keying last time? So, you slip your materials in there such that so that 
whenever Technicolor, for example, keys that site, they make a key for 
you. Then, all you have to do is be around when the disc shows up, 
make a copy, go home with it, you can pry it open on your software 
player, reencode it as DIVX and put it online as a pristine, 
unwatermarked copy. So the vetting of the cryptographic materials that 
comes from the theaters is obviously a really critical part. The business 
model, the business operations aspects of some of my Technicolor and 
Deluxe as far as making these keys?  They don’t want to be fooled into 
giving you a key for your software player. That would be bad. That 
would be a liability situation. So, one of the products my company sells 
is a KDM management server which is used by all these companies to 
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make the KDM’s that are sent to all these theaters. And our KDM server 
has cryptographic materials inside of it that represent all of the 
individual manufacturers, and so when we see materials coming in from 
theaters, we benchmark them against what we receive from the 
manufacturers, and if anything doesn’t match them we won’t make the 
KDM. So, as long as they are using those systems as advised by us, 
they’re not really susceptible to the attack I just described. And on the 
other hand, if someone gets lazy or doesn’t implement all the procedures 
that we advise, they can very easily be compromised by that attack.  
 
Me: John, you had mentioned you were writing an article currently?  
Who are you doing educational outreach for?  
 
John Hurst: I did a lot of consulting for one of the studios to explain to 
their executives, for example, every studio has an information 
processing system that they use to manage their releases. They know it’s 
the theaters it’s going to, and they have all this information that they use 
to get the right print to the right theater at the right time.   So, when they 
were looking at expanding their system to handle digital cinema, they 
needed to understand the IT artifacts of the Digital Cinema system, how 
it works, so I spent probably close to two years with one of the IT 
groups off and on explaining to them all the different pieces, and helping 
them bootstrap their own process for dealing with that.  So, the theaters, 
rather the studios for example they need to know –when they do a big 3-
D release? You need to know what kind of 3-D system is on the screen.  
The standards for 3-D are still evolving and so, in order to get the right 
print, you have to know what kind of glasses, and what kind of screen 
are being used because there are multiple prints available. And they have 
that in their database- otherwise they can’t book or order prints properly. 
So they had to understand that at a fairly deep level of detail in order to 
be able to implement the support for it in their system.  
 
Me: Will your company continue to be dealing exclusively with the 
security issues or do you see what perhaps might be going into the 3-D 
realm as well?  
 
John: 3-D is kind of a done deal for us. Our software products-the 
security aspect of our business is actually not our primary focus. 
Security is a necessary technology, but our primary focus to help people 
get from the digital intermediate which is the digital version of the film 
in post production as it’s completed-getting from that point to the 
exhibition screen.  So, you know, right now, with film, what they do to 
get to that point from exhibition is they take the digital intermediate, 
they put it into a laser recorder and strike a negative-actually, I think 
they strike is inter-positive now- and that goes to the film lab, gets 
duplicated, and that goes to shipping and its sent to all the screens and in 
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the case of digital cinema, we take the digital intermediate, we do some 
color processing on it in order to move it to the digital cinema color 
space,  encrypt it,  duplicate the volumes, send it to all the screens, then 
make all the keys for all the screens and send those out. Every step along 
the way with that we have either products or we’ve worked on standards 
or we’ve been involved in testing for DCI-somewhere along that entire 
chain we have something to say. 
 
Me: Are you all involved in film restoration? 
 
John: No. Film restoration is more like what a postproduction house 
would do. They would have the equipment to scan the film-they would 
have the necessary artists to do dirt and scratch removal. They would 
have the artists to do color rendering and when they are all done. They 
would have a digital intermediate. And, for them to get that to the 
theater, they need to go through a process that they can buy from a 
number of different companies including us and sometimes, if they’re 
really new to it, they buy training from us and we go in and spend half a 
day at the whiteboard explaining these different pieces. We don’t really 
work with any particular motion picture projects except really weird 
special things like-we had-one of our studio customers had a problem 
and called us in to take a look at the master because it wasn’t playing 
right on a particular player. So, that was about a particular project, but it 
had nothing to do artistically with a project. It was just a debugging 
within the mechanical gears that come between finishing it and seeing it 
on the screen in the actual theater.  
 
Me: Interoperability kinds of things. 
 
John: Exactly. 
Me: With all the security encryption that you’re dealing with, has it ever 
been an ironic situation where the amount of security that you’re dealing 
with on your end has been a problem or compromised your own 
productivity?  
 
John: Oh, sure. Encryption gets in the way.  That’s its nature. Just as a 
brief illumination on this, the purpose of the digital cinema package is to 
supplant 35mm film worldwide as the way high quality motion pictures 
are distributed. It’s intended to be as high-quality and as ubiquitous. You 
can strike a print in one place in the world and play it in another place in 
the world. The two sides don’t need to talk to each other-it’s just going 
to work. And you’ve seen with your experience with computers how file 
formats atrophy or they stop being supported after some time and so 
forth. And so it’s no small feat for us to try to attempt to come up with a 
file format that’s going to live for 20 years and is completely able to 
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play on any operating system, on any hardware platform, any intellectual 
property-that’s a really big deal for us. 
 
Me: 20 years? With technology being so ephemeral, that seems 
impossible. 
 
John: Not impossible. Bold. (Laughs) 
 
 Me: And why 20 years? Just the amount of expense and time it takes? 
 
John: It is fantastically expensive to change over what’s being 
distributed. It requires massive training, changes in workflow, all the 
way up and down the contribution pipeline-the next time we change, it 
will be easier because right now we’re changing from a physical system 
to electronic system and so that doubles the complexity. But the real--
one of the major threats to the ubiquity that we are searching for here is 
that something else would come along and take a share. That some other 
way of doing it would show up and people would say “Oh” and start 
doing that because it’s easier or cheaper or whatever. So, we work very 
hard- 
 
Me: How can that possibly happen if you’re the standard? 
 
John: India doesn’t care what Hollywood thinks about film distribution.  
India’s got an enormous distribution network and doing things with 
completely different standards. There is a whole world out there. It’s not  
gonna happen within the world of Hollywood, but I’m-it just can’t be. 
35mm is a planetary standard that everyone depends on. And we’re 
trying to do the same thing. So we try to engage our colleagues in Asia, 
and in Europe and in Oceana all the time because we need them to agree 
that this is the right thing to do, and so one of the reasons I’ve spent a 
bunch of time talking to Bob about this is this sort of thing needs to be 
taught in the schools. I can’t imagine someone getting out of film school 
and not knowing what a digital cinema package is. And I’ve worked 
with probably a half a dozen other educational institutions in Germany, 
and in San Diego, and in New England who are interested in doing 
digital cinema mastering for scientific or film department kinds of 
things. And I tell all of them: “Don’t use encryption (to finally get back 
to your original question.) Encryption costs money to use. It is 
inherently a block to the flow of information. And unless you have a 
financial interest in blocking the flow of information that equals or 
exceeds-maybe you have a  fiduciary interest-that equals or exceeds the 
cost of implementing encryption, and don’t touch the stuff because it’s 
going to ruin you.”  So when you ask what roadblocks does it throw up?  
Well, it throws up massive roadblocks and massive expenses but those 
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roadblocks and expenses are deemed insignificant compared to the 
losses of unauthorized copy that those expenses are piled up against. 
 
Me: Can you give me a specific example where maybe encryption code 
either prevented you from being able to move ahead, or maybe it was 
something that you created- 
 
John: Sure. One of our software products is a mastering system that you 
use to take your digital intermediate and produce an encrypted digital 
cinema package. And we’ve been selling that system for about five 
years. Like any software product, it had an alpha phase, and a beta 
phase, and then it finally reached mature stability. One of our very early 
customers of the system encrypted a feature for one of their customers, 
and they kept a copy in the archive but they didn’t keep a copy of the 
master encryption key that they used. So, they had an encrypted copy 
but they couldn’t decrypt it. The customer came to them and said, 
“We’ve lost our digital intermediate-we can’t make a new print of this 
film anymore-can you give us that DCP?” “Well, yeah, but we can’t 
decrypt it.”  So, fortunately we archive all of our certificate authority 
content and we were able to recover their key from our archives and 
decrypt and repackage that for them-that’s one of the special cases-we 
don’t normally do mastering projects but these guys needed us to help 
them because we have special expertise to help them recover something 
that they lost. 
 
Me: Was this particular business a major player, or smaller? 
 
John: It was one of the major studios.  Actually, maybe it was one of the 
boutique labels of one of the majors. 
 
Me: The main question that we haven’t talked about-you have the six 
studios involved in the standard-you said that they that they all have to 
be unanimous with these kinds of decisions. Is the MPAA involved at all 
in any of this? 
 
John: Nope.  The studios that comprise the MPAA are also the studios 
that comprise DCI. So, to the extent that those executive suites are in 
sync with each other the same basic interests are being upheld, but the 
bureaucracy of the MPAA went nowhere near digital cinema. 
 
Me: You talked about the standard that you’re working on with 
encryption being the standard for 20 years to come-is that what you’re 
saying, or are you talking about the delivery and-this is a 20 year long-
term plan? 
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John: Well the number “20” I threw off the top of my head as a number 
sufficiently far in the future- that in terms of stable computer file 
formats- it’s an impressive number. We would like to see it live longer, I 
mean, when studios archive film, their horizon for that asset is 100 
years. So, while it’s possible that the digital cinema package as we know 
it today won’t be in use in 100 years, it’s entirely possible there will be a 
desire to decode that package In order to forensically retrieve. Just as we 
do film restoration today-you may want to go back and it might be that 
the only way you can get a copy of a particular motion picture is through 
a digital cinema package. Whether it be encrypted or not. While the 
format that is sent to theaters may have a shorter life-we may change 
over to something else-nonetheless the knowledge of how to…. 
 
Me:  This is a really fascinating thing to me because in terms of home 
use of electronics and standards and digital rights management, 
standards have not lasted very long-the security encryption codes are 
usually broken but usually someone from like Norway or something like 
that. 
 
John: Well the government won’t protect the hardware. Try googling 
“trusted computing”- there was a push for a little while so that every 
motherboard that was in the personal computer had a little tamper 
responsive section in it. That section would be engaged in order to do 
things with copy protected content. And there’s still, I think a little bit of 
a dream in certain circles that such a thing could come to exist but it’s 
obviously a consumer-it’s so easy to confuse citizens with consumers-
isn’t it? It’s a disaster for citizens to have computer capacity with hidden 
remotely controllable features. 
 
 Me: That’s awful. It’s like discussions around selective output control. 
 
John: yep. It is. You have to look at it- I completely accept that these 
major studios-their corporations- so they are amoral beings in the first 
place-and their goal is to-a legal fiction cannot have morals. The people 
that work for it can. A corporation is a legal fiction. That is, a nonperson 
from my point of view- and it just does what it set out to do and they’re 
all set out to do-to exploit their catalogs and they’ve all learned that the 
best way to exploit their catalog is through controlled scarcity and so of 
course they’re going to pursue these measures-it’s their reason for 
living. So there’s a side of digital libertarianism that says it’s yeah well 
screw them I’m going to get access to my culture anyway but I take a 
more passive approach-if something is sold in a format that I don’t find 
acceptable to me, I just don’t buy it. You know, I still like buying music 
on CDs and rip them onto my Mac because I like the value proposition 
of the CD. The reason why I work on digital cinema is it has no fair use 
concepts whatsoever. I can ethically and morally do this all day and all 
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night because everybody knows precisely how bad they’re being 
screwed when they walk into the room. And I have no problem with 
that.  
 
Me: Where do you think the future of film is going in terms of 
exhibition? 
 
John: Well, it’s going to go all digital. And I tell you, I have a little 
crystal ball called the audio industry which tells me everything that’s 
going to happen in the motion picture industry. So-through the 90s-we 
started the 90s in the audio business with digital audio workstations 
being a real high ticket item. Very big money, very specialized, and very 
prone to cantankerous-ness. It took a lot of time and effort to use them. 
By the end of that decade, digital audio workstations were the way to do 
things for everybody. Everybody had moved their work over to them, 
except for those who were still enamored with the artistic benefits of 
analog. So, you take away the people who like analog for artistic reasons 
who comprise a hundredth of a percent of the analog tape market, and 
you look at the major users of analog tape which are broadcast and radio 
networks and governments and schools-the complete ascension of digital 
recording as cheap and reliable over the course of the 90s caused all 
those institutions to switch over to digital, and they stopped buying tape. 
And the economy of scale that made tape possible to produce dropped 
out, and while you had people left that wanted to buy tape, it was 
impossible to construct a business that could make it for the price that 
anyone would consider possible to pay. So, the same thing is going to 
happen in film. As the majors continue to increase distribution digitally, 
they’re going to be decreasing distribution on film. Institutional users, 
documentary shooters, small films-all of them are moving to digital 
formats because it’s cheaper. And all you’re going to be left with are 
people who need film for artistic reasons, and they’re going to be stuck 
in the same place. The economy of scale is going to drop out of the 
market because all the institutional users have gone away, and it will 
become financially infeasible to make film. So, I think that there’s more 
of a demand for it, and more money involved in it than there was for 
analog tape.  So, I think there will be boutique producers of film for 
many decades to come. But it will be outrageously expensive. Because 
the number of people willing to buy it and able to buy it will be a 
fraction of what it is even today. Deluxe and Technicolor know this-
they’ve been slashing and burning prices on prints. Kodak is completely 
freaking out because they see the loss of film as the loss of their blood. 
Film is completely dead.  It’s just a matter of time. 
 
Me: So, you talked about the future of film being digital-what about 
venues? Theaters have always been viable and will remain viable. That’s 
my opinion. Do you see the way in which we watch film as changing? 
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John: it’s a cultural question. I like to think that I can see those things, 
but my prognostications continually prove that I’m a market audience of 
one. (laughs). I like film in theaters. I think they’re fun. But I also think 
the only fun you can have is if the right crowd of people are around you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
